

DATE: 04-26-2006

CLASSIFIED BY 60309AUCTAM/MLT/CLS

REASON: 1.4 (C)


DECLASSIFY ON: 04-26-2031

~~SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

~~(SECRET,NOFORN,X1)~~

(SAAU)
other



~~(S)~~ The 11 September Hijacker Cell Model

February 2003

Classified by: FBI DAD/CT
Reason: 1.5(b)
Declassify on: X1

~~(SECRET,NOFORN,X1)~~

REQ. #36-1

000000024

~~SECRET~~



~~(S)~~ (SECRET,NOFORN,X1)

~~(S)~~ The 11 September Hijacker Cell Model

(U) EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

(U) Key Findings

~~(S)~~,NF) The 11 September hijackers successfully eluded the notice of US law enforcement and intelligence as they plotted to commandeer and use four airliners as weapons, but details of their lives and activities can be used to detect cells that may follow the 11 September hijackers' model. It should be noted, however, that the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center and the Millennium bombing plot—the previous two major international terrorist operations on US soil—used tactics that are different in key respects from the 11 September model, suggesting that future sleeper cells will use a variety of measures to conceal their activities.

- The 11 September hijackers were all Middle Eastern men between 20 and 33 years of age who wore a western style of dress and grooming.
- The hijackers entered the US legally and used either their true names or variations of their true names. Thirteen of the 19 hijackers traveled to the US in groups of two or three—four or the remaining six were the pilots.
- Once in the country, the hijackers obtained typical US identification—driver licenses, state identification cards, and commercially available documents—likely in order to avoid further use of their passports.
- The hijackers changed residences frequently.
- The hijackers' enrollment at US flight schools was not in itself necessarily uncommon, but their focus during simulation training on learning only the skills that would benefit their mission distinguished them from typical students.
- The hijackers opened bank accounts—often in pairs—with money either they brought legally into the US or wired from overseas.
- The hijackers largely avoided associating with radical Islamic groups in the US, likely in an effort to reduce the chances of detection by law enforcement.
- The hijackers' communications techniques—face-to-face meetings, prepaid phone cards, payphones, cell phones, the Internet, and possibly commercially available mailboxes—made it difficult to trace their operational communications.

DATE: 05-02-2006

CLASSIFIED BY 60309AUCTAM/MLT/CLS DUP TO 1100600, DATED 3/29/06

REASON: 1.4 (C)

CLASSIFY ON: 05-02-2031

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(S) The 11 September Hijacker Cell Model

(S//NF) Al-Qa'ida leaders and key 11 September plotters such as Usama Bin Ladin, Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM), and Ayman al-Zawahiri probably have derived lessons from the activities and experiences of the 11 September hijackers and may be relying on them to plan future attacks against the US.

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- The 11 September plot was at least two years in the making. [redacted] al-Qa'ida operative calling [redacted] claimed in a videotaped interview in June 2002 that al-Qa'ida sent a reconnaissance team to the US two years before the 11 September operation. We have no information to confirm that this reconnaissance operation occurred or that it can be tied to the 11 September attacks, but it is consistent with al-Qa'ida tradecraft that calls for long and detailed planning for major operations.
- Al-Qa'ida has lost its camps in Afghanistan where the plot was largely honed and the hijackers were trained, but between 10,000-20,000 potential terrorists trained in the camps and al-Qa'ida's networks in countries such as Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Indonesia leave it with an ample pool of potential recruits for future attacks.

(U) Snapshot of the Hijackers

(LES) Al-Qa'ida's criteria in choosing the 11 September hijackers is unknown, but one of the most important factors probably was their ability to not arouse suspicion from US or foreign intelligence and law enforcement services.

- The hijackers used Western-style clothing and grooming once in the US.
- The hijackers were all Middle Eastern men between 20 and 33 years of age. Many of them spent time in Afghanistan in either late 1999 or 2000, according to a variety of reporting.
- Personal connections and family ties among the hijackers also may have been important; among the 19 were two sets of brothers—Waled and Wa'il al-Shehri and Nawaf and Salim al-Hazmi—and other sub-groupings in which individuals appear to have known each other for years before the plot.

(U) How They Entered the US

(LES) The hijackers entered the US legally on valid visas—15 on B1 tourist visas, three on B2 business visas, and one on a F1 student visa—using their true names.

- Thirteen of the 19 hijackers traveled to the US in groups of two or three—the four pilots, Mohamed Atta, Marwan al-Shehhi, Hani Hanjour, and Ziad Jarrah are notable exceptions.

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~~(SECRET,NOFORN,X1)~~

- The hijackers arrived in the US on eight different airlines: United, Delta, Virgin Atlantic, Swiss Air, Sabena, Ceskoslovski Air, Condor, and Saudi Airlines. Their flights departed from Brussels, Frankfurt, London, Bangkok, Zurich, Riyadh, Paris, and Prague, and they arrived in Newark, Atlanta, San Diego, Orlando, Miami, Washington-Dulles, New York-JFK, and Los Angeles.
- The four pilots acquired their travel documents—passports from Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirate (UAE), and Egypt, and visas issued in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia; Dubai, UAE; and Berlin, Germany—between one and five months before entering the US. The other hijackers acquired their documents—Saudi and UAE passports with visas issued mostly in Jeddah and Riyadh—from several months to more than a year before entering the US.
- Most of the hijackers reported their previous passports as lost or stolen and received new ones that revealed no travel to Afghanistan—a potential “red flag” that might have invited scrutiny even prior to 11 September.

(U) Where They Lived and What They Drove

(LES) The hijackers' choices for living arrangements and cars were nondescript and likely would not have in themselves raised suspicion.

- The hijackers usually lived in small groups of two to five and routinely moved between cheap motels and apartments. The pilots maintained relatively stable residence during their flight training, obtaining apartments for approximately six months.
- They owned four older non-descript vehicles: Nawaf al-Hazmi's 1988 Toyota Corolla, Jarrah's 1990 Mitsubishi Eclipse, Waleed al-Shehri's 1993 Dodge Colt and Atta's 1989 Pontiac Gran Prix. The hijackers also rented a variety of vehicles 27 times from several companies, including Enterprise, Budget, and Alamo.

(U) Identification Used

(LES) Many of the hijackers obtained identification cards or driver licenses to use instead of their passports, which would have called attention to them as foreigners.

- Eight hijackers obtained driver licenses from Arizona, California, and Florida, 16 obtained state identification cards from Florida and Virginia, and seven obtained commercially available ID cards. None had social security numbers.
- At least two hijackers requested duplicate Florida driver licenses, and both Atta and al-Shehhi requested replacement pilot licenses, leaving open the possibility that al-Qa'ida forgers received the originals or duplicates and can try to reproduce these items.



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(LES) Mohamed Atta in Germany: His Conduct Before Coming to the US

(LES) As an expatriate in Europe, Atta behaved much like the typical budding jihadist. It was only after he apparently was tapped for his mission—perhaps spotted and selected because of this behavior—and returned from Afghanistan that he began observing strict operational security practices.

- Prior to early February 2000, Atta and his associates in Hamburg—including 11 September pilots Marwan al-Shehhi and Ziad Jarrah—were known to wear beards and Arab-style dress, attended a mosque known for extremists views, and openly associated with radical figures—all acts that contradict recommendations in al-Qa'ida training manuals not to behave in ways that would attract law enforcement attention.
- After defending his thesis in October 1999, Atta left for Afghanistan and Pakistan in late November and returned to Hamburg in late February 2000, where he no longer appeared to be outwardly radical, according to law enforcement and intelligence reporting. He did not wear a beard or Arab-style dress and generally blended into the Western world. Shortly thereafter, Atta applied for a new passport—apparently both to disguise his travel to Afghanistan and to acquire a new photograph—made inquiries to US flight schools, received a US visa, and spread word to family and friends that he was leaving Germany to continue his education.

(U) Flight Schools

(LES) The hijackers enrollment at multiple US flight schools was not in itself uncommon, but their focus on learning only the skills that would benefit their mission—such as Atta and al-Shehhi requesting advanced jet flight training that focused on approaches and turns but not on take-offs and landings—made them stand-out.

- Between June 2000 and September 2001, Atta, al-Shehhi, and Jarrah took flying classes, underwent flight simulator training, and flew test flights in at least eight facilities in Florida and Georgia. Atta and al-Shehhi also visited the Airman Flight School in Oklahoma.
- Hanjour attended three flight schools in Arizona and California between 1996 and 1999. After returning to the US in December 2000, he took jet simulator lessons in Arizona and rented planes from at least five other facilities in Arizona, New Jersey, and Maryland.
- Two other hijackers briefly took introductory flying lessons in San Diego in spring of 2000, but neither sought further flight training.



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(U) Banking in the US

(LES) The hijackers financed their operation with money electronically transferred from overseas as well as with cash and traveler checks they carried—and declared—when they entered the US. They opened US bank accounts and used them legally, but they favored an unusual practice of sharing accounts between unrelated members. None of the hijackers worked to supplement this funding.

- The hijackers, often in pairs, used 24 bank accounts from branch banks belonging to Sun Trust, Hudson United, First Union, Bank of America, and Dime Savings.
- As the operation drew near, the hijackers closed the majority of their bank accounts and wired most of the remaining money overseas through Western Union stations at bus terminals and grocery stores.

(U) How They Communicated


(LES) The hijackers favored communications techniques designed to make operational discussions difficult to trace.

- They used pre-paid calling cards combined with payphones to make operational telephone calls to conspirators in the US as well as the Middle East and Germany, according to law enforcement information. They used cell phones to receive operational calls.
- They apparently reserved their most sensitive planning discussions for face-to-face meetings, which likely were held three times in 2001; Germany in January, Spain in July, and Las Vegas in mid-August.
- At least nine hijackers used post office mailboxes from such places as Mail Boxes Etc and Mail Depot, possibly to receive regular mail and to help establish residence.

(U) Businesses They Frequented

(LES) Besides rental car businesses and commercially available post office boxes, the hijackers also frequented several other businesses.

- Many of the hijackers worked out at gyms—possibly to help prepare them for subduing passengers in taking over the airliners.
- They used Kinkos for photocopying unknown materials and for computer rentals.
- Marwan al-Shehhi also visited several bars during his stay in the US and along with Hamza al-Gamdi twice in July 2001 purchased a large amount of pornography—\$250, and \$183 worth—from a Video Outlet store in Florida.



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(U) Secondary Missions and Travel

(LES) Besides completing their primary missions, the hijackers also may have scouted for follow-on attacks or secondary targets.

- According to unconfirmed information, Mohamed Atta may have visited the Hoover Dam in August 2001. Atta possibly had time for such a trip during his visits to Las Vegas.
- Marwan al-Shehhi, possibly accompanied by Atta, rented a camcorder in June on the day Atta began a weeklong trip through Boston, San Francisco, Las Vegas, and New York, returning it two days after Atta flew back to Florida. The tape has never been recovered.
- Atta and al-Shehhi twice briefly stayed in Virginia Beach and traveled to Norfolk, Virginia, raising the possibility that the two cased local military facilities.
- Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hamzi lived in San Diego for six months and a full year respectively, giving them ample time and opportunity to case military facilities throughout southern California.
- Satam al-Suqami possibly scouted Disney World as a target when he stayed at the Doubletree Hotel—a far more expensive choice than the hijackers' normal accommodations—at Walt Disney World from 10-12 July 2001.
- According to unconfirmed law enforcement information, Atta inquired about crop dusters in February 2001, even after he had trained on a jet simulator, according to a variety of reporting.

(U) Rituals

(LES) While the hijackers made a special effort to blend in and conceal their jihadist zeal, this mask cracked in the closing days of their mission.

- A maid at the Days Inn in Boston where the Flight 175 hijackers stayed the night before the attack reported finding a large amount of body hair in the room, all of the rooms' lotion used—possibly to aid the shaving—and that they had only slept on top of their beds.
- Copies of the same letter were recovered from the hijackers' belongings that detailed steps and prayers that were to be followed before the attacks.



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(LES) Annex A: [redacted] the 11 September Hijackers' Operational Tradecraft

(LES) There are some similarities between the 1993 World Trade Center (WTC) bombers [redacted] the 11 September hijackers, but there also are key differences that make it difficult to establish a single pattern that sleeper cells in the US likely would follow.

(LES) Key operational characteristics common to the 1993 and 2001 plotters include:

- Some of the conspirators from both plots arrived in the US at least six months prior to the attacks—in some cases, more than a year—and members focused their time and energy in preparing for the attacks.
- Some members of each plot used shared bank accounts.
- The key leaders of both plots—[redacted] the 11 September pilots—shared a variety of personal characteristics. They had broad exposure to the West—[redacted] three of the four pilots studied in Western Europe and had technical backgrounds—spoke workable English, were in their 20s or early 30s, and hailed from affluent families.

(LES) Key operational differences include:

- [redacted] traveled together from Pakistan and used false names and documents to enter to the US, while all 19 hijackers used their true names, legitimate passports, and secured visas to enter the country.
- [redacted] four passports and three different names to enter, operate, and exit the US, while the hijackers acquired legitimate forms of identification, such as driver's licenses and state identification cards in their true name.
- [redacted] a local network of childhood friends and individuals introduced to him by others after his arrival in the US to carry out his attack. Most had no significant training and indoctrination, and one conspirator was brought into the plot two weeks before the attack. Conversely, the hijackers relied mainly on experienced, well-trained manpower from abroad and did not bring unknown individuals into their plot after arriving in the US.
- The 1993 conspirators frequently made overseas phone calls from their residences, while the hijackers relied on prepaid cell phones, calling cards, and Internet cafes to communicate abroad. [redacted] a personal computer, but the hijackers are not known to have owned laptop or desktop computers or any electronic data storage media.



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(LES) Annex B: [redacted] the 11 September Hijackers' Tactics in the US: More Contrasts in Tradecraft

(LES) There are few similarities between [redacted]
[redacted] the 11 September hijackers.

- [redacted]
[redacted] the 11 September hijackers exclusive use of legitimate documentation.
- [redacted]
[redacted] The 11 September plotters sought no special immigration status.
- Although [redacted]
[redacted] The 11 September pilots all spoke workable English.
- In contrast to the 11 September hijackers [redacted]
[redacted] conducted surveillance or route rehearsals to the US, other than with a map.
- In his debriefings [redacted]
[redacted] The 11 September hijackers used legitimate US bank accounts and either legally brought money to the US or had it electronically sent from the Middle East to their accounts.
- Like the 11 September hijackers [redacted] practiced operational security in communicating with his associates, although not as well. [redacted] multiple pre-paid calling cards and several different pay phones, but used a cellular phone to leave messages at the local mosque for associates to meet him there.



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(U) Annex C: List of Hijackers and Planes

American Airlines Flight 11

Departed Boston—Crashed into the north tower of the World Trade Center
76 passengers and 11 crew

Mohamed Atta
Satam al-Suqami
Waled al-Shehri
Wa'il al-Shehri
Abdulaziz al-Omari

United Airlines Flight 175

Departed Boston—Crashed into the south tower of the World Trade Center
51 passengers and nine crew

Marwan al-Shehhi
Fayez Banihammad
Ahmed al-Ghamdi
Hamza al-Gamdi
Mohand al-Shehri

American Airlines Flight 77

Departed Washington Dulles—Crashed into the Pentagon
53 passengers and six crew

Hani Hanjour
Khalid al-Mihdhar
Majed Moqed
Nawaf al-Hazmi
Salem al-Hazmi

United Airlines Flight 93

Departed Newark—Crashed near Stony Creek Township, Pennsylvania
33 passengers and seven crew

Ziad Jarrah
Saeed al-Ghamdi
Ahmed al-Haznawi
Ahmed al-Nami

DATE: 05-11-2006

(Rec'd 08-28-2009)

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REASON: 1.4 (C)

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

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b7D
b2

Precedence: IMMEDIATE

Date: 04/02/2003

To: Counterterrorism

Attn: ITOS, CONUS 1, Team 4

SSA

IOS

General Counsel

Chief, NSLU

From: Los Angeles

CT-5

Contact: SA

Approved By:

Drafted By:

er

Case ID #:

~~(S)~~

Title: ~~(S)~~

~~48)~~

ABDULAZIZ AL-ROOMI;
IT-UBL/AL-QAEDA;

Synopsis:

~~(X)~~

~~Derived From : G-3
Declassify On: X1~~

Enclosure(s) : ~~(2)~~ Enclosed is a

~~Administrative:~~ (S//NF,OC) This document is classified "~~SECRET~~" in its entirety unless otherwise noted.

~~SECRET//NOFORN//ORCON~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN/ORCON~~

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To: Counterterrorism From: Los Angeles
Re: ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED] 04/02/2003

(S)

[REDACTED] (S)

[REDACTED] (S)

[REDACTED] (S)

[REDACTED] (S)

LEAD ~~(S)~~:

Set Lead 1 : (Action)
COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

(S) FBIHQ is requested to disseminate enclosed
information to the National Security Law Unit and subsequent
units related [REDACTED]

(S)

Set Lead 2: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

(S) For SSA [REDACTED] Review investigation
for preparation of [REDACTED]

(S)

♦♦

~~SECRET//NOFORN/ORCON~~

DATE: 04-07-2006
CLASSIFIED BY 60309AUCTAM/MLT/LR2
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 04-07-2031
(Rev. 10-07-1999)

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 11/20/2002

To: Los Angeles

From: Los Angeles

CT-5

Contact: SA [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

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Drafted By: [REDACTED]

Case ID #: ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED] (S)

Title: ~~(S)~~ FAHAD AL-THUMAIRY;
IT-UBL/AL QAEDA

Synopsis: ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED] (S)

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~~(S)~~

~~Classified By: G3~~
~~Declassify On: X1~~

(U) [REDACTED] (S)

Attachment(s): ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED] (S)

Details: ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED] (S)

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(S) [REDACTED]

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ON 04-26-2006

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Page 1

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 09/24/2002

To: Counterterrorism

Attn: SSA [REDACTED]
UBLU

Kansas City

SSA [REDACTED]

From: San Diego
Squad 15
Contact: [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

Case ID #: (S) 199N-SD-64992 (Pending)

Title: (S) JAY STEVEN BARLOW, [REDACTED]
IT-UBL/AL-QAEDA;
OO:SD

Synopsis: (S) Requesting SAC Kansas City approval for San Diego agents [REDACTED] FBI, and [REDACTED] NCIS, JTTF, to travel to Kansas City on 09/30/2002 and interview [REDACTED] Requesting Kansas City to open 199 investigations on [REDACTED]

~~(S)~~ Derived From: G-1
Declassify On: X1

(S) Full Field Investigation Instituted: 09/11/2002

Details: (S) On June 16, 2002, FBI, JTTF, San Diego opened captioned investigation as a 265A investigation (265A-SD-64723), as a result of information obtain through Penttbomb investigation, (265A-NY-280350). The classification changed to assess the connections between former United States Navy members, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] two of the Flight 77 hijackers Nawaf Al-Hazmi and Khalid Al-Mihdhar.

~~(S)~~ During the period of April through September 2000, [REDACTED]

This apartment was the same apartment of the four individuals in [REDACTED]

Case ID : 315N-SD-64992
315-KC-C71504

Serial : 2
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San Diego who were arrested on Material Witness Warrants issued out of New York. It should be noted that Nawaf Al-Hazmi and Khalid Al-Mihdhar had close association to this same apartment. The San Diego individuals arrested on the Material Witness warrants were: [REDACTED]

(X) During the investigation of [REDACTED] (265A-SD-64663), [REDACTED] told New York agents that an individual known to him as FNU [REDACTED] who was an American in the United States Navy, resided in the apartment with [REDACTED] and his roommates. This is the same apartment where [REDACTED] introduced Nawaf Al-Hazmi and Khalid Al-Mihdhar to all his roommates residing at the apartment. [REDACTED] San Diego awaiting sentencing in October 2002, for making false statements on his I.N.S. asylum documents.

(X) The former United States Navy Personnel were subsequently identified [REDACTED]

(X) In June 2002, [REDACTED] was interviewed and stated that two Americans known to him as [REDACTED] LNU, and [REDACTED] LNU, resided with [REDACTED] his Muslim roommates [REDACTED] San Diego awaiting an I.N.S. deportation hearing. [REDACTED] was later identified as [REDACTED] was identified as [REDACTED]

(X) On May 15, 2002, [REDACTED] was interviewed at his residence in Kansas City, Missouri, and admitted previously residing at the [REDACTED] while he was [REDACTED] While residing in San Diego, [REDACTED] attended several Mosques and became acquainted with several foreign nationals. In March of 2000, [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] continuously resided there until [REDACTED] His address was unknown until a recent check with the United States Customs Service which revealed that [REDACTED] had arrived at the [REDACTED]

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Page 6

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Eyes: Blue

Address: Currently residing with [REDACTED]

Address on CDL: [REDACTED]

LEAD ~~(S)~~:

Set Lead 1: (Adm)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT FBIHQ

~~(S)~~ Read and Clear.

Set Lead 2:

KANSAS CITY

AT KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI

~~(S)~~ Requesting 199 investigation to be opened and assigned to Kansas City for [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED BY 60309autam/mlt/lr2
ON 03-23-2006

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0-93 (Rev. 9-1-97)

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATION MESSAGE FORM

TRANSMIT VIA:

☒ TeletypeDate 9/17/2003

PRECEDENCE:

☐ Immediate
☒ Priority
☐ Routine

CLASSIFICATION:

☐ TOP SECRET
☒ SECRET
☐ CONFIDENTIAL
☐ UNCLAS E F T O
☐ UNCLAS

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 US CAPITOL POLICE WASHINGTON DC//PRIORITY/
 US CUSTOMS SERVICE WASHINGTON DC//HQ INTEL//PRIORITY/
 HQ BICE INTEL WASHINGTON DC//ICLU//PRIORITY/
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 JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J3/J3DDAT-FP//PRIORITY/
 USSTRATCOM OFFUTT AFB NE//CS551//PRIORITY/
 USCINCSOC FP MACDILL AFB FL//SOIO-IN/SOJICC/SOIO-J/SOIO-W//
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MRI/JUL _____

Transmitted _____

ISN: _____

DTG: _____

REQ 5-9a

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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
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COMMUNICATION MESSAGE FORM

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LEGAT LONDON/PRIORITY/
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COUNTRY: (U) UNITED STATES/UNITED KINGDOM/SAUDI ARABIA
SERIAL: (U) TRRS-03-09-1718
SUBJ: (S//NF,OC) IIR: INTERVIEW OF OMAR AHMED MUSTAFA AL-BAYOUMI
REPORT CLASS SECRET NOFORN ORCON

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

DOI: (U) MID-AUGUST 2003
SOURCE: (S) AN OFFICER OF THIS AGENCY.
WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED
INTELLIGENCE.
TEXT: 1. (S//NF,OC) (FBI COMMENT: THE FOLLOWING IS AN EXCERPT
OF AN INTERVIEW CONDUCTED WITH OMAR AL-BAYOUMI. THE TEXT HAS
BEEN SUMMARIZED FOR BREVITY, BUT NO SUBSTANTIVE CHANGES HAVE BEEN
MADE TO THE INFORMATION.) SAUDI NATIONAL []

[] WAS INTERVIEWED IN RIYADH, SAUDI
ARABIA. AL-BAYOUMI HAS WORKED FOR THE SAUDI ARABIAN PRESIDENCY
OF CIVIL AVIATION (PCA) FOR APPROXIMATELY 27 YEARS, AND CURRENTLY
WORKS IN THE FINANCE/BUDGET DEPARTMENT. IN APPROXIMATELY 1995,
[]

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[REDACTED]

KHALID AND NAWAF, AND STATED THAT THEY WERE FROM SAUDI ARABIA AND ARRIVED IN THE UNITED STATES APPROXIMATELY ONE MONTH PRIOR TO STUDY ENGLISH. (FBI COMMENT: KHALID AND NAWAF ARE IDENTIFIABLE WITH 9/11 HIJACKERS KHALID AL-MIHDHAR AND NAWAF AL-HAZMI.)

8. (P/NF,OC) NEITHER KHALID NOR NAWAF MENTIONED WHERE THEY RESIDED IN LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA, BUT THEY POSSIBLY SPOKE OF PLANS TO TRAVEL TO SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA. [REDACTED] KHALID AND NAWAF THAT HE LIVED NEAR THE MOSQUE IN SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA, AND THAT THEY COULD CONTACT HIM IF EVER IN SAN DIEGO. [REDACTED] DID NOT RECALL IF HE PROVIDED HIS TELEPHONE NUMBER DURING THE CONVERSATION, WHICH LASTED APPROXIMATELY FIVE MINUTES.

9. (P/NF,OC) PRIOR TO THEIR MEETING IN THE RESTAURANT, [REDACTED] [REDACTED] HAD NEVER SEEN NOR HEARD OF KHALID AL-MIHDHAR OR NAWAF AL-HAZMI. [REDACTED] WAS NOT INTRODUCED TO KHALID AND NAWAF BY ANY OTHER INDIVIDUAL, AND HE JUST HAPPENED TO MEET THEM IN THE RESTAURANT. [REDACTED] WAS NOT INSTRUCTED TO VISIT THAT SPECIFIC RESTAURANT ON THAT DAY, NOR WAS HE INSTRUCTED TO MEET KHALID AND NAWAF IN LOS ANGELES.

X

[REDACTED]

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THE KING FAHAD MOSQUE [REDACTED]

11. (S//NF,OC) [REDACTED] IDENTIFIED [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] AT THE KING FAHAD MOSQUE, BUT DENIED KNOWING [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] WAS EMPLOYED AT THE SAUDI CONSULATE IN LOS ANGELES [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] DID NOT SEE NOR TALK [REDACTED] ON THE DAY THAT [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] TRAVELED TO THE CONSULATE IN LOS ANGELES.

12. (S//NF,OC) LESS THAN ONE WEEK AFTER THE TRIP TO LOS ANGELES, KHALID AND NAWAF ARRIVED AT THE ISLAMIC CENTER OF SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA, (ICSD) AND ASKED THE IMAM IF [REDACTED] WAS AVAILABLE. THE IMAM RESPONDED THAT [REDACTED] WOULD BE IN LATER TO PRAY. [REDACTED] DID NOT RECALL IF HE MET KHALID AND NAWAF AT THE MOSQUE OR AT THE APARTMENT COMPLEX LATER THAT DAY, NOR COULD HE RECALL THE EXACT DATE THAT KHALID AND NAWAF ARRIVED AT THE MOSQUE. WHEN THEY DID MEET, KHALID AND NAWAF TOLD [REDACTED] THAT THEY WERE LOOKING TO RENT AN APARTMENT IN THE AREA NEAR THE MOSQUE.

13. (S//NF,OC) [REDACTED] KHALID AND NAWAF TO THE MANAGEMENT OFFICE OF AN IDENTIFIED APARTMENT COMPLEX, AT WHICH [REDACTED] KHALID AND NAWAF IN FILLING OUT AN APARTMENT RENTAL APPLICATION DUE TO THEIR POOR ENGLISH SKILLS. AT THE DIRECTION OF THE MANAGER, [REDACTED] THE APPLICATION AND ALSO THE NAME OF HIS FRIEND LUWAM (NFI) AS A REFERENCE. THE MANAGER INSTRUCTED [REDACTED] AS A REFERENCE BECAUSE [REDACTED] HAD RESIDED AT THE IDENTIFIED APARTMENT COMPLEX APARTMENTS FOR AN EXTENDED PERIOD OF TIME. [REDACTED] THE RENTAL APPLICATIONS IN THE NAMES OF KHALID, NAWAF, AND HIMSELF, AND LISTED HIS OWN ADDRESS AS THE PREVIOUS RESIDENCE OF BOTH KHALID AND NAWAF EVEN THOUGH THEY HAD NEVER LIVED THERE. KHALID AND NAWAF EACH SIGNED THEIR OWN SIGNATURES ON THE APPLICATIONS, [REDACTED] ON THE APPLICATION [REDACTED]

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14. (S//NF,OC) [REDACTED] READ THE TERMS OF AGREEMENT TO SIGNING AS THE GUARANTOR, BUT DID SO TO HELP OUT KHALID AND NAWAF AS NEWCOMERS TO THE COMMUNITY. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] COMMON PRACTICE IN THEIR COMMUNITY AND IN THE MOSQUE IS TO ASSIST INDIVIDUALS NEW TO THE AREA. WHEN AL-BAYOUMI FIRST MOVED TO SAN DIEGO, AN INDIVIDUAL NAMED [REDACTED] (NFI) HAD ASSISTED HIM IN OBTAINING AN APARTMENT RENTAL, [REDACTED] THEREFORE DID THE SAME FOR KHALID AND NAWAF. OTHER THAN KHALID AND NAWAF, [REDACTED] DID NOT RECALL ASSISTING ANY OTHER INDIVIDUALS IN OBTAINING AN APARTMENT RENTAL.

15. (S//NF,OC) KHALID AND NAWAF ATTEMPTED TO PAY CASH FOR THEIR RENT AND SECURITY DEPOSIT, BUT THE MANAGEMENT OFFICE WOULD NOT ACCEPT CASH PAYMENT. AFTER THE MANAGER ADVISED THAT THEY NEEDED TO OPEN A BANK ACCOUNT, [REDACTED] ASSIST THEM IN DOING SO. [REDACTED] KHALID AND NAWAF TO A LOCAL BRANCH OF AN IDENTIFIED U.S. FINANCIAL INSTITUTION WHERE [REDACTED] AN EXISTING ACCOUNT. KHALID AND NAWAF OPENED A BANK ACCOUNT WITH A LARGE AMOUNT OF CASH. [REDACTED] DID NOT KNOW THE EXACT AMOUNT OF CASH THAT KHALID AND NAWAF POSSESSED, BUT BELIEVED IT MAY HAVE BEEN BETWEEN U.S.\$4000 AND \$8000.

16. (S//NF,OC) KHALID AND NAWAF ALSO NEEDED A BANK CHECK TO PAY FOR THEIR RENT AND SECURITY DEPOSIT AT THE IDENTIFIED APARTMENT COMPLEX. THE BANK TELLER INFORMED THEM THAT THEY COULD NOT OBTAIN A BANK CHECK AS NEW CUSTOMERS WHO HAD NO CREDIT HISTORY. THE TELLER SUGGESTED THAT THEY DEPOSIT CASH INTO [REDACTED] ACCOUNT AND DRAW THE CHECK FROM THAT ACCOUNT. UPON OBTAINING THE CHECK [REDACTED] ACCOUNT, KHALID AND NAWAF IMMEDIATELY PROVIDED [REDACTED] THE SAME AMOUNT OF CASH AND [REDACTED] DEPOSITED THE MONEY INTO HIS ACCOUNT. [REDACTED] DID NOT RECALL IF HE ACCOMPANIED KHALID AND NAWAF BACK TO THE MANAGER'S OFFICE WHEN THEY SUBMITTED THE CHECK.

17. (S//NF,OC) [REDACTED] NEVER PAID RENT OR PROVIDED MONEY TO EITHER KHALID OR NAWAF, AND KHALID AND NAWAF DID NOT STAY [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] AT ANY TIME. [REDACTED] DID NOT KNOW IF THEY STAYED ANYWHERE ELSE IN SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA, BEFORE MOVING INTO THEIR OWN APARTMENT. A SYRIAN INDIVIDUAL NAMED [REDACTED] (PHONETIC, NFI) OWNED A RECREATIONAL VEHICLE (RV) WHICH HE KEPT IN THE PARKING LOT OF THE ISLAMIC CENTER OF SAN DIEGO (ICSD), BUT [REDACTED] DID NOT HAVE KNOWLEDGE OF EITHER KHALID OR NAWAF EVER STAYING IN THE RV. KHALID AND NAWAF HAD MET [REDACTED] WHO [REDACTED] DESCRIBED AS HAVING SOME MENTAL PROBLEMS, AT THE MOSQUE. 18. (S//NF,OC) APPROXIMATELY TWO TO FOUR DAYS AFTER KHALID AND NAWAF MOVED INTO THE IDENTIFIED APARTMENT COMPLEX, [REDACTED] PLANNING A DINNER IN HONOR OF A SHEIKH (NFI) FROM NORWAY WHO HAD LECTURED AND PROVIDED HIS SERVICES AT THE MOSQUE DURING RAMADAN. THE SHEIKH WAS KNOWN BY THE KURDISH MEMBERS OF THE MOSQUE AND VISITED THE MOSQUE FOR TWO CONSECUTIVE YEARS. [REDACTED] PLANNED ON HOLDING THE DINNER AT THE MOSQUE, BUT OTHERS FELT THAT THE MOSQUE WAS IN AN INCONVENIENT LOCATION. [REDACTED] DECIDED TO HOLD THE DINNER AT THE IDENTIFIED APARTMENT COMPLEX. BECAUSE THE FEMALE GUESTS WOULD BE IN HIS OWN APARTMENT [REDACTED] KHALID AND NAWAF IF THE MALE GUESTS COULD CONGREGATE IN THEIR APARTMENT BECAUSE THERE WAS EMPTY SPACE AND NO FURNITURE IN THEIR APARTMENT. KHALID AND NAWAF AGREED. 19. (S//NF) DURING THE DINNER, KHALID AND NAWAF STAYED IN THE BACK ROOM OF THEIR APARTMENT DESPITE INVITATIONS TO SIT WITH THE OTHER INDIVIDUALS IN ATTENDANCE. ALTHOUGH THEY STAYED IN THE BACK ROOM, KHALID AND NAWAF DID CONVERSE WITH OTHER INDIVIDUALS WHO CIRCULATED THROUGHOUT THE APARTMENT. AN INDIVIDUAL (NFI) WHO HAD LED PRAYERS AT THE MOSQUE AND WHO WAS RETURNING HOME WAS PRESENTED WITH A PLAQUE DURING THE DINNER. [REDACTED] PRESENTED WITH A PLAQUE [REDACTED] IN APPRECIATION OF [REDACTED] WITH HIS STUDIES. THE SHEIKH DID NOT RECEIVE A PLAQUE BECAUSE HE HAD BEEN PROVIDED A SALARY IN RETURN FOR HIS SERVICES. THE DINNER IN HONOR OF THE SHEIKH WAS THE ONLY DINNER HELD AT KHALID AND NAWAF'S APARTMENT AND THE ONLY DINNER HELD BY

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[REDACTED] THE TIME THAT KHALID AND NAWAF LIVED AT THE IDENTIFIED APARTMENT COMPLEX. [REDACTED] ANY KIND OF "WELCOMING" PARTY IN HONOR OF KHALID AND NAWAF. THE DINNER WAS VIDEOTAPED WITH [REDACTED] VIDEO CAMERA, BUT SOME INDIVIDUALS DID NOT WANT TO APPEAR ON THE VIDEOTAPE.

20. ~~(S//NF,OC)~~ [REDACTED] RECALLED THAT KHALID AND NAWAF SUBMITTED A NOTICE-TO-VACATE FORM SHORTLY AFTER MOVING IN TO THE IDENTIFIED APARTMENT COMPLEX BECAUSE THEY FELT THE APARTMENT WAS TOO COSTLY. [REDACTED] KHALID AND NAWAF WERE PLANNING TO MOVE INTO THE APARTMENT [REDACTED] A STUDENT IN SAN DIEGO WHO WAS GOING TO BE RETURNING TO SAUDI ARABIA. [REDACTED] HAD KNOWN [REDACTED] FOR A LONG TIME THROUGH SCHOOL AND WOULD SEE AND CALL HIM OFTEN BUT [REDACTED] DID NOT KNOW HOW KHALID AND NAWAF KNEW [REDACTED]

21. ~~(S//NF,OC)~~ [REDACTED] RECALLED HEARING THAT KHALID AND NAWAF HAD MOVED [REDACTED] FOR TWO WEEKS, THEN RETURNED TO THEIR APARTMENT AT THE IDENTIFIED APARTMENT COMPLEX. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] WAS IN WASHINGTON, DC, DURING THAT TIME.

[REDACTED] HAD DEPARTED SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA, FOR WASHINGTON, DC, A COUPLE OF WEEKS AFTER KHALID AND NAWAF MOVED INTO THE IDENTIFIED APARTMENT COMPLEX. WHILE IN WASHINGTON, DC, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

+
[REDACTED] RECALLED HEARING THAT KHALID AND NAWAF HAD MOVED FROM THE IDENTIFIED APARTMENT COMPLEX TO [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] DID NOT KNOW WHEN KHALID AND NAWAF FIRST MET

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[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] KHALID AND NAWAF AT THE
MOSQUE ON ONE TO TWO OCCASIONS.

23. (S//NF,OC) [REDACTED] A GREAT DEAL OF CONTACT
WITH KHALID OR NAWAF WHILE THEY RESIDED AT THE IDENTIFIED
APARTMENT COMPLEX DUE TO HIS TRAVEL. ON A FEW OCCASIONS [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] APARTMENT TO SAY
HELLO. DURING THESE VISITS, KHALID AND NAWAF OFTEN WOULD JOKE
WITH EACH OTHER BY PUSHING OR SHOVING. [REDACTED] DID NOT LIKE
[REDACTED]

24. (S//NF,OC) [REDACTED]
INDIVIDUALS IN SAN DIEGO WITH WHOM KHALID AND NAWAF SPENT A
SIGNIFICANT AMOUNT OF TIME, AND DID NOT KNOW OF ANY INDIVIDUALS
WHO ASSISTED KHALID OR NAWAF IN OBTAINING DRIVER'S LICENSES OR
ANY OTHER FORMS OF IDENTIFICATION. [REDACTED]
EVERYONE AT THE MOSQUE IS ALWAYS WILLING TO HELP NEWCOMERS TO THE
COMMUNITY.

25. (S//NF,OC) [REDACTED] EITHER KHALID OR
NAWAF [REDACTED] BUT BELIEVED THAT THEY KNEW EACH OTHER
FROM THE MOSQUE. [REDACTED] KHALID
AND NAWAF AT THE MOSQUE. [REDACTED] TO
TRANSLATE OR TO CONTACT FLIGHT SCHOOLS ON THEIR BEHALF NOR DID
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] TO KHALID OR
NAWAF, BUT RECALLED SEEING THEM TOGETHER AT THE MOSQUE.

26. (S//NF,OC) [REDACTED] EITHER KHALID OR NAWAF TO
HAVE WORKED WHILE IN SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] KHALID AND NAWAF ATTENDED THE LOCAL COMMUNITY COLLEGE TO
LEARN ENGLISH. [REDACTED] KHALID AND NAWAF
WORKING OUT IN THE EXERCISE ROOM AT THE IDENTIFIED APARTMENT

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COMPLEX ON ONE TO TWO OCCASIONS. [REDACTED] KHALID OR NAWAF USE A COMPUTER, AND HE NEVER SPOKE WITH EITHER KHALID OR NAWAF ABOUT COMPUTERS OR THE INTERNET. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] TO EITHER KHALID OR NAWAF.

27. (~~S~~/NF,OC) [REDACTED] NEVER SPOKE TO EITHER KHALID OR NAWAF ABOUT POLITICS, INCLUDING JIHAD, MARTYRDOM, OR ANTI-U.S. SENTIMENT, MARRIAGE, OR FAMILY. NEITHER POLITICS NOR RADICAL VIEWS WERE ALLOWED TO BE DISCUSSED AT THE MOSQUE. [REDACTED] WAS NOT AWARE THAT KHALID AND NAWAF HAD ATTENDED FLIGHT TRAINING WHILE LIVING IN SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA, AND NEITHER KHALID NOR NAWAF EVER SPOKE [REDACTED] ABOUT FLIGHT TRAINING.

28. (~~S~~/NF,OC) [REDACTED]

29. (~~S~~/NF,OC) [REDACTED]

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30. ~~(S)~~ (NF, OC)

31. ~~(S)~~ (NF, OC)

33. (U) COMMENTS, QUESTIONS AND EVALUATIONS ARE WELCOME AND MAY
BE ADDRESSED TO [REDACTED] TERRORISM REPORTS AND REQUIREMENTS
SECTION. [REDACTED]

ACQ: 8/03

~~DERIVED FROM: G 3, REASON: 1.5(C), DECLASSIFY ON: X-1.~~

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(U) THIS COMMUNICATION WAS APPROVED BY A/UC [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] ASC [REDACTED] UC [REDACTED] AND SSA [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] (ITOS 1,PENTTBOM) PRIOR TO DISSEMINATION.
INFORMATION PERTAINS TO THE CASE NUMBER 265A-NY-280350-302,
SERIAL 118533, DATED 08/18/2003.

DRAFTED BY: [REDACTED] DMW RM#: [REDACTED] EXT: [REDACTED]

SUBJECT: INTERVIEW OF

FIELD OFFICE: NY

COUNTRY: UNITED STATES/UNITED KINGDOM/SAUDI ARABIA

SOURCE: AN OFFICER OF THIS AGENCY.

THE IDENTIFICATION OF U.S. PERSONS IS PLACED HERE FOR RECORD
KEEPING PURPOSES AND MUST BE HELD IN ACCORDANCE WITH FEDERAL AGENCY
PRIVACY REGULATIONS. FURTHER DISSEMINATION OF U.S. PERSON IDENTITY
OR IDENTIFIERS MUST BE APPROVED BY FBIHQ.

IDENTIFIED APARTMENT COMPLEX =

IDENTIFIED U.S. FINANCIAL INSTITUTION = [REDACTED]

IDENTIFIED U.S. UNIVERSITY = [REDACTED]

THREAT: NO

AGENT: SSA [REDACTED]

TERRORIST GROUPS:

TRRS NUMBER: TRRS-03-09-1718

LIASON: NONE

COPY DESIGNATIONS:

THREATS TMU

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1 - CT WATCH
1- SSA
1- SSA
1- LEGAT RIYADH
1- LEGAT LONDON

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Precedence: PRIORITY

Date: 06/03/2002

To: Counterterrorism
New York

Attn: UBLU/RFU

Attn: ASAC [REDACTED]

SSA [REDACTED]

SSA [REDACTED]

SA [REDACTED]

SA [REDACTED]

Attn: SSA [REDACTED]

SA [REDACTED]

Attn: SSA [REDACTED]

Attn: SSA [REDACTED]

Minneapolis

Washington Field

Phoenix

San Diego

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From: Newark

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Contact: SA [REDACTED]

SA [REDACTED]

SA [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED] ala

Case ID #: (S) 265A-NY-280350-CD (Pending)

Title: (S) PENTTBOM;
MAJOR CASE 182

(U) [REDACTED]

Synopsis: (S) To provide investigative summary information and set leads.

~~(S)~~ Derived From : G-3
~~(S)~~ Declassify On: X1

Reference: (S) 265A-NY-280350 Serial 9772
(S) 265A-NY-280350-NK Serial 1111, 9436, 4868
(S) 265A-NY-280350-PX Serial 11114
(S) 199Q-NK-95811 Serial 29, 3
(S) 265C-MP-54588-T8518 Serial 6
(S) 199Q-MP-45209 Serial 171
(S) 265A-NY-280350-302 Serial 38180, 73431, 113489,
113484, 79727, 79726
47759, 59232, 36440
114144, 77663, 112843
932125, 21529
(S) 265A-NY-280350-NK Serial 13375, 17496, 4868
(S) 265A-NY-280350-WF Serial 6472, 8704, 9991, 1808
(S) 265A-NY-280350-IN Serial 40663, 13477, 3654
(S) 265A-NY-280350-BN Serial 858

Case ID : 315N-NY-280350-CD

Serial : 18734

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~~(S)~~ 265C-DL-85383-S Serial 76
~~(S)~~ 199P-NK-81348 Serial 576
~~(S)~~ 199H-NK-76996 Serial 1140, 562
~~(S)~~ 199Q-NK-92908 Serial 404
~~(S)~~ 199H-WF-213358 Serial 120
~~(S)~~ 199H-NY-261070 Serial 73
~~(S)~~ 199Q-AT-76104 Serial 672
~~(S)~~ 199H-NY-256049 Serial 21
~~(S)~~ 199Q-WF-211947 Serial 238
~~(S)~~ 265A-NY-280350-TEL Serial 92
~~(S)~~ 199Q-AT-76104 Serial 672

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Enclosure(s): ~~(S)~~ Enclosed for the Minneapolis Division is a copy of the toll records for the [redacted] cellular telephone, [redacted]. Enclosed for the Washington Field Office is a copy of the toll records for the cellular telephone used [redacted] subscriber name [redacted].

Details: ~~(S)~~ Previous investigation has revealed that [redacted]

[redacted] were associated with known hijackers, MOJED MOOED, HANI HANJOUR, NAWAF ALHAZMI, and AHMED ALGHAMDI. [redacted]

[redacted] from approximately 03/2001 to 06/2001. The aforementioned hijackers visited [redacted] during 04/2001-05/2001.

~~(S)~~ [redacted] rented this apartment from a woman by the name [redacted] and the lease was in her name.

[redacted] and was listed [redacted]. Investigation has revealed that [redacted] both utilized telephone number [redacted] during their stay in Virginia.

~~(S)~~ On 05/07/2001, [redacted] drove the four hijackers from Falls Church, Virginia to the FAIRFIELD INN, Fairfield, Connecticut. On 05/09/2001, [redacted] drove the four hijackers to Paterson, New Jersey.

~~(S)~~ Prior to living in the aforementioned apartment in Falls Church, Virginia, [redacted]

[redacted] While [redacted] resided in Paterson, he met [redacted] and eventually left New Jersey to live in Falls Church, Virginia, [redacted] met the four hijackers in Virginia while he resided there. [redacted]

~~(S)~~ Upon his return [redacted] lived with two men [redacted]

[redacted] maintained contact with [redacted] who was working and residing in Connecticut.

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(S) The past activities [redacted] [redacted] have raised questions as to whether they were associated with the known hijackers, as well as [redacted] FBI Phoenix had conducted an investigation into the automatic teller transactions of known hijacker HANI HANJOUR and the investigation revealed the following:

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(S) On 06/19/2001, at 23:03:29 hours, HANI HANJOUR conducted an automatic teller machine (ATM) transaction at the PNC Bank, 1152 Main Street, Paterson, New Jersey. A review conducted by the Phoenix Division of all transactions conducted 30 minutes before and after HANJOUR'S transaction revealed four individuals who made transactions at the same ATM just prior to HANJOUR. Two of the four individuals identified [redacted]

[redacted] At present, it has not been determined if [redacted] knew HANJOUR or made some financial transaction for him, but the aforementioned transaction illustrates the possibility.

(S) Additionally, [redacted] had two telephones in his name; a VOICESTREAM cellular telephone, [redacted] and the main hardline number for his residence [redacted] Investigation by the Newark Division revealed that [redacted] was in possession of the aforementioned VOICESTREAM cellular telephone, [redacted]

(S) The Newark Division has reviewed the toll records for these two telephone numbers. The review produced the following:

[redacted]

(S) [redacted] was arrested on 08/16/2001 in Minnesota and held in federal custody at the Sherburne County Jail in Elk River, Minnesota. A review of the telephone calls on the tolls records of the [redacted] cell phone reveal that, subsequent 08/16/2001, [redacted] was attempting to locate and speak with [redacted] subject of full field investigation 1990-NK-98511. The aforementioned call activity was confirmed by [redacted]

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[redacted] conducted by the Newark Division on 06/05/2002.

(S) In the aforementioned interview, [redacted] he lived with his friend, [redacted] sometime during 1991 or 1992 at a location [redacted] in Paterson, New Jersey. [redacted] the interviewing agents that he has a single engine pilot's license and that some point in time in the 1980's he had taken flight lessons in New Jersey. [redacted] had taken flight lessons at AIR FLEET TRAINING SYSTEMS, TETERBORO AIRPORT, Teterboro, New Jersey, and CALDWELL FLIGHT ACADEMY, Essex County Airport, Fairfield, New Jersey. It should be noted that known hijackers HANI HANJOUR and SAEED ALGHAMDI took flight lessons at FLEET TRAINING SYSTEMS and HANI HANJOUR took flight lessons at CALDWELL FLIGHT ACADEMY. (265A-NY-280350 Serial 9772)

(S) On 08/16/2001, [redacted] cellular telephone contacted the telephone number [redacted] twice. The telephone number [redacted] is subscribed to [redacted] [redacted] was the subject of numerous Currency Transaction Reports (CTR) due to a large number of currency transaction he conducted in the past that were over the \$10,000 limit. These reports were filed by what was the MIDATLANTIC BANK and is currently a PNC BANK located at the intersection of Main Street and Crooks Avenue in Paterson, New Jersey. [redacted] on the CTRs which reflected numerous financial transactions that took place during 1996.

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(S) On 08/17/2001, [redacted] cellular telephone contacted the telephone number [redacted] once. The telephone number [redacted] is listed to [redacted] [redacted] provided information about the prior ownership of the [redacted] during his interview with the FBI on 05/21/2002. (265A-NY-280350-302, Serial 114144) [redacted] was also a location where a number of the hijackers were observed in the past. (265A-NK-280350-NK Serial 17496)

(S) The [redacted] cellular telephone also contacted the telephone number [redacted] on 08/17/2001. The telephone number [redacted] is listed [redacted] [redacted] (265A-NY-280350-302, Serial 114144)

(S) On 08/18/2001, the [redacted] cellular telephone contacted [redacted] twice. The [redacted] cellular telephone also contacted the telephone number [redacted] twice. The telephone number [redacted] is the number of [redacted] cellular telephone. During 09/2001 [redacted] was interviewed by the Minneapolis Division and he advised the interviewing agents that his VOICESTREAM cellular telephone number was [redacted] (265A-NY-280350-302 Serial 73431)

(S) On 08/18/2001, the [redacted] cellular

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telephone also contacted the telephone number [redacted] once. [redacted] as his home telephone number on his VOICESTREAM subscriber paperwork. (265A-NY-280350-302 Serial 77663)

(S) On 08/19/2001, the [redacted] cellular telephone contacted the telephone number [redacted] once and the telephone number [redacted] once. In the aforementioned interview of [redacted] had advised the interviewing agents that his home telephone number was [redacted] and his cellular telephone number was [redacted]. The aforementioned call to [redacted] home number, [redacted] was approximately 25 minutes in duration. It should be noted that [redacted] resided in Minnesota when [redacted] was arrested and that the aforementioned attempts to reach him were in the time period of 08/16/2001 to 08/19/2001.

(S) [redacted] was under investigation by the Newark Division, in the past, for his links to terrorist organizations, HAMAS and the HOLY LAND FOUNDATION for RELIEF and DEVELOPMENT (HLFRD), a known fund raising front organization for HAMAS. (199Q-NK-98511) During the aforementioned interview [redacted] by the Minneapolis Division, [redacted] he currently lives at [redacted] (265A-NY-280350-302 Serial 73431)

(S) In the referenced full field investigation 199Q-NK-98511, [redacted] was found to be an associate of [redacted]

[redacted] the ISLAMIC CENTER OF PASSAIC COUNTY (ICPC) when he resided in New Jersey. [redacted] presently resides in San Diego, California and he is the subject of an investigation by the San Diego Division, 199Q-SD-60938. Toll analysis of [redacted] former place of business, PRO-TECH COMPUTERS, INCORPORATED, Fairlawn, New Jersey, during the 1998-1999 time frame, revealed numerous calls to HLFRD headquarters.

(S) [redacted] was held in federal custody in the Sherburne County Jail in Elk River, Minnesota, subsequent his arrest on 08/16/2001. Toll analysis of calls placed from the Sherburne Jail during the time period of 09/11/2001 to 09/14/2001 revealed numerous calls from the S2 and S2-A locations in the jail to the AL-ALMAL ISLAMIC SCHOOL, also known as, ISLAMIC CENTER OF MINNESOTA, 1401 Gardena Avenue, N.E., Fridley, MN 55432, at telephone 763-571-5604. It should be noted, the Minneapolis Division has directly linked the AL-ALMAL ISLAMIC SCHOOL to HAMAS and HLFRD activities in Minneapolis, MN. (referenced in 199Q-MP-45209 Serial 171,166) The Newark Division has not yet determined if [redacted] has any ties to the AL-ALMAL SCHOOL, even though both [redacted] and the AL-ALMAL SCHOOL have ties to HAMAS and HLFRD.

(S) The [redacted] cellular telephone was also in contact with the main telephone number to [redacted] [redacted] As previously indicated, [redacted]

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lived at this address and was associated with four of the known hijackers. In his interview with the FBI on 06/05/2001, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] the writer that he is the cousin [REDACTED] who also resided at the [REDACTED]

(P) The [REDACTED] cellular telephone was also in contact with [REDACTED]. This telephone number is the listed number [REDACTED] is of interest because it was contacted not only by [REDACTED] the hardline [REDACTED] but also telephone numbers [REDACTED] numbers for the residence [REDACTED] (199P-NK-81348 Serial 576)

(S) [REDACTED] is an avid supporter of [REDACTED] terrorist organization, AL GAMA AL ISLAMIYYA (AGAI). [REDACTED] holds a key position in AGAI, whereby he willingly has acted as a communications conduit between AGAI leaders overseas and in the U.S. (199P-NK-81348 Serial 576)

(S) [REDACTED] is associated [REDACTED] [REDACTED] (265A-NY-280350-NK Serial 13375)

(P) [REDACTED] entered the United States on 10/23/1992, on a M1 Visa to attend the ACADEMIC OF FLIGHT SCHOOL, 46-12 Queens Boulevard, STE 204, Sunnyside, New York, telephone 718-937-5716. A reveal of the Telephone Application of ACS revealed that the ACADEMIC OF FLIGHT SCHOOL was contacted by known hijacker MOHAMMED ATTA, cell phone number 646-479-0432, on 06/21/2000. [REDACTED] denied knowing how to fly an aircraft during an interview conducted by the Newark Division. (265A-NY-280350-302 Serial 113489)

(S) During the aforementioned interview, [REDACTED] in late 1996 to early 1997, he became business partners [REDACTED] Palestine, and purchased [REDACTED]

(S) The Newark Division has not yet ascertained if [REDACTED] who was the subject of a past investigation by the Newark Division, 199H-NK-89960. [REDACTED] was a Palestinian businessman and [REDACTED] the ICPC in 1996. [REDACTED] was also an active HAMAS leader and the close friend of [REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

(S) Previous investigation by the Newark Division has identified the ICPC as a place where, among legitimate Islamic worship, HAMAS supporters meet to raise funds and conduct business. (referenced in 199Q-NK-92908 Serial 404) As stated previously, [REDACTED] of ICPC at one time. (199H-NK-76996 Serial 562)

(S) [REDACTED] are currently under investigation by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) due to the fact that they currently appear to be illegal aliens. Additionally, Special Agents of the INS believe that [REDACTED] may have entered into a fraudulent marriage to obtain U.S. citizenship [REDACTED] (265A-NY-280350-IN Serial 40663)

(S) The [REDACTED] cellular telephone was also in contact with [REDACTED] which was utilized [REDACTED] As stated previously, [REDACTED] conducted an ATM transaction in close proximity to known hijacker HANI HANJOUR. [REDACTED] is currently in custody due to the fact that he was in the U.S. illegally. [REDACTED] has been previously interviewed by the Newark Division. (265A-NY-280350-302 Serial 112843)

(S) In the aforementioned interview conducted by the Newark Division, [REDACTED] attended a mosque located in Falls Church, Virginia while he was staying with a friend [REDACTED] in Maryland. The mosque that [REDACTED] referred to could possibly be the DAR AL-HIJRA MOSQUE, 3159 Row Street, Falls Church, Virginia.

It should be noted that [REDACTED] had met the four known hijackers at the DAR AL-HIJRA MOSQUE in Falls Church, Virginia. The DAR AL-HIJRA MOSQUE is known to be attended by members of HAMAS. (referenced in 265A-NY-280350-WF Serial 9991, 199Q-WF-211947 Serial 238) Also, a telephone number associated with the DAR AL-HIJRA MOSQUE was found during a search of the belongings of [REDACTED] in Germany. (265A-NY-280350-BN Serial 858)

(S) As indicated previously, [REDACTED] utilized a cellular telephone, [REDACTED] who left the United States and has recently returned from Jordan. The telephone assigned telephone number [REDACTED] will be hereafter referred to as the [REDACTED] cellular telephone. A review of the toll records for this cellular telephone revealed the following:

(S) The [REDACTED] cellular telephone was in contact with [REDACTED] which is probably due to the fact that [REDACTED] lived there [REDACTED]

(S) The [REDACTED] cellular telephone was also in contact with [REDACTED] which, as previously indicated, was

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the number of [redacted]
[redacted] lived in Falls Church, Virginia.
Additionally, it should be noted that four known hijackers
visited [redacted]
[redacted] (265A-NY-280350-3002 Serial 932125)

(S) The [redacted] cellular telephone has contacted
telephone number [redacted] listed to [redacted]
[redacted] is currently owned by
[redacted] is possibly
linked to [redacted] in that the telephone number [redacted]
[redacted] was found during a search of the belongings [redacted]
[redacted] by the authorities in Germany. The
telephone number [redacted] was subscribed to [redacted]
[redacted] (265A-NY-
280350-BN Serial 858)

(S) The [redacted] cellular telephone has contacted the
telephone numbers [redacted] The telephone
number [redacted] is the home telephone number [redacted]
[redacted]
The telephone number [redacted] is subscribed to [redacted]
[redacted] but the
telephone is utilized [redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted] numerous times, but there are two dates
that should be noted. On 09/10/2001, [redacted]
[redacted]

(S) [redacted] was interviewed by the Washington Field
Office in 10/2001. [redacted]
[redacted] which was
next door to the apartment [redacted] when they
lived in Virginia. In fact, [redacted] claimed to have met
[redacted] in the street and brought them to [redacted]
[redacted] to rent her apartment that was next door to his. [redacted]
then claimed to not have had any other interaction with [redacted]
[redacted] (265A-NY-280350-302 Serial 79727)

(S) [redacted] claimed that a friend of his, [redacted]
knew that [redacted] lived in New Jersey. The call activity from
[redacted] would suggest that [redacted] may not have
been truthful when discussing his knowledge [redacted]
[redacted] It should also be noted that he lived next door to
where several of the known hijackers are known to have visited.

(S) [redacted] was a friend [redacted] and his
family and lived with his family for a period of time. The facts
surrounding [redacted] association [redacted] would also
suggest that [redacted] would have known the individuals that he
brought to [redacted] apartment. Additionally, [redacted] in
her interview by the Washington Field Office, that [redacted]
[redacted] were friends of his when he
brought them to her apartment. (265A-NY-280350-302 Serial 47759)

(S) [redacted] friend and former roommate, [redacted]

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[redacted] currently lives with his wife in a house [redacted] [redacted] has been interviewed by the Washington Field Office and advised that he splits his time between Clifton, New Jersey and Langley Park, Maryland, where he stays with a friend. [redacted] the interviewing agents that he met [redacted] in the Paterson, New Jersey area and that he never saw [redacted] in Virginia or Maryland. (265A-NY-280350-302 Serial 79726)

(S) Due to the fact that [redacted] knew each other from the Paterson area and lived in addresses that were next door to each other in Falls Church, Virginia, it is possible that [redacted] has not been truthful with the FBI when he discussed his knowledge [redacted] It should be noted that [redacted] and several of the known hijackers have all been in, Falls Church, Virginia, and Paterson, New Jersey, at one time or another. [redacted] and several of the known hijackers were in Falls Church, Virginia basically during the time period of 03/2001 to 07/2001.

(S) [redacted] before and after he [redacted] [redacted] (265A-NY-280350-302 Serial 74522,17494) Previous investigation has placed the hijackers in Paterson, New Jersey at various times during 2001, such as the confirmed sighting of 7 of the hijackers at APOLLO INTERNATIONAL TRAVEL, 1009 Main Street, 2nd floor, Paterson, New Jersey in 07/2001. (265A-NY-280350-NK Serial 9436, 265A-NY-280350-302 Serial 21529) The Newark Division has not ascertained whether [redacted] has come into contact with any of the known hijackers.

(S) The Newark Division has not ascertained why [redacted] is utilizing a VOICESTREAM cellular telephone subscribed to the [redacted] However, there are calls from [redacted] which is the home telephone number listed on the VOICESTREAM paperwork. A CHOICEPOINT Database check revealed [redacted]

[redacted] An Internet search on the telephone number [redacted] revealed a listing [redacted]

[redacted] The telephone facility assigned the number [redacted] will hereafter be referred to as [redacted] cellular telephone. Additional analysis of the toll records of [redacted] cellular telephone, [redacted] revealed the following:

(S) The [redacted] cellular phone contacted [redacted] home telephone, [redacted] numerous times, but it should be noted that [redacted] number on 09/10/2001 and on 09/12/2001. The Newark Division has not ascertained the significance of the contact [redacted]

(S) The [redacted] cellular telephone contacted [redacted] [redacted] The telephone number [redacted] is the cellular telephone number utilized [redacted] who is the [redacted]

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[redacted] The telephone number [redacted] is the main telephone number of [redacted] (265A-NY-280350-WF Serial 6472)

~~(S)~~ As documented in 265A-NY-280350-WF Serial 6472, [redacted] came to the attention of the FBI due to his purchase of [redacted]. Apparently, the former owner, [redacted] was offered a large sum of money to get him to sell the gas station. [redacted] cell phone has also contacted [redacted].

~~(S)~~ A CHOICEPOINT database check on the name [redacted] revealed [redacted]. The address [redacted] is also listed as the address of [redacted]. The employer [redacted] was listed [redacted]. CHOICEPOINT listed [redacted] as the President/Treasurer [redacted] INCORPORATED and [redacted] the Vice President/Secretary.

~~(S)~~ [redacted] appears to be the same person [redacted] owner of the aforementioned [redacted] due to the fact that [redacted] on his cellular telephone, [redacted] (265A-NY-280350-TEL Serial 92) [redacted] is also contacted by the [redacted] cellular telephone and, as indicated previously, the [redacted] cellular telephone. (review of the toll records [redacted] cellular telephones)

~~(S)~~ As documented in the CHOICEPOINT Database, [redacted] appear to be partners and/or owners of a number of gas stations located in the Virginia and Washington, D.C. area. The following gas stations appear to be associated with [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]


[redacted] and 703-534-9794 (payphone); all three of these numbers were in contact with hijacker phone 973-652-2555, believed to have been used by known hijackers HANI HANJOUR, NAWAF ALHAMZI, and SALEM ALHAMZI.

[redacted]

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


hijacker cellular telephone 973-652-2555 believed to have been used by known hijackers HANI HANJOUR, NAWAF ALHAMZI, and SALEM ALHAMZI. (265A-NY-280350-WF Serial 1808)



the known hijackers, and the HOLIDAY INN, Route 46 West, Totowa, New Jersey. Known hijacker KHALID M. AL-MIDHAR was positively identified by a hotel housekeeper who worked for the aforementioned HOLIDAY INN. (265A-NY-280350-WF Serial 8704)

~~(S)~~ AL-MIDHAR was registered under



during the first week of 09/2001. A number of the known hijackers were in Totowa, New Jersey at this time. (265A-NY-280350-WF Serial 8704, 265A-NY-280350-NK Serial 4868)



denied seeing or knowing any of the known hijackers. (265A-NY-280350-302 Serial 59232)

~~(S)~~ It should be noted that the hijackers were in Totowa, New Jersey, at the same time There is contact between

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[redacted] and telephones that were in contact with the known hijackers. [redacted] is in FALLS CHURCH, Virginia, where known hijackers resided for a period of time.

(X) Along with the aforementioned telephonic contact, the [redacted] cellular telephone and the [redacted] cellular telephone both contacted telephone number [redacted] (review of toll records of [redacted] cellular telephones) The subscriber for the telephone number [redacted] [redacted] date of birth [redacted] [redacted] The telephone facility assigned number [redacted] will hereafter be referred to as the [redacted] cellular telephone.

(X) There are significant contacts in the toll records pertaining to [redacted] A preliminary review of the [redacted] cellular telephone toll records revealed the following:

(X) The [redacted] cellular telephone contacted [redacted] [redacted] on 09/11/2001, at approximately 11:44pm, for a 4 minute time period. The telephone number [redacted] has also been in contact with the telephone number 972-680-0761, which is subscribed to the HLFRD, 525 International Parkway, Richardson, Texas.

(X) The [redacted] cellular telephone contacted the telephone number [redacted] The telephone number [redacted] [redacted] (referenced in 199Q-AT-76104 Serial 672, 199H-NY-261070 Serial 73)

(X) The number [redacted] has appeared in a number of investigations to include the TERRSTOP (265A-NY-239143) and TRADEBOM (265A-NY-235983) investigations. [redacted] who is the subject of a New York Division investigation due to his ties to HAMAS. [redacted] has a number of relatives in the New York area that are involved [redacted] (referenced in 199Q-AT-76104 Serial 672, 199H-NY-261070 Serial 73)

(X) [redacted] participated in shotgun and rifle target practice with three people associated with the WORLD TRADE CENTER bombing case, TRADEBOM (265A-NY-235983), [redacted] [redacted] was also a subject in the TERRSTOP investigation. (referenced in 199Q-AT-76104 Serial 672, 199H-NY-261070 Serial 73)

(X) The telephone number [redacted] also appeared in the telephone records of [redacted] [redacted] convicted in the TRADEBOM investigation. (referenced in 199Q-AT-76104 Serial 672, 199H-NY-261070 Serial 73)

(X) The telephone number [redacted] appeared on a pen register conducted on the telephone associated with [redacted] [redacted] The telephone number [redacted] was the home telephone

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number [redacted] In 1992,
[redacted] for firearms and explosives training in
Pennsylvania [redacted]
[redacted] was convicted and sentenced to life in the TERRSTOP
investigation. (referenced in 199Q-AT-76104 Serial 672, 199H-NY-
261070 Serial 73)

(S) [redacted] has been in contact with [redacted]
[redacted] who was the subject of a HAMAS investigation by FBI New
York, 199H-NY-256049. [redacted] in
Jersey City, New Jersey, and was linked to TRADEBOM subjects
[redacted] The address for the
[redacted] was utilized by [redacted] for various
bank accounts and insurance policies. (199H-NY-256049 Serial 21,
199H-NY-261070 Serial 73)

(S) The [redacted]
in Jersey City, New Jersey. The telephone number [redacted] is
subscribed to [redacted] and was contacted by [redacted]
[redacted] (review of ACS Telephone Application) As stated
previously, [redacted] was the home telephone number for [redacted]
[redacted]

[redacted] Several of the known hijackers
visited [redacted]
[redacted]

(S) The writer recommends that [redacted]
[redacted]
interviewed concerning the aforementioned information. The
interviews should involve the following topics:

(X) Interviewees should be questioned about their
association with or knowledge of HAMAS, HLFRD, ICPC, DAR AL-HIJRA
MOSQUE, [redacted]
[redacted]

(S) [redacted] should be
questioned at length about their knowledge of each other, the
known hijackers, the DAR AL-HIJRA MOSQUE, the ALGHAZALY SCHOOL,
overseas travel, e-mail addresses, and HAMAS.

(S) [redacted] should be questioned about
the BEACH EXXON and the ALGHAZALY SCHOOL and who they have been
in contact with at these locations.

(S) [redacted] should be questioned
about any knowledge of the known hijackers when they resided in
Falls Church or overseas, the aforementioned gas stations, [redacted]
[redacted] possible contact with the known hijackers
in Totowa, New Jersey.

(S) [redacted] should be questioned at length on
his knowledge and/or involvement with HAMAS, HLFRD, AL-ALMAL
SCHOOL, [redacted] GREAT NOTCH EXXON, [redacted]
[redacted] any of the aforementioned [redacted] family
members, and the MIDTOWN EXXON.

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LEAD~~(S)~~:

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Set Lead 1:

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

(U) Read and clear.

Set Lead 2:

NEW YORK

AT NEW YORK, NEW YORK

(U) Provide copies of this communication to SA [redacted]
[redacted] and SA [redacted] Newark Division requests
that New York Division review the content of this communication
and facilitate logical investigation as appropriate.

Set Lead 3:

MINNEAPOLIS

AT BROOKLYN PARK, MINNESOTA

~~(S)~~ Locate and re-interview [redacted]

[redacted]
[redacted] concerning his knowledge of
[redacted] ALGHAZALY SCHOOL, GREAT
NOTCH EXXON, MIDTOWN EXXON, HAMAS, and the rest of the
information provided in this communication.

Set Lead 4:

WASHINGTON FIELD

AT ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA

~~(S)~~ Locate and re-interview [redacted]

[redacted]
concerning his knowledge of [redacted] DAR AL-
HIJRA MOSQUE, the known hijackers and his previous residence,
[redacted] and the rest of the information provided in
this communication.

Set Lead 5:

NEWARK

AT NEWARK, NEW JERSEY

~~(S)~~ Locate and interview [redacted]

[redacted] family members
mentioned in this communication.

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
(Rev. 01-31-2003) HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 05-08-2006 BY
60309AUCTAM/MLT/CLS DUP
TO 1006600, DATED 3/29/06
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 12/05/2003

To: Counterterrorism

Attn: ITOS1, ETIU-4,

SSA [REDACTED]

IOS [REDACTED]

International Operations
New York

Attn: SSA [REDACTED]

Attn: PENTTBOM Team,

SA [REDACTED]

Washington Field

Attn: Squad IT-6,

SA [REDACTED]

From: Berlin

Contact: SA [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED]:cta

Case ID #: 315N-WF-227135 (Pending)

Title: ABDELGHANI MZOUDI, aka
Talha
IT-AOT

Synopsis: Report testimony of Mohamed Abdulla Mohamed Awady provided on 10/24/2003.

Administrative: All court proceedings were conducted in the German language. SA [REDACTED] translated his summary notes from German into English.

Enclosure(s): Enclosed is one (1) FD-340 containing original notes concerning Mohamed Abdulla Mohamed Awady's testimony and the court proceedings.

Details: On 10/24/2003, Special Agent ("SA") [REDACTED] attended the morning session of the criminal trial of Abdelghani Mzoudi convened by the Third Criminal Panel of the Hanseatic Higher Regional Court (3. Strafsenat des Hanseatisches Oberlandesgericht) in Hamburg, Germany.

Appearing for the prosecution were Chief Prosecutor Walter Hemberger and Prosecutors Dr. Matthias Krauß and Gerhardt Hummer from the Federal Prosecutor's Office for the Federal Republic of Germany ("Generalbundesanwaltschaft").

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Re: 315N-WF-227135, 12/05/2003

Appearing for the defense were Gül Pinar and Michael Rosenthal.

Appearing for the civil litigants ("Nebenkläger") were Andreas Schulz, and Dr. (First Name Unknown) von Grönnen, appearing on behalf of Dr. Ulrich von Jeinsen, and other German attorneys appearing on behalf of the various civil litigants.

The court now called Mohamed Abdulla Mohamed Awady (hereinafter "Awady"), a twenty-five (25) year old male, student residing in Bochum, Germany, to testify about Marwan Yousef Mohamed Rashed Al-Shehhi (hereinafter "Al-Shehhi").

Awady advised the court that he was not related to Abdelghani Mzoudi, Mounir El Motassadeq, Ramzi Mohammed Abdullah Binalshibh, Said Bahaji or Zakariya Essabar.

Awady knew Al-Shehhi from Dubai in the United Arab Emirates. They had met when they both traveled to Germany from the United Arab Emirates.

Awady and Al-Shehhi attended the same German language course at the Goethe Institute in Bonn, Germany, and lived together for six (6) months. After completing the language course, they both took the university admissions examination at the same time.

Upon admission to the university in Bonn, they also attended the same university preparatory course ("Studiumkollegium") for two (2) weeks. Thereafter, Awady left Bonn in 1997 and moved to Cologne, Germany. Al-Shehhi stayed in Bonn to finish the university preparatory course ("Studiumkollegium").

Awady described Al-Shehhi as a regular guy with whom one could have a regular conversation.

Al-Shehhi was frugal and did not spend much money. He sometimes rented cars to take trips to France, the Netherlands and to Berlin.

Al-Shehhi was "cool." He wore regular label clothing and had a short beard. He was also a Muslim and prayed five (5) times each day. Usually, he would pray at home, but on Fridays, he would pray in the mosque in Bonn.

When Al-Shehhi first moved to Hamburg, he maintained regular contact with Awady. They would sometimes meet in Bonn. Awady also traveled to Hamburg a few times to see Al-Shehhi.

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Al-Shehhi had enrolled in the University of Hamburg to study shipbuilding. Awady noted that there were only two (2) locations where one could study shipbuilding, namely at the universities in Hamburg or Duisburg.

However, Al-Shehhi had to return to Bonn approximately six (6) months after arriving in Hamburg, since he had to repeat the university preparatory course ("Studiumkollegium") in Bonn.

During this time period, Awady was living in Cologne and did not have much time to visit with Al-Shehhi. Likewise, Al-Shehhi was also very busy and did not have much time to see Awady either.

Awady's contact with Al-Shehhi consisted of the occasional telephone call. He thought that he might have spoken telephonically with Al-Shehhi about once or twice a month.

After a while the contact between the two diminished. Al-Shehhi called Awady once to invite him to his wedding in Dubai on 01/15/2000. Al-Shehhi explained that he wanted to invite all of his friends from Germany to the wedding. Awady went and visited Al-Shehhi in Dubai in 2000.

Awady saw Al-Shehhi once in Hamburg. Awady had heard from Harad (phonetic) (Last Name Unknown) that Al-Shehhi was in Hamburg. When he saw Al-Shehhi, he was surprised to see that he was not like the "old" Al-Shehhi. Instead, Awady noticed that Al-Shehhi's personality had changed.

For example, when Awady first knew Al-Shehhi he lived alone in a new apartment. Now, Al-Shehhi was living in an old apartment with a roommate and without a television set. Al-Shehhi had also given up his label clothing in favor of cheap clothing and cheap jeans.

Al-Shehhi also asked Awady if he was praying regularly and attending prayer services in the mosque. Awady asked him why he was so concerned about this, but Al-Shehhi did not give him a response.

Al-Shehhi told Awady that his studies were too difficult.

Awady asked a friend about the person with whom Al-Shehhi was sharing the apartment. The friend told Awady that it was someone from Yemen.

Awady then returned home to Bochum, Germany. The next time that he saw Al-Shehhi again was in Dubai, United Arab Emirates for Al-Shehhi's wedding. Awady was surprised to see that Al-Shehhi had shaved off his beard and was acting like the "old" Al-Shehhi.

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Awady also saw Al-Shehhi once more in Bonn. He was unsure if this occurred before or after the wedding in Dubai, but he thought that it might have been after the wedding. At that time, Al-Shehhi wore Afghan-style clothing. Awady had to laugh about Al-Shehhi's manner of dress. They joked that it was a pajamas, but Al-Shehhi said that it was to pray in.

When Awady was in Bonn, he went looking for their friend Nafa (phonetic) (Last Name Not Provided). Awady saw Al-Shehhi in the company of Nafa.

Awady did not ask Al-Shehhi about his studies or what he was doing when he saw him.

Awady also noticed that Al-Shehhi was concentrating upon other matters, such as religion and praying. Al-Shehhi had previously not been so interested in religion.

Awady had a contact telephone number for Al-Shehhi, but when he tried to call that telephone number, the telephone number did not work. Later, Awady called a mutual friend and asked him for Al-Shehhi's new telephone number. The friend informed Awady that Al-Shehhi did not have a telephone or a cellular telephone.

At some point, the Embassy for the United Arab Emirates called Awady and asked him whether he knew where to locate Al-Shehhi. Khalid (Last Name Not Provided) specifically asked him whether Al-Shehhi was with [redacted] in Bochum. Later, Al-Shehhi's brother came to Hamburg from the United Arab Emirates to look for him.

Awady testified that the Embassy for the United Arab Emirates monitored their educational studies, and checked up on them.

Chief Judge Klaus Rühle asked whether it was true that they had shared an apartment in Bad Godesberg, Germany near Bonn, and that Al-Shehhi later lived with two (2) families in Bad Godesberg. It had been documented in Awady's statement provided to police investigators that Al-Shehhi had moved out of the first family's home since they drank alcohol.

Awady testified that this was true.

Awady did not know the people with whom Al-Shehhi associated in Hamburg.

When Awady asked Al-Shehhi why he lived so frugally and why he did not have a television set in his apartment in Hamburg, Al-Shehhi answered that he was living like the Prophet had once lived.

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When Awady broke off his contact with Al-Shehhi in 2000, he believed that Al-Shehhi was on a "Jihad" somewhere in Afghanistan. Awady explained that he knew Al-Shehhi, and he believed that Al-Shehhi would do such a thing.

After Khalid (LNU) called him to inquire why Al-Shehhi was not attending his classes at the university, Awady called Al-Shehhi and asked to meet him in Hamburg. Al-Shehhi told Awady not to come to Hamburg. He did not want to see Awady.

Awady believed that Al-Shehhi did not want him to see how he was living in Hamburg, and then report this back to the Embassy for the United Arab Emirates. Awady, however, stayed firm in his intention to meet with Al-Shehhi and told him that he would come to Hamburg the next weekend.

Al-Shehhi's father had called Awady's father, who had then ordered his son to go and check upon Al-Shehhi. Awady was, thus, not going to let himself be swayed out of meeting with Al-Shehhi in Hamburg.

Awady drove to Hamburg by car and did not know the way to Al-Shehhi's apartment. Thus, they met each other at the Hamburg train station. It was obvious to Awady that Al-Shehhi did not want Awady to see his apartment in Hamburg.

Awady knew that Al-Shehhi would never eat in a restaurant where wine was served, such as an Italian restaurant. Al-Shehhi would also never eat at McDonald's since he claimed that it was owned by Jews.

Awady, thus, suggested that they go drink tea at Al-Shehhi's apartment, so that Awady could learn Al-Shehhi's address. Neither Al-Shehhi's brother, nor Ali (Last Name Not Provided), nor the UAE Embassy, nor Khalid (Last Name Not Provided) knew Al-Shehhi's address.

Awady did not care about seeing Al-Shehhi's room, so long as he got a chance to find out Al-Shehhi's address.

In the end, Awady and Al-Shehhi drove to Al-Shehhi's apartment in Hamburg-Harburg. Al-Shehhi lived in the apartment on the first floor. There were two (2) or three (3) rooms in the apartment, as well as a hallway, bathroom and kitchen. Awady recalled seeing at least one (1) bedroom.

The apartment was sparsely furnished with a few mattresses and a prayer table.

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Awady did not know how many other people lived in the apartment since he did not meet anyone else in the apartment.

Chief Judge Rühle then asked if he could explain why he had problems recognizing two (2) pictures shown to him by police investigators. Awady had told the police investigators that he did not recognize Picture #30, and that he thought that he recognized the other picture. Awady explained that the pictures depicted the apartment prior to the renovations. Consequently, Awady was unable to recognize those pictures.

Awady did not think that Al-Shehhi's name was on the outside apartment door buzzer.

Al-Shehhi had told Awady that he was not registered as a resident at that location. He was only temporarily living in that apartment until he found something better. As a result, his name was not listed on the outside apartment door buzzer.

Chief Judge Rühle now showed him two (2) pictures of houses. Awady said that the first picture was not Al-Shehhi's apartment building, while the second picture could have been his apartment building. However, he was unsure of his identification of that photograph.

Upon seeing a floor plan of an apartment, Awady said that he was unsure if that was Al-Shehhi's apartment.

Associate Judge (First Name Unknown) Sakuth then asked whether Al-Shehhi said that he did not want his Embassy to know his whereabouts. Awady testified that Al-Shehhi had not said this. Awady learned where Al-Shehhi was living and told him that his brother also wanted to know his address.

Awady did not report back his findings to Al-Shehhi's family. Awady believed Al-Shehhi when he had said that this was only a temporary living arrangement, and that he would move out into a better apartment soon.

Awady later spoke with Al-Shehhi's brother about this matter when he came to Germany to look for Al-Shehhi.

When Awady saw Al-Shehhi at the wedding, he thought that things were going better for Al-Shehhi.

When they met during previous times, Al-Shehhi never seemed to care where they would plan to meet. He did, however, inform Awady that he only had a small room in a student dormitory, so

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that they might want to meet elsewhere. As a result, they usually met somewhere else in the city.

Al-Shehhi told Awady that he wanted to bring his wife back to Germany from Dubai. He had already applied for a tourist visa for her, and now he needed a larger apartment for the two (2) of them.

Associate Judge Dr. (First Name Unknown) Mohr now asked Awady how many days Al-Shehhi had remained in Dubai. Awady testified that Al-Shehhi spent between ten (10) and fifteen (15) days in Dubai. Awady thought that he might have returned to Germany on January 20th.

Associate Judge Mohr noted an apparent discrepancy in Awady's testimony. Namely, Awady had stated in his statement provided to police investigators that Al-Shehhi did not return to Germany until February. He now asked Awady which date was correct.

Awady answered that he thought that Al-Shehhi had returned to Germany by January 20th. He recalled that Al-Shehhi had told him that he needed to get back to the university in Hamburg. If he returned after January 20th, then he would have returned to the university too late.

Awady had also heard from Al-Shehhi's brother that Al-Shehhi needed to stay ten (10) to twenty (20) days in Dubai, since he needed to procure a new passport.

Chief Prosecutor Hemberger asked Awady whether he had seen Al-Shehhi with anyone. Awady answered that he had seen Naja (phonetic) (Last Name Not Provided) with Al-Shehhi.

The court excused Awady without requiring him to swear an oath to his testimony.

The court then adjourned until 11:00 a.m., at which time the next witness would be called.

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LEAD (X) :

Set Lead 1: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT ETIU4, DC

Read and clear.

Set Lead 2: (Info)

INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS

AT IO1, DC

Read and clear.

Set Lead 3: (Info)

NEW YORK

AT NEW YORK, NY

Read and clear.

Set Lead 4: (Discretionary)

WASHINGTON FIELD

AT WASHINGTON, DC

Disseminate as necessary.

awady.wpd

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(Rev. 01-31-2003)

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 12/05/2003

To: Counterterrorism

Attn: ITOS1, ETIU-4,

SSA [REDACTED]

IOS [REDACTED]

International Operations
New York

Attn: SSA [REDACTED]

Attn: PENTTBOM Team,

SA [REDACTED]

Washington Field

Attn: Squad IT-6,

SA [REDACTED]

From: Berlin

Contact: SA [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED]:cta

Case ID #: 315N-WF-227135 (Pending)

Title: ABDELGHANI MZOUDI, aka
Talha
IT-AOT

Synopsis: Report testimony of Heinz Fromm, President of the BfV,
provided on 10/24/2003.

Administrative: All court proceedings were conducted in the German
language. SA [REDACTED] translated his summary notes
from German into English.

Enclosure(s): Enclosed is one (1) FD-340 containing original notes
concerning Heinz Fromm's testimony and the court proceedings.

Details: On 10/24/2003, Special Agent ("SA") [REDACTED]
attended the morning session of the criminal trial of Abdelghani
Mzoudi convened by the Third Criminal Panel of the Hanseatic Higher
Regional Court (3. Strafsenat des Hanseatisches
Oberlandesgericht) in Hamburg, Germany.

Appearing for the prosecution were Chief Prosecutor Walter
Hemberger and Prosecutors Dr. Matthias Krauß and Gerhardt Hummer from
the Federal Prosecutor's Office for the Federal Republic of Germany
("Generalbundesanwaltschaft").

Appearing for the defense were Gül Pinar and Michael
Rosenthal.

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Appearing for the civil litigants ("Nebenkläger") were Andreas Schulz, and Dr. (First name Unknown) von Grönnen, appearing on behalf of Dr. Ulrich von Jeinsen, and other German attorneys appearing on behalf of the various civil litigants.

The court now called Heinz Fromm (hereinafter "Fromm"), a fifty-five (55) year old attorney currently serving as the President of the German Federal Office of Constitutional Protection ("Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz", hereinafter "BfV") located in Cologne, Germany, to testify about statements concerning September 11th which he had made during an interview with the "Süd-Deutsche Zeitung" on 07/06/2003.

Fromm advised the court that he was not related to Abdelghani Mzoudi, Mounir El Motassadeq, Ramzi Mohammed Abdullah Binalshibh, Said Bahaji or Zakariya Essabar.

Fromm provided the court with a letter from the German Minister of the Interior which addressed the scope of his authority to provide testimony before the court. Fromm's testimony was restricted to statements he had made to the "Süd-Deutsche Zeitung." He was prohibited from disclosing any classified sources or any information derived from foreign sources.

Fromm testified that he gave the interview to the "Süd-Deutsche Zeitung" and that all of his statements made during the interview were correct. Specifically, the attacks of September 11th were not conceived in Hamburg, but rather in Afghanistan. Furthermore, those individuals from Hamburg who had been involved in the attacks on September 11th had wanted to travel to Chechnya to fight. Upon reaching Afghanistan, they were recruited by Al-Qaeda for their English abilities, and were persuaded to participate in the September 11th attacks.

This represented the conclusion of the BfV which it publicly reported in May 2003 as part of its Annual Report for the Year 2002. The BfV's conclusion was based upon the totality of the information available to it.

According to Fromm, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (hereinafter "KSM") was the operational "mastermind" of the September 11th attacks for Al Qaeda. This view of KSM as the "mastermind" was supported by an Al-Jazeera interview of Ramzi Mohammed Abdullah Binalshibh (hereinafter "Binalshibh") and KSM conducted in 2002. The interview was first broadcast by the Al-Jazeera network in September 2002.

Specialists at the BfV had analyzed this interview and deemed it as authentic.

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Furthermore, the Al-Jazeera journalist, who had interviewed both Binalshibh and KSM, later co-authored a book, Masterminds of Terror, which explained the interview results in greater detail. The book stated that the planning for the September 11th attacks originated in Afghanistan with KSM.

That the planning for the September 11th attacks originated in Afghanistan was the critical point, according to Fromm. The BfV knows, or believes to know, that the Hamburg Group intended to travel to Chechnya.

Chief Judge Klaus Rühle then asked Fromm whether Binalshibh, Mohammed Atta, Marwan Yousef Mohamed Rashed Al-Shehhi and Ziad Samar Jarrah traveled to Afghanistan in order to fight in Chechnya and then proposed the September 11th concept to senior Al-Qaeda leadership there, or whether the entire plan was conceived solely in Afghanistan by KSM.

Fromm testified that the Hamburg Group became ever more radical in its views. While in Hamburg, they developed an interest in participating in a militant "Jihad." The BfV was certain of this development.

However, the planning of the attacks on New York City and the Pentagon were conceived and initiated much earlier in Afghanistan.

The BfV was convinced that the members of the Hamburg Group only intended to travel to Chechnya to participate in a "Jihad."

Chief Judge Rühle asked Fromm to identify the sources of information upon which the BfV was basing its conclusions.

Fromm stated that these conclusions were based upon the investigative results developed by the police and by the prosecutor's offices, from information exchanged with domestic and foreign intelligence agencies, and upon both intelligence operations and "open sources" of information derived from the Internet.

The Chief Judge then asked whether Fromm was basing his conclusions upon information developed by the German Federal Criminal Police ("Bundeskriminalamt", hereinafter "BKA").

Fromm testified that he had not said that they were planning to go to Chechnya by way of Afghanistan. They only wanted to go to Chechnya, but at some point they changed their plans and decided to go to Afghanistan instead. Once they arrived in Afghanistan their "target direction" was altered.

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The Chief Judge then asked whether he had understood Fromm correctly, in that they only wanted to go to Afghanistan and not to Chechnya via Afghanistan.

Fromm answered that this was correct. They had traveled to Afghanistan because they knew that one could complete military training there in less than one year. This, according to Fromm, was their goal for traveling to Afghanistan.

It was the BfV's conclusion that they were recruited in Afghanistan as a result of their English language abilities, and their familiarity with Western countries. This conclusion was based upon "open" sources of information available to the BfV.

The attacks on the World Trade Center (hereinafter "WTC") were planned by KSM. Those who had arrived in Afghanistan from Germany simply became the means to execute the plan. They were asked to volunteer for this plan.

Chief Judge Rühle asked whether Fromm meant that the entire plan had been conceived by Binalshibh and KSM. Fromm testified that this was correct.

The Chief Judge told Fromm that Motassadeq had claimed this same allegation. The Chief Judge noted that the Hanseatic Higher Regional Court in Hamburg had recently convicted Mounir El Motassadeq (hereinafter "Motassadeq") under a prosecutorial theory similar to the one now presented before the Mzoudi trial court. He asked Fromm whether they had just convicted an innocent man to fifteen (15) years in prison. The Chief Judge rhetorically asked Fromm that if his interpretation of the facts was accurate, then should not the court have declared Motassadeq innocent and released him?

Defense attorney Pinar then noted for the court that the Binalshibh interview was considered by intelligence services to be true and accurate.

Chief Judge Rühle asked whether the BfV had any of its own sources upon which the BfV was basing its conclusions.

Fromm answered that there were none in that regard.

The Chief Judge then asked whether there was a person who could corroborate that the Hamburg Group was recruited for the September 11th attacks in Afghanistan.

Fromm referred the court to look to the "open" sources of information available. For example, page 30 of the U.S.

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Congressional Report on September 11th stated that the American intelligence community considered KSM to have been the "mastermind" for the attacks. Fromm was not permitted to testify to anything more than this statement.

The Chief Judge asked again whether it was Fromm's testimony that the planning for the September 11th attacks was devised and decided upon solely in Afghanistan. Fromm testified that this was correct.

Chief Judge Rühle now asked if there were any sources which could state that the Hamburg Group had not considered or conceived of the September 11th attacks on their own.

Fromm answered that it was not so "black and white" as the court was trying to depict the situation. The members of the Hamburg Group were not completely clueless when they traveled to Afghanistan. They intended to undertake a "Jihad" and the trip to Afghanistan was in preparation for such activities. However, once they arrived in Afghanistan, their ultimate goal became finalized. Their purpose was re-directed and they were set upon the World Trade Center and the Pentagon as their final target.

Furthermore, Fromm noted that there were two (2) of the September 11th participants who were mentioned on page 233 of the U.S. Congressional Report on September 11th as having been in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia in January. It was known that Khalid Al-Midhair and Nawaf Al-Hamsi traveled to the United States from Malaysia to commence with their flight training. This was an important point, according to Fromm.

If the Hamburg Group conceived of the plan on its own in Hamburg, and then traveled to Afghanistan to present this plan as alleged, then it was unlikely that Al-Midhair and Al-Hamsi would travel to the United States from Malaysia at approximately the same time for the same reason. Consequently, it was the BfV's conclusion that Al-Qaeda's senior leadership had been searching throughout the entire world for persons to be recruited for the September 11th attacks.

Of further importance was the fact that the members of the Hamburg Group never undertook any activities to prepare for the September 11th attacks prior to December 1999. Although they already displayed anti-American sentiments, they never undertook any specific preparations such as seeking flight instruction in Germany. According to Fromm, it was possible that they might have undertaken some actions in furtherance of which the BfV was unaware, but, generally, the BfV had concluded that the plan for the September 11th attacks had not originated in Hamburg.

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Chief Judge Rühle then asked if Fromm was aware that Binalshibh had flown to Malaysia before his travels to Afghanistan, and whether Fromm could explain the significance of this fact. Fromm answered that he had no authority to testify further on this matter.

The Chief Judge then asked whether Fromm could completely exclude the possibility that the idea and plan to use aircraft as bombs had existed before the group's trip to Afghanistan. Fromm said that this could not be completely discounted.

Associate Judge (First Name Unknown) Sakuth then asked why they gave up on their plan to go to Chechnya. Fromm answered, "no," and added that he could give no further information.

He then asked Fromm if he could explain the group's motivation for changing their plans. Again, Fromm answered, "no," and added that he could give no further information.

Chief Judge Rühle then asked Fromm what exactly he had meant with his answer, "no." He asked whether Fromm meant that he did not know the answer to the question, or that he was not authorized to provide an answer to that question.

Fromm answered that if he provided any further explanation in his answers, then the court and the public would know what he did or did not know.

Chief Judge Rühle explained to Fromm that this was why he had been called as a witness before the court.

Defense attorney Gül Pinar now complained to the court that it was treating Fromm differently than how it had treated the FBI witness. When the FBI witness had advised the court that he did not have the authority to testify on that matter, the court had only laughed and allowed him to continue.

Chief Judge Rühle informed Pinar that Special Agent [redacted] had presented the court with a written authorization restricting his testimony to certain matters.

Fromm now testified that he did not want to say further what he did or did not know.

The Chief Judge explained that the issue revolved around whether he was or was not authorized to testify before the court on these matters.

Fromm testified that he did not want to disclose matters about which someone would be able to deduce that his agency was in

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possession of certain documents which the court and the public were barred from seeing. Consequently, he had decided to confine his answers simply to the word "no."

Chief Judge Rühle advised Fromm that the word "no" had a double meaning. Namely, the court could interpret it as Fromm did not know the answer to the question, or that Fromm was not authorized to provide testimony on that specific matter.

Fromm expressed his concern that others, and by that he did not mean the court, would be able to gain insights into certain matters. He was concerned that the questions could narrow the scope to such a degree that one could deduce certain information from his answers. Fromm was worried about inadvertently disclosing classified information. Thus, he had confined himself to the simplest possible answer.

Associate Judge Sakuth then asked Fromm whether he had any knowledge whether the members of the Hamburg Group were recruited solely in Afghanistan and Pakistan, or whether they had been recruited in Hamburg which resulted in an invitation to travel to Afghanistan.

Fromm said that he did not understand what the Judge had meant by "recruited."

Associate Judge Sakuth clarified that he meant whether they had been recruited to attack the World Trade Center.

Fromm testified that this did not occur here in Germany, but rather later in Afghanistan.

Associate Judge Sakuth asked whether Fromm derived this information from "open" sources of information as well. Fromm testified that it was derived mainly from "open" sources of information which the BfV had analyzed and weighed with respect to credibility.

Associate Judge Dr. (First Name Unknown) Mohr then asked how the interview of Fromm had come to exist. Fromm explained that a journalist had called the BfV and asked if Fromm could sit for an interview concerning the events of September 11th. Fromm had agreed to do so.

The Minister of the Interior had been advised of the interview and could have objected to Fromm providing an interview. He did not do so.

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The journalist's questions were submitted to the BfV in a written format in advance of the scheduled interview. Then, BfV experts reviewed the questions and provided Fromm with appropriate answers to the questions. Fromm reviewed the prepared answers, and subsequently gave those same answers to the questions posed by the journalist during the interview.

Associate Judge Dr. Mohr then asked whether Fromm had discussed those answers before the interview with other federal agencies. Fromm answered that he had not done so.

The Associate Judge then asked whether anyone else was present during the interview with Fromm. Fromm testified that the head of the BfV's Press Office was also present during the interview.

Prosecutor Dr. Matthias Krauß next asked how high up the planning for the September 11th attacks originated in the Al-Qaeda leadership, or if the basic idea for the attacks had been formed in Hamburg. Fromm testified that it was difficult to make a general statement about such matters. The BfV had concluded that the goal of attacking the World Trade Center had existed with Al-Qaeda for a very long time. It was the type of goal for which they undertook long-term planning. A similar example was the attack on the U.S. navy ship, the U.S.S. Cole. This was another target for which Al-Qaeda conducted long-term planning and preparations.

Prosecutor Dr. Krauß noted that Fromm had just testified that Al-Shehhi, Binalshibh and Atta had all traveled to Afghanistan in 1999. He now asked whether Fromm had any information if any one of them had traveled to Afghanistan prior to the 1999 trip.

Fromm testified there were claims that Atta had traveled to Afghanistan during 1998, but the BfV had no evidence to support these claims.

Prosecutor Dr. Krauß next asked Fromm whether Binalshibh had ever traveled to Afghanistan prior to the 1999 trip. Fromm testified that this question was beyond the scope of his own knowledge.

Chief Prosecutor Dr. Walter Hemberger asked Fromm how many people were trained in the camp in Afghanistan which the members of the Hamburg Group had attended. Fromm testified that he could not provide a precise number. Suffice it to say that the numbers were in the five (5) digits, encompassing thousands of participants. The BfV, however, did not have any precise numbers to that effect.

The Chief Prosecutor now asked Fromm how many of these thousand of participants spoke English. Fromm answered "no."

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Next, he asked Fromm how many of the thousands of participants had come to the camp from Western countries. Again, Fromm answered "no." He then stated that he was unsure if he was permitted to provide an answer, since he was uncertain if this question was related to the scope of his prior interview. After all, Fromm explained that he was not an expert witness.

Chief Prosecutor Dr. Hemberger told Fromm that he had just testified that there had been thousands of participants at the camp, and that these four (4) participants had been selected and recruited for their knowledge of English and familiarity with Western countries. He now wanted Fromm to explain why they had been selected over the thousands of other participants.

Fromm explained that an analysis conducted by the BfV and others had come to the conclusion that there were no other suitable people available. Fromm could only speculate that they had been selected for their language abilities.

Attorney Andreas Schulz asked Fromm if he could provide a specific time period for the recruitment in Afghanistan. Fromm asked whether Schulz wanted him to narrow the time frame. Schulz asked him to do so.

Fromm then testified that since they knew when the Hamburg participants traveled to Afghanistan, they had concluded that the recruitment occurred at some time around January.

Attorney Schulz then directed Fromm's attention to a news article in "Die Welt," in which it was noted that Al-Qaeda's former, closely controlled, hierarchical leadership structure had been altered to a more loose network-like form after September 11th. He asked Fromm if he could comment to this change.

Fromm testified that some aspects of Al-Qaeda's methods had undergone changes due to the successes of the military campaign against Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and the world-wide manhunts for senior Al-Qaeda leaders. That Al-Qaeda had changed its leadership and planning structure was evident from Al-Qaeda attacks executed since 09/11/2001. Prior to September 11th, the planning and coordination for such attacks was being undertaken from Afghanistan.

Attorney [] now asked Fromm whether his testimony before the court today concerning Afghanistan was not the result of recent criticism directed against his agency, the BfV, for having overlooked the threat of Al-Qaeda in Hamburg, and not having done enough prior to September 11th to investigate that threat.

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Fromm stated that the testimony that he gave today was the result of analysis conducted by the BfV's experts. The BfV experts, as well as Fromm himself, were convinced of the accuracy of their conclusions.

Attorney Schulz asked to what degree the effect of disinformation by Al-Qaeda had been considered with respect to his testimony pertaining to the Al-Qaeda camp in Afghanistan. Fromm advised that disinformation was always present in such information, and it had been appropriately considered in the final analysis.

Attorney Schulz now re-phrased his question and asked again to what degree the disinformation had been considered with respect to the "open" sources of information upon which Fromm was basing his testimony about the camp in Afghanistan.

Fromm testified that disinformation was always considered in the final analysis, but the greater the number of independent sources of information one utilized in the analysis, the higher the probability that the information was accurate.

Attorney Schulz asked Fromm to explain how this was specifically addressed. Fromm responded that the question had already been answered. All the sources of information utilized had been noted.

Attorney Schulz asked Fromm how the disinformation was checked. Fromm explained that he did not check the information himself since he is only the head of a federal agency.

Attorney Schulz advised Fromm that such checking of the information was important to the final analytical conclusions. One could not simply read a book and then state that one was convinced of its credibility. Schulz asked Fromm what the BfV had done to check the "open" sources of information upon which it was basing its conclusions.

Fromm answered that the information had been checked.

Attorney Schulz asked whether the U.S. Congressional Report on September 11th was one of the sources of information against which the other "open" sources had been checked. Fromm answered that this was correct.

Attorney [] now asked Fromm what he had meant by the "intelligence community." Fromm testified that all intelligence services work in a similar manner. They either exclude something as improbable, or they are convinced of its accuracy and credibility. Fromm could not say any more to this matter.

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Attorney Schulz then asked Fromm who had checked the accuracy of the U.S. Congressional Report on September 11th. Fromm could not answer that question, and suggested that Schulz direct his question to the United States Government.

Defense attorney Pinar asked Fromm what he would say if someone stated that the planning had not occurred in Afghanistan, but instead in Hamburg. Fromm testified that this would contradict the analysis and conclusions of the BfV.

She now asked whether this was derived from "open" sources of information. Fromm testified that it was derived from all available "open" sources of information which had been evaluated.

She then asked how probable was it that the idea for using aircraft as bombs for September 11th had been conceived in Hamburg before the trip to Afghanistan.

Attorney Schulz objected to the form of the question as being based upon probability factors.

The Chief Judge overruled the objection and allowed the question to stand.

Attorney Schulz asked the entire court panel to issue a formal ruling.

The court now granted a short recess, while it deliberated about the objection.

When the court returned to the courtroom, the Chief Judge ruled that the question, of the likelihood of the Hamburg Group having conceived of utilizing aircraft as bombs before the Afghanistan trip, would be permitted to stand.

Fromm now testified that he was only familiar with the BfV's own analysis and conclusions. He could not exclude the possibility that the idea had been conceived in Hamburg, but he could not say so with any specific degree of probability.

Defense attorney Pinar asked whether there was any other analysis which had come to a different conclusion than the one presented by Fromm. Fromm testified that the BfV was unaware of any activities that were undertaken in Germany to prepare for the September 11th attacks. The first indications of preparations for the September 11th attacks came at the end of 1999 when the Hamburg Group members began to interest themselves in flight training.

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Defense attorney Pinar now asked that Fromm's testimony be cited in the final verdict.

Chief Judge Rühle informed Pinar that it would be noted:

Defense attorney Pinar then asked Fromm if he could explain what he had meant by his testimony that the members of the Hamburg Group became ever more radical in their perspective.

Fromm advised that he had already explained this to the court. Atta and the other members of the Hamburg Group were not the fanatical Muslims that they later became to be. They had decided in 1998 or 1999 to take part in a Holy War and fight to the death, if necessary.

Defense attorney Pinar then asked whether it was a necessary element of their radical development to travel to Afghanistan. Fromm answered that it was not a necessary aspect of radical Islamic development.

She also asked whether Islamic radicals go to Afghanistan to participate in a "Jihad." Fromm advised that those radicals could go to Afghanistan to participate in "Jihad." However, they could also go to Chechnya and Bosnia to participate in a "Jihad."

Defense attorney Pinar asked how Fromm was able to identify the time period during which the Hamburg Group members were recruited for the September 11th plan. Fromm testified that this information was derived from the results of statements given by detained Mujahadeen. The information was also derived from "open" sources of information and information shared with the BfV by other intelligence agencies. Fromm could not answer the question any further.

Prosecutor Dr. Krauß next asked Fromm if he was aware that flight simulator computer programs had been discovered on Motassadeq's computer, and that these programs had existed on his computer prior to 1999. Fromm testified that this information was not known to him. If this were true, then such information would have been known by the experts at the BfV. Nonetheless, Fromm did not consider this information as relevant, since it would not have altered the final conclusion issued by the BfV.

Chief Prosecutor Walter Hemberger then asked Fromm if he had understood Fromm's testimony correctly. Namely, the BfV's conclusion that there was no previous intention to commit the acts of September 11th was based upon the absence of preparations for executing the plan, such as undertaking flight training. Fromm answered that it could not be viewed in such a strict manner.

To: Counterterrorism From: Berlin
Re: 315N-WF-227135, 12/05/2003

Associate Judge Sakuth asked Fromm how the Al-Jazeera journalist had been able to travel to Afghanistan and find the Al-Qaeda leadership. Fromm testified that it was described in the book. The journalist initially traveled to Pakistan where he waited for a telephone call. Thereafter, he was taken to a location where he was able to interview Binalshibh and KSM. Fromm had not seen the video of the interview, but he was familiar with the subsequent book. Fromm only knew the substance of the book's statements.

Defense attorney Pinar noted that she had seen the video, but that one could not see the faces of the interview subjects. She asked Fromm whether he doubted the authenticity of the identities of the interview subjects. Fromm answered that he did not doubt the identities of the interview subjects. In fact he had no doubts whatsoever regarding the authenticity of the statements made or the identities of the subjects.

Chief Judge Rühle asked if Fromm was basing his conclusions on the book by the Al-Jazeera journalist. Fromm said that it was so.

The Chief Judge informed Fromm that he was unfamiliar with this interview, either on film or in book format. Fromm suggested that the court obtain excerpts of the interview from the Internet.

The court then excused Fromm without requiring him to swear an oath to this testimony.

Defense Motion to Dismiss the Indictment and Release the Defendant

Defense attorney Michael Rosenthal advised the court that Fromm's testimony, which had been based upon carefully analyzed information, presented conclusions fundamentally contradicting the prosecutorial theory for the case. His testimony called into question not only whether the planning for the September 11th attacks had been formulated in Hamburg, but also whether such planning existed before or after 1999. If Fromm's testimony was correct, then the prosecution's Indictment was fundamentally flawed. Consequently, the defense was filing a Motion to Dismiss the Indictment and Release the Defendant from Custody.

Chief Prosecutor Hemberger argued against a dismissal of the matter. Fromm's testimony should not mislead the court into concluding that the prosecution's Indictment was incorrect. His testimony was based upon conclusions which had no further bearing to the main elements of the underlying criminal offenses.

To: Counterterrorism From: Berlin
Re: 315N-WF-227135, 12/05/2003

Chief Judge Rühle informed the defense that any Motion to Dismiss the Indictment and Release the Defendant from Custody needed to be in writing.

Thereafter, the court adjourned for lunch until 1:30 p.m. at which time the next witness was scheduled to testify.

To: Counterterrorism From: Berlin
Re: 315N-WF-227135, 12/05/2003

LEAD ~~(s)~~ :

Set Lead 1: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT ETIU4, DC

Read and clear.

Set Lead 2: (Info)

INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS

AT IO1, DC

Read and clear.

Set Lead 3: (Info)

NEW YORK

AT NEW YORK, NEW YORK

Read and clear.

Set Lead 4: (Discretionary)

WASHINGTON FIELD

AT WASHINGTON, DC

Disseminate as necessary.

fromm2.wpd

◆◆

DATE: 05-02-2006

CLASSIFIED BY 60309AUCTAM/MLT/CLS DUP TO 1006600 DATED 3/27/06
REASON: 1.4 (C) HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

DECLASSIFY ON: 05-02-2031

(01/26/1998)

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 07/08/1999

To: National Security
Bangkok
Islamabad

Attn: RFU: [redacted]
Attn: [redacted]
Attn: [redacted]

Manila

Attn: [redacted]

Riyadh

Attn: [redacted]

New York

Attn: [redacted]

From: New York

I-46

Contact: [redacted]

Approved By: [redacted]

Drafted By: [redacted]

Case ID #: (U) 265A-NY-252802 (Pending)

Title: (U) Manila Air;
AOT-IT;
OO:NY

Synopsis: ~~(S)~~ Summary of information obtained from the [redacted]
[redacted] with regard to Manila Air fugitive Khalid Shaikh
Mohammed. (S)

~~(S)~~ Derived From: G-3
Declassify On: X1

Details: ~~(S)~~ The Manila Air investigation was initiated in January 1995 when a terrorist plot was uncovered in Manila, the Philippines. [redacted] the FBI top ten fugitive wanted for [redacted] conspired with others to plant explosive devices aboard American jetliners while those aircraft were scheduled to be airborne and loaded with passengers on their way to the United States. [redacted] were subsequently arrested, rendered to the FBI-NYO, and convicted in the Southern District of New York.

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REQ 16-1a

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To: National Security From: New York
Re: (U) 265A-NY-252802, 07/08/1999

As a result of the continuing investigation, another conspirator was identified and in January of 1996 [redacted] was indicted for his involvement in the Manila conspiracy. The indictment of [redacted] was sealed at the time. On January 8, 1998, the indictment was unsealed and [redacted] qualified for inclusion in the State Department's Rewards Program.

There were numerous connections developed between [redacted] as detailed in prior communications. On June 18, 1999, representatives from FBI New York, FBIHQ, and Legat Riyadh, traveled to [redacted] to meet with [redacted] and his representatives from [redacted] as arranged [redacted] (S)

The [redacted] was advised of the purpose of the visit and was provided a complete report as to the connections between [redacted]

Representatives from [redacted] provided the following information:

[redacted] who was reported to be in [redacted] during mid 1998, is still currently living in Sharjah, [redacted] with his family. His wife [redacted] is the sister [redacted] (S) In addition, [redacted]

[redacted] and advised that they will share the information obtained. It was requested that the FBI be informed before any operation targeting [redacted] ends so we can meet and discuss the best course of action, to include a possible interview [redacted] G

We were informed that in July 1998, authorities from [redacted] based on information probably obtained from Qatar, located [redacted] living and working in [redacted] After questioning him about his activities with the Jama at-ul-Ikhwan El-Muslimin (Muslim Brotherhood), he was deported to Bahrain. (S)

[redacted] full name is [redacted] and he is [redacted]. His other names are [redacted]

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To: National Security From: New York
Re: (U) 265A-NY-252802, 07/08/1999

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It is believed that the information regarding [redacted]
[redacted] was obtained during the questioning of Zahid

(S)

It was also advised that [redacted] is currently
living in Pakistan.

(S)

The numbers were negative in IIIA and Telephone
Applications. FBIHQ and [redacted] are also running the numbers.
[redacted] has been tasked by FBIHQ to collect on these
numbers.

(S)

A

(S)

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To: National Security From: New York
Re: (U) 265A-NY-252802, 07/08/1999

~~LEAD (S)~~:

Set Lead 1:

National Security

at Radical Fundamentalist Unit

In order to avoid duplication of efforts, FBIHQ is requested to check with [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] as to any available subscriber information on the [REDACTED] (S)

Set Lead 2:

Bangkok

at Bangkok Thailand

For information

Set Lead 3:

Islamabad

at Islamabad, Pakistan

Legat Islamabad is requested to contact the appropriate Liaison in an attempt to determine the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] In addition, if possible, Legat Islamabad is requested to obtain [REDACTED] that may be available. (S)

Set Lead 4:

Manila

at Manila, Philippines

For information

Set Lead 5:

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To: National Security From: New York
Re: (U) 265A-NY-252802, 07/08/1999

Riyadh

at Riyadh, Saudi Arabia

For information

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REQ 16-1a

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DECLASSIFIED BY 60309AUCATAM/MLT/CLS
ON 04-26-2006

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Page 1

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 06/17/2002

To: Counterterrorism

Attn: UBLU/RFU

Tampa

SA [REDACTED]
ORA 1

From: Philadelphia

Squad 11, PhJTTF

Contact: IRS [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED] smh

Case ID #: ~~(S)~~ 199N-PH-93296 (Pending)

Title: ~~(S)~~ KHALED A. SHOUKRY
IT - UBL

Synopsis: ~~(S)~~ SAC authorizes opening preliminary inquiry (PI)
based upon subject's contact with [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] a former associate of Mohammed Atta.

~~(S)~~ Derived From: G-3
Declassify On: X1

(U) Preliminary Inquiry Instituted: 06/17/2002, set to expire
10/14/2002.

Package Copy: ~~(S)~~ Being forwarded under separate cover to
assigned case agent are the results from Choicepoint and internet
searches [REDACTED]

Details: (U) On 9/16/2001, agents from the Orlando Resident
Agency (ORA) contacted [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The ORA interviewed [REDACTED]
because he was identified by the father of suicide pilot Muhammed
Muhammad Al-Amir Awad Al-Sayad (Al-Amir), a.k.a. Muhammad Atta,
as an "associate" of Al-Amir. Information from this interview, in
case number 265A-NY-280350-TP, provided the basis for the opening
of a preliminary inquiry in Philadelphia.

~~(S)~~ Full details of interview and the polygraph result
with [REDACTED] follow. The link between the Philadelphia
subject and [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] in Queens during May through November 1996. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] since December 2000, stated that Al-Amir had been
in New York and met [REDACTED] once during this time period.

Case ID : 199N-PH-93296

Serial : 1

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Because of this association, and [redacted] possible knowledge of Al-Amir (Atta), Philadelphia has opened a PI.

(S) [redacted] interview information indicated that [redacted] had received a [redacted] and worked for an unknown employer in Philadelphia. A search of the Choicepoint/Infotek system reveals that [redacted]

[redacted] These results also show a Queens, NY address corresponding to the 1996 time period when he was [redacted] personal details follow:

Name: [redacted]

Current Address: [redacted]

DOB: [redacted]

SSN: [redacted]

OLN: [redacted]

Telephone: [redacted]

Possible Employer: [redacted]

Education: [redacted]

(S) Case background [redacted] On the afternoon of 9/16/2001, agents from the ORA contacted [redacted] at his residence. He gave consent for the search of his home and documents were obtained showing [redacted]

(S) [redacted] had several newspapers clippings, e-mail printouts, letters and notes which showed he is an active member of the Muslim American Society (MAS), a group dedicated to promoting a positive public image of Muslims in the United States. [redacted] is also a member of the Media Watch Board of the MAS, which is dedicated to monitoring the American media for perceived anti-Arab prejudice. Some of the MAS literature [redacted] emphasized that Muslims should remain mute or indifferent to the terrorist attacks of 9/11/2001, but should be vocal in their condemning of the violence. [redacted] also recently became a volunteer [redacted] in the Florida Department of Corrections for incarcerated Muslim prisoners.

(S) After the consent search of his home, [redacted] voluntarily came to the ORA where he was interviewed for over six hours. Present during the interview and acting as [redacted] counsel was [redacted] who is an attorney.

(S) [redacted] provided the following information concerning his background and his relationship and knowledge of

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AL-AMIR: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
befriended AL-AMIR.

[REDACTED] knows AL-AMIR by his true name and prior to approximately 9/14/2001, had never heard the name MUHAMMED ATTA.

* After graduation, AL-AMIR enrolled in an intensive German language program at a well-known school in Cairo named Gotta. AL-AMIR told [REDACTED] that he needed to become fluent in German to be eligible to attend a graduate level civil engineering school in Germany. It was common knowledge among the engineering graduates from Cairo University that the best graduate engineering programs were in the United States or Germany. The American schools were known as selective and expensive and the German schools offered free tuition to any applicant who was fluent in German.

* In their senior year at Cairo University and for the next several years, [REDACTED] AL-AMIR and their friends frequented a sports club in Cairo named Nadi Said, where they played soccer and basketball and swam. The club was co-ed; therefore, no fundamentalist Muslims came to the club.

* Between 1990 and 1998, AL-AMIR never expressed any extremist or fundamentalist beliefs, nor did he ever express any hostility to the United States or any other western country.

* Between 1990 and 1998, AL-AMIR engaged in social activities such as attending movie theaters, which further indicated [REDACTED] that AL-AMIR was not then a Muslim fundamentalist.

* AL-AMIR never talked about aviation or wanting to become a pilot.

* AL-AMIR was never in the military, nor did he ever have any technical training which [REDACTED] would be helpful to carrying out any of the terrorist attacks of 9/11/2001.

* [REDACTED] in Cairo until May 1996, when he traveled to the United States and lived in Long Island and applied for civil engineering jobs. [REDACTED] found that he could not get satisfactory employment in the United States without a graduate degree.

* When [REDACTED] first arrived in New York in May 1996, he lived for about two weeks [REDACTED] with a distant cousin whom [REDACTED] had never met or spoken with before coming to New York. [REDACTED] then moved into an apartment [REDACTED] with [REDACTED]

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four roommates:



* In November 1996, [redacted] returned to Cairo and applied for enrollment at the University of California at Los Angeles, University of California at Berkeley, Arizona State University, the University of Florida and UCF. [redacted] applied to UCF because one of his professors at Cairo University, [redacted] had a brother, [redacted] who was a professor at UCF and offered to provide a good reference [redacted] to get admitted to UCF. Because of his test scores, [redacted] was accepted only at Arizona State University and UCF. [redacted] accepted the UCF offer and in August 1997, he enrolled as a first year graduate student in the Civil Engineering Department at UCF.

* [redacted] does not know whether AL-AMIR was close to any of his professors at Cairo University or whether he maintained contact with any of the faculty at Cairo University.

* In approximately 1996, AL-AMIR told [redacted] that as part of his education in Germany, he had gone to Hallab, Syria to study ancient architecture.

* When [redacted] returned to Cairo in November 1996, AL-AMIR was staying with his parents and was actively "trying to get married." AL-AMIR told [redacted] he was returning to Cairo from Hamburg, Germany as often as he could in his effort to marry a suitable Egyptian woman. AL-AMIR was then a full-time student at an unknown university and working part-time as an architectural engineer for an unknown employer. AL-AMIR, like most young Egyptian males his age, was preoccupied with finding a suitable Egyptian wife.

* [redacted] initially said he never had any contact of any kind with AL-AMIR since [redacted] Orlando, Florida in June 1997. [redacted] also initially denied having telephone, personal, indirect or e-mail contact with AL-AMIR since 1997 or perhaps as recently as 1998.

* [redacted] believes the last telephonic contact he had with AL-AMIR was a telephone call in 1997 or 1998 in which [redacted]

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called AL-AMIR at his apartment in Hamburg, Germany. [redacted] telephone directory on his home computer show the [redacted] AL-AMIR then had an e-mail address [redacted] presumes the e-mail address was provided to AL-AMIR by the school he was attending in Hamburg. [redacted] last sent an e-mail to AL-AMIR in approximately 1998 and the e-mail bounced.

* AL-AMIR then had at least one roommate in Germany. At least twice, the roommate answered the phone when [redacted] called for AL-AMIR. [redacted] does not know anything about the roommate except that based upon the roommate's manner of speaking Arabic, [redacted] does not believe the roommate was Egyptian. [redacted] never talked with AL-AMIR about his roommates, he never met any of the roommates, nor did he ever hear any names of roommates.

* The last phone call in 1997 or 1998 consisted of conversation about their respective efforts to meet and marry a suitable Egyptian female. AL-AMIR expressed his unhappiness about the fact he was unable to carry out the required courtship which took at least two weeks. AL-AMIR had only a few days at a time to return to Cairo from Hamburg because of his schooling and employment.

* In May 2000, [redacted] met his future wife via the Internet and they got engaged in June 2000 and set their wedding date for December 30, 2000.

* When they met, [redacted] wife was a fourth year medical student at the University of Florida in Gainesville. She graduated in June 2000 and is now a resident in the family practice department at Florida Hospital, Orlando's largest hospital. [redacted] wife works shifts of 24 hours and is therefore away from home for extended periods of time.

* In July 2000, [redacted] called the phone numbers he had for AL-AMIR to invite him to his wedding. When [redacted] spoke with AL-AMIR's father [redacted] the father told him he did not know where his son was and told [redacted] not to call again.

* [redacted] then called AL-AMIR [redacted] [redacted] told him nobody in their family knew where AL-AMIR was, but he did occasionally call the family. When [redacted] again asked where AL-AMIR was, [redacted] AL-AMIR was in Syria. [redacted] for a telephone number for AL-AMIR so he could call AL-AMIR himself. [redacted] said she would give AL-AMIR his number and tell AL-AMIR that [redacted] wanted to speak with him.

* During the interview on 9/16-17/2001, [redacted] was insistent he has not attempted to call or e-mail AL-AMIR since July 2000 and has not had contact with him since December 1998.

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* At the time of the interview, [] had in his wallet a piece of folded paper about 5" X 5" which he said he created using Excel Spreadsheet software. The paper was a list of names and telephone numbers. [] created the list approximately four months ago when he obtained a telephone calling card account number for calling long distance for about \$.05 per minute.

* The list has a total of nine names and associated telephone numbers. [] went over the list in detail and identified what his relationship is with the individuals and what his most recent contact with each person was. The people whose names are on the list are friends or relatives [] or his wife. One name had no phone numbers in the columns beside the name.

* [] has had contact with eight of the nine people on the list at least since January 2001. [] has spoken by phone with six of eight of the persons on the list at least once a month for the past several years. AL-AMIR is the only person on the list with whom [] has not had contact since January 2001. [] denied having contact with him since December 1998.

* [] was questioned about the inconsistency in his account of his having the list of phone numbers in his wallet yet denying contact with AL-AMIR since 1998. He remained adamant he has not had any contact with AL-AMIR since 1998.

* One of the names on the list is [] whom [] identified as another classmate from engineering school at Cairo University. []

* [] AL-AMIR from Cairo university and knew [] [] was friends with AL-AMIR. After the attacks on 9/11/2001, [] They discussed the attacks and the fact AL-AMIR's photograph was being shown on the Internet and television as one of the suicide pilots.

* [] does not believe AL-AMIR [] were friends or that they ever talked by phone other than the one three way call.

* [] claimed that when he saw AL-AMIR's photograph on the Internet and television, he did not believe the person was AL-AMIR for the following reasons:

1. The pilot was identified as MUHAMMED ATTA, not MUHAMMED AMIR.
2. The pilot was described as being born in the United Arab Emirates. [] knew AL-AMIR was born in Cairo.

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3. The pilot was described as having a degree in electrical engineering. AL-AMIR had a degree in architectural engineering.
4. The person whose picture was on the Internet and television was described as having attended flight schools in Florida. [] knew that if AL-AMIR had come to Florida, he would have contacted EL-[] and he did not.
5. [] believed the photograph looked like AL-AMIR, but he was not positive it was him.

* On approximately 9/14/2001, [] was called at home by [] who also graduated from the engineering department of Cairo University in 1990. [] asked [] if he had seen the photograph of the suicide pilots and [] replied affirmatively. They then briefly discussed whether one of the photographs looked like AL-AMIR. [] told [] none of the photographs was AL-AMIR and that Al-AMIR's name was not ATTA. [] does not have a phone number or other contact information for []

* The two numbers on the list for "MOHAMMED AMEER" are:

1. [] (listed in Cairo EC dated 9/13/2001 as the home telephone number of AL-AMIR's father) The number was in a column headed "Home."
2. [] The number is in a column headed "CELL PHONE."

* [] was last in New York City in January 2001 when he and his wife flew to Cairo via Kennedy Airport for their honeymoon. [] has been in Washington, D.C. only once and that was in the winter of 1998 as part of his studies in at UCF.

(S) [] was returned to his home by ORA agents on the early morning of 9/17/2001. [] consented to a search of his vehicle. The ORA SA told [] agents would contact him later on 9/17/2001 for a follow up interview. [] said he was planning to go to work in a few hours. The apartment and []'s car were kept under surveillance. Approximately an hour after he was left at the apartment, [] walked from his apartment and threw a garbage bag into a trash dumpster a short distance from his apartment. The bag was subsequently retrieved and it contained food stuffs, newspapers and documents which appeared to be notes [] wife had written about patients at her hospital. There were no documents in the bag which had not been examined during the earlier consent search.

(S) Later on the morning of 9/17/2001, []

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left his apartment and drove to work, where he remained except for an out- of-office meeting with co-workers. Twice during the day, [] called the ORA agent who had interviewed him on 9/16-17/2001 to when somebody would contact him to complete the interview.

(*) On the evening of 9/17/2001, FBI TP and FBI NY agreed that [] should be polygraphed. Since [] had been up all night and then worked all day, it was decided to polygraph him on the morning of 9/18/2001. On 9/17/2001, NY SAs [] flew to Orlando to participate in interviews related to [] apartment and car were kept under surveillance until he was picked up at the apartment at approximately 9:30 A.M., 9/18/2001 and transported to the ORA. [] wife and sister-in-law drove to the ORA in a separate vehicle.

(*) On the morning and early afternoon of 9/18/2001, [] was interviewed at the ORA in the presence of his sister-in-law by an ORA SA and NY SA []. Another ORA SA and NY SA [] interviewed [] wife. The statements by [] are consistent except for the fact she thought [] had worked as a civil engineer in Lebanon after graduation from Cairo University and that [] had met AL-AMIR in New York once when [] was living in Queens in 1996. [] has denied knowing anything about the terrorist attacks of 9/11/2001. [] said she believed it would be her moral and religious obligation to tell the FBI if he had admitted any such knowledge. [] denied knowing who AL-AMIR was until 9/11/2001 and said her husband initially did not believe the person whose picture was on the Internet and television was the person he knew from college. [] said she has never met or talked with AL-AMIR.

(*) During the interview on the morning of 9/18/2001, [] was questioned in great detail about the chronology of his most recent contacts with AL-AMIR. [] provided the following details which differ from his statement on 9/16-17/2001:

* [] initially said the last personal contact [] had with AL-AMIR was in December 2000, when [] returned to Cairo during Christmas vacation from UCF. During the interview by the polygrapher, [] revised the date to May 1999, when UCF was on summer break. It was the subjective opinion of the SAs who interviewed [] that he appeared to have difficulty reconstructing his activities during the past several years.

* After [] moved to Orlando and was attending UCF, he attempted to reach AL-AMIR by telephone in Germany and was told by a female who answered the phone that AL-AMIR no longer lived at the number. The female appeared to know who AL-AMIR was. [] estimated that call was before between January and May

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1999; however, he could not further specify the date of the call.

* In 1999, [] sent an e-mail to AL-AMIR at his school e-mail address and it bounced.

* After that call, [] attempted to reach AL-AMIR through AL-AMIR's father. [] estimated he called AL-AMIR's home in Cairo [] three times between May 1999 and July 2000. Each time, AL-AMIR's father told [] he did not know where AL-AMIR was or how to reach him. The fourth call was in July 2000, when [] called to invite AL-AMIR to his wedding. AL-AMIR's father answered and immediately began to yell at [] not to call any more. AL-AMIR's father said that AL-AMIR was also in Florida. When [] asked where in Florida AL-AMIR was, AL-AMIR's father got angry with [] and [] hung up.

* After the July 2000 call, [] had his fiancée call AL-AMIR's father to get AL-AMIR's [] phone number. [] then called [] identified himself and asked for AL-AMIR's number. [] told him she did not have a number and that AL-AMIR was in Syria. [] described [] statement as an unequivocal statement that AL-AMIR was in Syria rather than a statement that she thought he was there. [] said AL-AMIR "sometimes calls us" and promised to give him [] number when he did call.

* [] then searched the Internet for AL-AMIR's phone number in Florida. He located about one hundred possible numbers for AL-AMIR, using variations on the spelling of the name and he began calling the numbers. After about five calls, [] gave up, realizing he could call all of the numbers and still not reach AL-AMIR.

* [] discussed the calls [] had with AL-AMIR's father and [] unsuccessful attempts to locate AL-AMIR via the Internet. [] advised [] to stop trying to find AL-AMIR, stating that if AL-AMIR wanted to talk to [] he would have called him.

* [] was adamant that he did not speak by phone with AL-AMIR since late 1998 and that he did not speak to AL-AMIR in person after [] got engaged in June 2000.

* The last time [] spoke by phone with AL-AMIR was in late 1998 when [] called AL-AMIR in Germany at []. In that call, [] connected a three way call with their mutual friend, [] who was then living in Saskatchewan, Canada and working as a civil engineer. The call was almost entirely related to their respective efforts to meet and marry a suitable Egyptian woman.

* It was in the 1998 call that AL-AMIR first displayed any conservative or fundamentalists beliefs. During the call, AL-

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AMIR told the other two they should "be strong and not give in" to women by having pre-marital sex. AL-AMIR also advised [redacted] to pray daily. Those admonishments were the first time AL-AMIR had ever talked about such beliefs, suggesting to [redacted] that AL-AMIR had recently become significantly more religious.

* In May 1998, when [redacted] saw AL-AMIR in Cairo, AL-AMIR was staying with his parents and was planning to return to Hamburg. When [redacted] was in Cairo in May 1998, he saw AL-AMIR once or twice. AL-AMIR then had a beard and closely cropped hair. [redacted] said such an appearance would immediately draw attention to AL-AMIR as a fundamentalist Muslim and could possibly cause the police to detain, question and possibly arrest AL-AMIR.

* In [redacted] opinion, the appearance would also make it very difficult for AL-AMIR to find a wife because of the reluctance of most Egyptian females to accept the subservient role a female would have in a marriage with a Muslim fundamentalist.

* AL-AMIR told [redacted] that both his parents disapproved of his wearing the beard.

* In May 1998, AL-AMIR would no longer meet [redacted] at night and he spoke negatively of the sports club which they had previously frequented.

* By May 1998, AL-AMIR had obviously adopted a fundamentalist life; however, he did not express any militant views about the United States and he definitely did not say anything suggesting he would ever become involved in something like the 9/11/2001 attacks.

* In May 1998, AL-AMIR told [redacted] he had been to Mecca and had completed Hajj, an Islamic religious undertaking indicating he had become devoutly religious. AL-AMIR did not specify when he had been to Mecca; however, [redacted] believes it would have been approximately three months after Ramadan in 1998.

~~(S)~~ [redacted] was then given a polygraph exam and no deception was found on his negative answers on the following issues:

Did you have any advance knowledge of the terrorist attacks on 9/11/2001?

Have you had contact of any kind with AL-AMIR since January 2000?

~~(S)~~ [redacted] was then transported back to his residence where he voluntarily surrendered his home computer. On 9/19/2001, a TP FBI CART examiner made an image of the contents of the computer's hard drive. TP is in the process of obtaining [redacted] telephone and e-mail records.

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~~(S)~~ At the conclusion of the interviews of 9/18/2001, [redacted] denied he has had any phone, e-mail or other contact [redacted] or any other person to discuss the attacks or his interviews by the FBI since he was first contacted by the FBI on 9/16/2001.

~~(S)~~ Based upon the above, it appears [redacted] had no knowledge of AL-AMIR's presence in Florida during the period 2000 through 2001 or advance knowledge of the terrorist attacks of 9/11/2001. It also appears [redacted] has cooperated with the FBI to date. [redacted] has agreed to maintain contact with the ORA. [redacted] voluntarily surrendered both his and his wife's passports. [redacted] and his wife are permanent resident aliens and are awaiting approval of their applications to become naturalized United States citizens.

Descriptive Data:

Reference

Name -

Last:

First:

Middle:

Race:

Sex:

DOB:

POB:

DLN:

DLN:

PNO:

PNO:

SOC:

Address(es) -

House #:

Street Name:

City:

State:

Phone #:

Phone #:

Phone #:

~~(S)~~ Philadelphia believes the link between [redacted] and [redacted] is significant, and will conduct logical investigation to develop any information about [redacted] possible contact with Al-Amir (Atta).

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1:

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

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COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

~~(S)~~ Read and clear.

Set Lead 2: (Adm)

TAMPA

AT ORLANDO, FLORIDA

~~(S)~~ Read and clear.

Set Lead 3: (Adm)

NEW YORK

AT NEW YORK, NEW YORK

~~(S)~~ Read and clear.

~~SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 05-02-2006 BY [redacted] Working Copy ----

60309AUCTAM/MLT/CLS DUP

TO 1006600, DATED 3/22/06

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#45

Page 1

Precedence: PRIORITY

Date: 10/23/2001

To: Riyadh

Attn: ALAT Sana's, Yemen

From: New York

I-44

Contact: SA [redacted]

Approved By: [redacted]

Drafted By: [redacted]:jmf

Case ID #: 265A-NY-280350 (Pending)

Title: PENTTBOM

Synopsis: New York requests agents in Sana's Yemen contact and interview [redacted] regarding their knowledge and association with [redacted] [redacted] is suspected of conspiring to aid the attackers of the PENTTBOM case. New York also requests Sana's to determine the exact date [redacted] was rejected for a U.S. visa.

Enclosures: Enclosed for SANAA is one (1) copy of West Covina, California FD-302 and background information of [redacted]

Details: New York spoke to a source who revealed that [redacted] [redacted] applied for a visa together in Sana's, Yemen. Investigation has revealed that [redacted] applied for a visa to the United States on or about August 12, 1995.

[redacted] whom the German government has an arrest warrant for, and with MOHAMED ATTA, a hijacker aboard American Airlines Flight 11. There is evidence linking [redacted] to hijacker ZIAD SAMIR JARRAH and others. ZIAD JARRAH attempted several times to [redacted] admitted to flight training in the United States.

Source stated that the [redacted] [redacted] wrote a letter of recommendation for [redacted] to assist in [redacted] efforts to secure a visa to the United States. [redacted] worked for the Central Bank of Yemen at that time. Source believed that [redacted] became acquainted [redacted] worked as an intern at the International Bank of Yemen. [redacted] worked at the International Bank of Yemen until approximately August 1995.

[redacted] was granted a visa and went to school in the United States, [redacted]

[redacted] was not granted a visa to the United States. [redacted]

Case ID : 315N-NY-280350-OUT

Serial : 1264

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Germany and [REDACTED] however,

Following a lead independent of New York, FBI agents from the West Covina RA in California interviewed an individual named [REDACTED] hijackers KHALID AL-MIDHAR and NAWAF ALHAZMI through college and address information. [REDACTED] in California. [REDACTED]

FBI agents from the West Covina RA also interviewed [REDACTED] on or about Friday September 28, 2001. (See enclosed FD-302) [REDACTED] was not asked about and did not mention any association [REDACTED] did advise agents that he planned on leaving the United States as soon as possible.

New York contacted the West Covina RA on Sunday September 30, 2001. Agents in West Covina have attempted repeatedly to locate and re-interview [REDACTED] with negative results. It is believed that [REDACTED] returned to Sana's, Yemen.

New York requests agents in Sana's, Yemen to review the visa application(s) [REDACTED] also known as [REDACTED] of August 12, 1995 with special emphasis on locating the letter provided [REDACTED] may have made several other applications using a different passport number and/or name variation. [REDACTED] also used the [REDACTED]

New York requests agents locate and interview [REDACTED] (A Central Bank of Yemen employee as of August 1995) and question them as to their knowledge [REDACTED] knowledge and association with any of the alleged hijackers, especially KHALID AL-MIDHAR and NAWAF AL-HAZMI.

Lastly, New York requests Sana's determine the date [REDACTED] was rejected for a U.S. visa. The U.S. Attorney, SDNY, has requested this information for use in an affidavit for a warrant [REDACTED]

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60309AUCTAM/MLT/CLS DUP

TO 1006600, DATED 3/22/06

3/19/2001

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[redacted] (Protect Identity) (hereinafter referred to as the source for security purposes), [redacted]

[redacted] was interviewed at an undisclosed location. Present during the interview was [redacted] attorney for the source, and JOSEPH BIANCO and MICHAEL McGOVERN, Assistant United States Attorneys (AUSA), Southern District of New York (S.D.N.Y.). AUSA PATRICK FITZGERALD was present on 03/16/2001 and 03/17/2001. At the outset of the interview, the source was presented and signed a proffer agreement which was prepared by the S.D.N.Y. and explained to him by his attorney, [redacted]

The agreement was presented to the source for his signature on each day of the interview and witnessed by those present. Source thereafter provided the following information:

Source was born [redacted]

[redacted]
[redacted] had decided to relocate to California in order to become a producer. Source decided to accompany [redacted] to California in 1987, where he attended [redacted]

[redacted] During this time, he stayed with his friend [redacted] of California and worked in two locations [redacted]

[redacted] He attended school during the day.

While in California, source attended a mosque on 10th Avenue in Northridge. He was [redacted] the mosque by the Imam, whose name he does not recall. He also changed residences at this time and began staying with an individual [redacted] who had

Case ID : 265A-NY-259391-302
265A-NY-259391-Y

Serial : 309
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recently immigrated to the United States [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] It was at this time that the source began to hear about the war in Afghanistan. Numerous people at the mosque spoke concerning Afghanistan, including [REDACTED] the mosque. Source became convinced that it was his Muslim duty to participate in the jihad in Afghanistan. He read numerous flyers and newsletters at the mosque which provided him information as to how to relocate to Afghanistan in order to support the jihad or holy war.

At this time, an individual in New York by the name of [REDACTED] [REDACTED] an organization which assisted people in traveling to Afghanistan, telephoned the Northridge Mosque. [REDACTED] was calling numerous mosques around the country in an effort to recruit people to travel to Afghanistan. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

DECLASSIFIED BY 60309AUCTAM/MLT/CLS DUP TO 1006600, DATED 4/25/06
ON 05-11-2006

~~SECRET~~

Connections of San Diego PENTTBOMB Subjects
to the Government of Saudi Arabia

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[REDACTED]

emigre community in San Diego; has been in contact with UBL family members; ardent UBL supporter; very close associate [REDACTED] Flight #77 hijackers Nawaf AlHazmi and Khalid Al-Mihdhar).

S- Current Status: In custody in San Diego (Southern District of California) charged with two counts of violating Title 18, USC, Section 1546 (visa fraud); [REDACTED]

Links to Saudi Government:

~~SECRET~~



ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 04-20-2006 BY
0309AUCTAM/MLT/LR2

U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

#59

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Phoenix, Arizona 85012
January 4, 2004

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LOTFI RAISSI,

[redacted]
Lotfi Raissi is described as a white male, [redacted]
[redacted] This communication augments
prior disseminations regarding [redacted] and summarizes information
obtained which established reason to believe [redacted]
[redacted] Hani Hanjour, the presumed pilot of the hijacked
American Airlines Flight 77 on 09/11/2001 who flew the plane into
the Pentagon.

[redacted]
On August 21, 1993, at 19:45 [redacted] the
line at the Gulf Air check-in desk at Heathrow Airport. While
waiting, [redacted] a passenger in
the line. [redacted] was arrested and charged with Theft.
On September 27, 1993, he was convicted at Uxbridge Magistrates
Court.

It has been established through efforts by LEGAT Rome
that [redacted] the Italian
authorities on August 22, 1996 [redacted]
[redacted] To summarize circumstances surrounding the
detention, the following is provided:

On August 22, 1996, two Italian National Police
Officers stopped an individual who appeared to be North African
behaving in a suspicious manner in Rome, Italy. The individual
produced an international driver's license, issued in Egypt,
identifying him [redacted]
[redacted] Various checks revealed [redacted] had a criminal

LOTFI RAISSI

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history under numerous aliases (identified as [redacted]) His driver's license was seized and he was charged with false information and false documents.

[redacted] had made a telephone call on his cellular telephone as he was being stopped by the police, advising the recipient of the call, in French, that he was being stopped by the police. The police determined that the number he called, [redacted] was subscribed to by the Hotel Napoleon, Pizza Vittorio Emanuel II. The police went to the hotel and learned that [redacted] telephone call had been transferred to a room occupied by an Algerian and a French woman. The police also learned from the hotel personnel that the Algerian had received Arabic speaking males as visitors to the hotel room.

The hotel registry indicated that the Algerian had provided French documents to the hotel in the name [redacted] A French identity card number [redacted] issued in France on 12/10/1991 identified [redacted] The French woman possessed a French passport, number [redacted] issued in France on 07/22/1994 identifying [redacted] [redacted] also possessed copies of two other French government documents indicating that his name [redacted]

The police went to the hotel room and found the woman hurriedly packing a suitcase, and a man taking a shower. Upon seeing the police, the woman threw herself on the floor, screaming. The man told her, in French, that "they're Italian police, they're excrement." The Italian police found an Algerian [redacted] containing [redacted] photograph, issued to [redacted] Also found were the following items: a copy of the Koran - which the Algerian did not want touched, a form I-20M-N, entitled, US Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Certificate of Eligibility for Non-immigrant (M-1) Student Status For Vocational Students. (A M1 visa is issued for vocational or non-academic student training.)

On the same day that [redacted] questioned by the Italian police, 08/22/1996, two other [redacted]

[redacted] were stopped at the Rome-Fiumicino airport. [redacted] were in possession of false French passports and tickets for New York. [redacted] also

LOTFI RAISSI

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possessed fraudulent French documents and tickets to New York on the same day [redacted]. The passports were issued to true individuals, but [redacted] photographs had been substituted for the photographs of the original holders of the passports. They were not permitted to travel to New York since their passports were fraudulent. LEGAT Rome recently learned that [redacted] was an associate [redacted] and that they played soccer together. The Italians seized [redacted] cellular telephone on 08/22/1996 and LEGAT Rome has requested the results of the Italian investigation into the telephone. Initial results reveal contacts with four Italian cellular telephones:

[redacted] subscribed to [redacted]

[redacted] subscribed to [redacted]

[redacted] subscribed to [redacted]

[redacted] subscribed to [redacted]

[redacted] subscribed to [redacted]

[redacted] The Italian investigator indicated that these individuals are criminals involved in prostitution and narcotics. The Italian investigator offered that one of the telephone numbers is associated [redacted]

[redacted] however, they did not have the full connection yet. [redacted] may be involved in narcotics trafficking. Additionally, LEGAT Rome, also learned that

[redacted] was stopped in Dublin, Ireland on either 08/13/1996 or 08/15/1996, coming from the Rome - Fiumicino airport with a false French passport in his own name and an French identification card [redacted]

[redacted]

Phoenix [redacted] applied for a B-1 and B-2 visa in Tunis on 8/19/1996 but was refused due to insufficient documentation. On 08/22/96 he was detained and questioned by the Italians and his Algerian passport, no [redacted] was seized. On 10/24/96 he applied for an M-1 visa in Tunis with Algerian passport, no [redacted]. This was granted. In early November 1996, [redacted] enrolled in flight training in Phoenix, Arizona and obtained an apartment [redacted]

[redacted] passport was recovered by his mother in Rome on 12/03/1996.) On 05/10/2001, [redacted] applied in London for an M-1 Visa. The Consulate in Tunis conducted a search and issued the M-1 Visa. [redacted] passport, number

[redacted] and the visa was requested for the purpose of attending flight training at K&S Aviation in Phoenix, Arizona. The adjudication occurred on 05/8/2001 and the M-1 visa was issued on 05/10/2001 with an expiration of 05/3/2002. [redacted]

[redacted] by the British in 1993

LOTFI RAISSI

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for theft under the alias of [redacted] or his use of the [redacted] alias in his visa application.

The FBI received information from multiple individual who represented that [redacted] Hanjour were associated. The results of those interviews have been previously disseminated via a Letter Head Memorandum dated 09/22/2001. The information set forth below are excerpts from those interviews which established the basis for believing [redacted] with Hanjour.

On September 14, 2001, [redacted] provided the following information:

[redacted] Sawyer, School of Aviation, hereafter referred to as Sawyer, 2730 Sky Harbor Blvd., Phoenix, Arizona 85034, telephone number: [redacted] facsimile number: (602) 244-2282. [redacted] at Sawyer. She has been employed with Sawyer [redacted]

[redacted] remembers that four male individuals that she believed to be from the Middle East joined the Sims Club at Sawyer on 06/23/2001. [redacted] researched Sawyer computer records for Sims Club membership and identified the following male individuals as being the Middle Eastern individuals who joined the club on 06/23/2001: [redacted]

[redacted] Hani Hanjour. Sawyer records reflects that Hanjour's [redacted] membership at the Sims Club expired on 07/29/2001. [redacted] membership expired on 08/08/2001.

[redacted] provided interviewing Agent with a copy of Sawyer Simulator Club records naming the above described individuals. These were place in a 1A envelope.

[redacted] stated that she distinctly remembers the above listed individuals because they wandered around the Sawyer facility liked they owned the place. They would all come into the facility at once and block off large segments of time on the AST-300 flight simulator. They would take turns using the simulator. When one of them was using the simulator the others would be lounging around the snack bar area or taking a nap while waiting for their turns on the simulator. [redacted] described these individuals as being rude to other Sawyer employees. [redacted] stated that these individuals would come in together. Sometimes all four would come in and at other times two would come in. She

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LOTFI RAISSI

believes that two of the individuals only participated briefly in the training. She could not remember which two.

The individuals described above would not normally make reservations to block out time to use the simulator on the Sawyer's simulator schedule. [] that the norm is for club members to call the Sawyer front desk and reserve simulator time. It is unusual for members not to reserve time in advance.

[] never saw a vehicle(s) associated with the above described individuals.

[] described the individuals as follows:

UNSUB #1 Middle Eastern, male, early to mid 20s in age, 5'2"-5'4" in height, 160 lbs. in weight, short and stocky build, dark olive complexion, black short curly hair, back mustache, spoke English with a heavy accent.

UNSUB #2 Middle Eastern, male, early to mid 20s in age, 5'9" - 5'10" in height, 170 lbs. in weight, medium build, dark colored short/medium length hair, dark full mustache.

UNSUB #3 Middle Eastern, male, early - mid 20s in age, 5'8" in height, 170 lbs. in weight, olive complexion, medium build, dark colored hair cut short, dark colored mustache.

UNSUB #4 Middle Eastern, male, early to mid 20s in age, 5'6" - 5'7" in height, olive complexion, dark colored hair, dark colored beard and mustache.

On September 15, 2001 [] provided FBI Phoenix the following information:

[] advised that he was employed [] at Arizona Aviation Academy from 1991-1999. [] Hani Hanjour at the Arizona Aviation Academy in 1997. [] advised that Hanjour had two additional flight instructors while attending Arizona Aviation Academy, []

[] when Hanjour first began flying lessons at Arizona Aviation Academy, Hanjour already had some advanced training and a private pilots license. []

LOTFI RAISSI

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Hanjour was training on the Cessna 172, which is a single engine, four seat and 150 horse power engine. [redacted] the ability to fly a Cessna 172 could transfer over to the ability to fly a 757 airplane. [redacted] Hanjour was also training for an instrument level, and the instructor for this training [redacted]

[redacted] Hanjour was a terrible pilot. Hanjour had difficulty understanding air traffic control, the methods for determining fuel management and had poor navigational skills. [redacted] the only flying skill Hanjour could perform was flying the plane straight. [redacted] he did not believe Hanjour's poor flying skills were due to a language barrier. [redacted] Hanjour took lessons [redacted] two to three times per week, for two months. [redacted] after two months, [redacted]

[redacted] Hanjour as very quiet, and did not discuss politics, the military or any aspect of his personal life; however, [redacted] Hanjour became very upset, [redacted] [redacted] Hanjour would occasionally cheat on several flying tests and when confronted about it, Hanjour would lie about it. [redacted] [redacted] Hanjour only associated with the other Arab students, while at Arizona Aviation Academy.


[redacted] Hanjour as a male, 5'5", short dark hair, light complexion, slight build, well spoken, and possessed adequate English skills. [redacted] was shown a picture of Hanjour and [redacted] that was the person [redacted] at Arizona Aviation Academy.

[redacted] when he refused to continue instructing Hanjour, Hanjour started training [redacted] [redacted] Hanjour completed his training [redacted]

LOTFI RAISSI



On September 16, 2001, Phoenix FBI interviewed [redacted] regarding her knowledge of Hani Hanjour and known associates. [redacted] came in regular contact with Hanjour and his associates [redacted] at Arizona Aviation from January 1998 to September 1999. [redacted] had contacted the task force to report that she had some information about Hani Hanjour. [redacted] provided the following information:



[redacted] students pursuing various ratings. While at Arizona Aviation she had occasional contact with Hanjour and associates.

[redacted] Hanjour as a small man who was very quiet. A picture of Hanjour was shown [redacted] and she recognized him as the Hanjour that trained at Arizona Aviation. Hanjour often participated in flying lessons for a one to two weeks and then would disappear for weeks or months at a time. [redacted] Arizona Aviation, often had to call Hanjour in an effort to get Hanjour to pay his bill. Hanjour did not pay his fees daily but often let the monthly bill add up to \$1,500 to \$2,500, based on the money owed for the plane rental and instructor's fees. On at least two occasions, Hanjour came into the office and paid [redacted] in cash using small denominations, which he retrieved from an envelope that he was carrying.

[redacted] Hanjour and thought that he was pursuing his private pilots license while at Arizona Aviation. She thought that Hanjour may have also been pursuing his instrument rating as well, after getting his private pilots license.

LOTFI RAISSI

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[redacted] Hanjour was friends with three other student pilots and two other pilot instructors, all of Middle Eastern decent. She assumed that Hanjour was roommates with several of the students based on them sharing rides to and from the airport.

[redacted] Hanjour associates and described him as 22 or 23 years old, who was friendlier than the others. She knew his name because [redacted] for all the Arizona Aviation students. [redacted] often picked up and dropped off the other Middle Eastern students in his own car.

Another of Hanjour's associates, [redacted] was a very large man weighing about 250 lbs and described him as having a good sense of humor. On May 31, 1998, [redacted] for a "Stage 1 Phase Check" which was required to secure his private pilots license. [redacted] wrote in her flight log book that she did not recommend [redacted] to fly solo.

[redacted] also recognized the photo [redacted] as a former Arizona Aviation student pilot and an associate of Hanjour. She described him as a very small man, and confirmed that he was only about 5'0" tall. [redacted] Abdullah but saw him around Arizona Aviation.

[redacted] the photograph of [redacted] Arizona Aviation and an associate of Hanjour. [redacted] recalled that [redacted] Hanjour both took flying lessons [redacted] a very nice man with a nice family and could not possibly see him as being involved in any terrorist attack.

[redacted] the photograph [redacted] working as a freelance [redacted] at Falcon Field, Mesa, and an associate of Hanjour. [redacted] often rented Arizona Aviation's planes as an instructor but never was on Arizona Aviation payroll. [redacted] flew multi-engine airplanes and was checked out [redacted] for proficiency before being allowed to fly at Arizona Aviation. [redacted] instructor pilots at Arizona Aviation often discussed the poor hygiene of these Middle Eastern students and were reluctant to fly with them because of their odor. It was arranged to have [redacted] be assigned as [redacted] to at least three of the above four students Hanjour, [redacted]. [redacted] a very forceful and pushy guy with bad teeth. [redacted] also recalled that he often traveled back and forth to the Middle

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LOTFI RAISSI

East and remembered one conversation that she had [redacted] of him complaining that he could not smoke cigarettes on American flights, but that he could smoke on the airlines in his country. [redacted] all of the individuals associated with Hanjour were chain smokers include Hanjour.

An analysis of records received from Arizona Aviation conducted by the Phoenix Division determined [redacted] flight activity began on November 19, 1997 and ended on May 10, 1999. [redacted] paid a total of \$7,465.15 for the training. All of [redacted] training was conducted without an instructor.

Hani Hanjour trained on 151 days at Arizona Aviation during the period December 29, 1997 to December 23, 2000. Hanjour paid a total of \$15,110.74 for the training. Hanjour [redacted] engaged in flight activity at Arizona Aviation on the same dates no less than five times, including: May 29, 1998, June 1, 1998, June 17, 1998, September 30, 1998, and October 7, 1998.

On September 19, 2001, [redacted] provided FBI Phoenix the following information:

In approximately 1996, [redacted] moved to Arizona to finish his flight training. He attended a program at Westwind Aviation for which he would pay \$14,000.00 to complete the program. Westwind Aviation was located near the Deer Valley Airport. [redacted] worked at the airport concession stand in order to raise money for the flight training and living expenses. In April 1997, he was granted his instructor certification. He was certified in commercial, multi-engine, and instrument ratings. [redacted] wanted to become an instructor in order to build hours towards getting a higher level flight status and also to be more marketable to become an air transport pilot. Also, while [redacted]

While at Westwind Aviation, [redacted] Middle Eastern students. One student named [redacted] was from Qatar and was the first student [redacted] This student was government subsidized and attended training at Westwind Aviation. [redacted] whereabouts at this time but believes he may be in Qatar.

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LOTFI RAISSI

Another student [redacted] who also attended the Westwind Academy. He was approximately two months behind [redacted] in his flight training. [redacted] flew [redacted] on two different occasions that he knows of and described him as having a temper. He was Algerian by nationality. At the present time, [redacted] [redacted] Raissi is in Algeria or possibly England; however, [redacted] has had no other contact [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Hani Hanjour was a Saudi Arabian National [redacted] [redacted] as very, very quiet who did not interact with the other students, to include the Arabic or the Muslim students. Hassan had seen Hanjour at the mosque many times and considered him to be overly religious. Hani Hanjour's flight training was financed [redacted] His father was deceased, [redacted] that Hanjour [redacted] took on the financial obligations to ensure that Hanjour was taken care of. Hanjour was described as not anti-social but very much to himself. He sat by himself at lunch and would not go out with the other pilots to do things. The only place that Hanjour was seen outside of the aviation school was by the mosque.

LOTFI RAISSI

Hani Hanjour was also [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Hanjour as a very poor pilot who did not react to criticism very well. Hanjour was very, very nervous inside the cockpit to the point where Hanjour was almost fearful. [REDACTED] he flew with Hani Hanjour on five to six flights. Hanjour struggled with the instrument rating, [REDACTED] Hanjour eventually passed his commercial pilot certification with the FAA. He had initially failed it once [REDACTED] for Hani Hanjour's English was extremely weak, and it is believed that he wanted to become a Saudi Arabian airlines pilot.

Immediately after Hanjour passed his check-out ride for his commercial rating, Hanjour left for Saudi Arabia. The last time [REDACTED] Hanjour was sometime during the religious holidays of Ramadan at the mosque. Hanjour did not approach [REDACTED] They spoke only briefly. Hanjour said he wanted to come back to the United States to build more hours. Hanjour also asked [REDACTED] if he knew where to go to get a 737 aircraft type rating. [REDACTED] told him that he would have to contact the school to find out how to get that rating.

[REDACTED] became aware that Hani Hanjour was one of the pilots of the hijacked aircraft on approximately Friday or Saturday, September 13 or 14, 2001. While he was talking to his wife on the phone, [REDACTED] noticed that Hani Hanjour's name and picture had come up on the media.

On September 21, 2001, [REDACTED] provided FBI Phoenix the following information:

[REDACTED] America West Airlines. [REDACTED] employees on the Boeing 737 flight system. Prior to his current job [REDACTED] the flight simulators at Sawyer Aviation (SA). [REDACTED] a one hour dual check flight on the simulators of all individuals joining the Sim Club. [REDACTED] a check flight on the simulator of an Arab man named Hani. Hani was not interested in going to flight school, he was only interested in using the simulator. [REDACTED] first met Hani in 1998. [REDACTED] was introduced to Hani [REDACTED] the flight simulators. [REDACTED] recalled that this meeting took place in the hallway of SA. [REDACTED] a picture of Hani Hanjour. [REDACTED] was unaware

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LOTFI RAISSI

that the picture was of Hanjour. [] the individual pictured (Hanjour) was very similar to a man he recalled seeing walking in a hallway at SA []

In addition to the Arab man named Hani, [] other men of Arab descent that were members of the Sim Club. [] was specifically asked if he knew of a man named [] which [] remembered well. [] was both a member of the Sim Club and the SA flight school. [] eventually went on to obtain a commercial pilots license, and recalled that [] went back to a middle eastern country to fly for an airline. [] did not finish his flight school training with SA. He was asked to leave the program at some point because of his poor performance. [] had a bad temper and wanted things done his way. [] did not like the people or the culture in the United States. [] could possibly be connected in some way, or may have some information regarding the recent terrorist attack on the United States.

[] was shown several photographs of men of Arab descent. The photographs were of Arab men whose identities were known to the investigators showing the photographs. [] was not aware of their identities. [] the faces of [] Marwan Alshehhi [] and Zaad Samir Jarrah. [] was a member of the Sim Club. He remembered doing [] He was eighty percent sure that he had seen Alshehhi using the simulator. He thought he recognized the faces [] from his time at SA, and was one hundred percent sure that he had talk to Jarrah at SA. He identified Jarrah's lip as the distinctive feature which made him sure that he had talked with Jarrah. [] that he may have seen [] using the simulator. He was only eighty sure because [] was pictured with a beard, and [] did not recall any of the men having a beard.

[] the Arab men that used the simulator come alone. From their behavior he felt that they were all a part of a support group to help each other learn on the simulator. [] lived at an apartment complex with another Arab man, whose identity was unknown []

[] recalled that men of middle eastern descent began to "flock" to the Sim Club when word got out that it provided unlimited access to a flight simulator.

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[redacted] individuals of middle eastern descent knew that the Phoenix, Arizona area, described [redacted] as the valley, provided renowned flight training, to include Lufthansa Airlines. Lufthansa has significant operations in both the Phoenix area and the middle east. [redacted] around 1990 there was a significant increase in the amount of people of middle eastern descent that began to request flight training in the Phoenix area.

[redacted] the following description of the man known to him as Hani.

Sex:	Male	Weight:	145-150 pounds
Hair:	Curly, close cropped		
Build:	Very slight and thin		
Height:	5'5"-5'6"		
Hands:	Big and gangly		

On September 24, 2001, [redacted] provided the following information:

[redacted] shown photographs of Hani Hanjour [redacted] all of whom he recognized as having attended flight training together at Arizona Aviation.

[redacted] Arizona Aviation as a [redacted] from November, 1997 until May, 1999. Hani Hanjour, [redacted] and another Middle Eastern student whose first name was [redacted] (Last Name Unknown) attended flight training together at Arizona Aviation, arriving very shortly after [redacted] working there. The only one-on-one contact that [redacted] had with any of the men was on January 6, 1998, at which time [redacted] (a flight training testing requirement) with Hanjour.

Not long after Hanjour [redacted] LNU arrived at Arizona Aviation, [redacted] also arrived there. [redacted] believed the five men must have known each other prior to the flight training because they were very close from the beginning. [redacted] would see the men on a regular basis at the flight school, and they were usually together. They spoke some English, but mostly they spoke a foreign language [redacted] thought to be Arabic.

[redacted] as "cocky". If [redacted] made a mistake, he always blamed it on someone else, or claimed there

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was a problem with the aircraft. [] talked about going to flight school in Scottsdale, Arizona, and in fact had a 737 rating. Arizona Aviation allowed free lance flight instruction. [] did a lot of flight instruction there, predominantly if not exclusively to other Middle Easterners.

On September 26, 2001, [] (PROTECT IDENTITY) provided the following information:

[] was shown a photograph depicting [] identified the individual in the photograph [] from November 4, 1996 to April 6, 2000.

[] a photograph depicting Hani Hanjour. [] identified the individual in the photograph as Hani Hanjour.

[] met Raissi on or about July, 1998 through [] [] [] [] always had money, wore nice clothes and was well groomed. [] made long distance phone calls from the apartment office and would speak Arabic. [] Hanjour was sometimes [] when he made the phone calls.

[] met Hanjour on or about August 1998. [] introduced Hanjour [] saw Hanjour [] several times [] for a couple of weeks. [] Hanjour was a quiet individual and had a strong Arabic accent.

On September 27, 2001, [] provided the following information:

[] the Westwind Aviation Academy and [] as a close and personal friend. [] often spent personal time together and also flew together at Westwind Aviation. [] took a vacation together [] last saw [] approximately two months ago in Phoenix, Arizona.

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[redacted] wanted to be a commercial pilot and was living in England.

[redacted] an individual named Hani Hanjour at the Tempe, Arizona mosque, through another acquaintance named [redacted]. Hanjour was a very quiet individual and only spoke with him on three or four occasions. [redacted] Hanjour were close friends. [redacted] only spoke with Hanjour at the mosque. [redacted] last saw Hanjour praying at the mosque approximately two months ago. [redacted]

[redacted] he attended Westwind Aviation Academy at the same time as Hanjour.

On September 27, 2001, [redacted] (PROTECT IDENTITY) provided the following information:

[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted] a photograph depicting [redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted] November 4, 1996 to April 6, 2000.

[redacted] a photograph depicting Hani Hanjour. [redacted] did not identify the individual by name. However, [redacted] stated she has seen the individual in the photograph [redacted]

[redacted] a photograph [redacted]
[redacted] identified the individual in the photograph as, [redacted]
[redacted] referred to his cousin as Hani, last name not provided. [redacted] "Hani").

[redacted] in February or March, 1999. [redacted] saw two unknown Middle-Eastern males [redacted] described one of the unknown males as being eighteen to twenty years old, 5'7"-5'8", slight build, wavy black hair (medium length), with a goatee. [redacted] the other unknown male as being twenty to twenty five years old, 5'6"-5'7", average build, clean shaven, dark hair with a dark complexion.

[redacted]
[redacted] in February, 1999. [redacted] was very amicable, charming, and kind. [redacted] would talk to [redacted]

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[redacted] about white American men and how they did not support their families. [redacted] Raissi almost on a daily basis [redacted]

[redacted]
[redacted] use the office phone on several occasions and at times he would call someone in California [redacted] did not provide any information regarding the identity of the individual [redacted] calling. [redacted] dinner on one occasion but did not provide any details.

[redacted] the individual she identified as being seen [redacted] may have lived with two other unknown males in the apartment complex but she is not sure. The individual in the photograph [redacted] was actually Hani Hanjour.

On October 7, 2001, [redacted] provided the following information:

[redacted] first met [redacted] at the Pan Am flight Academy in late 1997 or early 1998. [redacted] started out as a flight student and eventually became an instructor. [redacted] first instructor was an individual [redacted] The first time [redacted] flew solo he crashed a plane [redacted] was assigned to be his teacher. [redacted] at the time. From May 1998 to September 1998, [redacted] on a daily basis. [redacted] but would leave for three or four months at a time. [redacted] he was going to Paris or England.

[redacted] several times since September 1998. [redacted] would come to Westwind with several people and fly to Las Vegas. [redacted] LNU and Hani Hanjour were two people that would travel with him. [redacted] remembered seeing Hani Hanjour [redacted] three times during 1998. When [redacted] Hanjour would come to the airport with several people, Hanjour would sit by himself at a distance. [redacted] that Hanjour was weird and he did not like socializing with people.

On October 16, 2001, [redacted] provided the following information:

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[redacted] Sawyer School of Aviation, 2730 Sky Harbor Blvd., Phoenix, Arizona. Interviewing Agents asked [redacted] if she wanted to add anything to her 09/17/2001 statement to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). [redacted] there was something that she wanted to add to her statement. [redacted] indicated that sometime after her interview with the FBI on 09/17/2001 she was watching television coverage of the arrest of [redacted]. The video coverage [redacted] was watching showed [redacted] out of a car. The news coverage identified this person as [redacted] stated that she immediately recognized [redacted] as being a person she met at Sawyer Aviation.

[redacted] met an individual at Sawyer Aviation during late June or early July 2001 who identified himself to her as being [redacted] when [redacted] and two other males were leaving the building. [redacted] on the day she saw these individuals. The four were just finishing training in the flight simulator and stopped by the front counter where [redacted] from previous encounters. She did not know the two other individuals with them. One of the individuals came to the front counter [redacted]. This person introduced himself [redacted]. He stated that his name was [redacted] and that he was a flight instructor [redacted]. [redacted] stated that [redacted] looked more Western than either [redacted] or the fourth individual that she described as the "shadowy guy." The fourth individual was an "Arab looking" male, 5'6" in height, short cut dark hair, "maybe" some facial hair, thin "wiry build." [redacted] this individual as being a "small guy" and a "shadowy guy" who would hang out in the back and never talk.

[redacted] believed that this was the "one and only" time that she saw all four individuals together. She remembers seeing the "shadowy guy" [redacted] "at the most three times" during June and July 2001.

Interviewing Agents displayed a photo identification line up [redacted]. This line up contained a photograph of Hani Hanjour. Hanjour's picture was number 2 in the line up.

[redacted] when shown the line up containing the photograph of Hanjour, pointed to photograph number 2 (Hani Hanjour) as being the person she refers to as the "shadowy guy" that she has seen [redacted] this person has the same general characteristics and is very similar

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appearing as the person she saw at Sawyer. She stated that the person in photograph number 2 has the same "wiry build", thin neck, light skin, hair and facial hair that she remembers seeing on the guy she saw at Sawyer Aviation. However, she could not be 100 % sure.

On October 19, 2001, [redacted] provided the following information:

[redacted] was contacted at her store. [redacted]
[redacted] a photo of [redacted] from a photo spread, as an individual that came into her store 2-3 months ago, "late this summer", with another Middle Easterner. She then tentatively identified a photo of Hani Hanjour (I'm pretty sure it was him) from a photo spread, as the man that came into the store [redacted]. She advised that [redacted] got one of her business cards and said "thank you" when they left the store. She advised that the man she tentatively identified appeared to be shy and didn't say anything while they were in the store. She advised that they did not buy anything and she has never seen either one since. [redacted] the False Statements case against [redacted] who was convicted and deported.)

On November 5, 2001, [redacted] provided the following information:

[redacted] Aviation Safety Inspector, Federal Aviation Administration, Flight Standards Certificate Management Office, who is also a flight instructor, asserted the AST-300 is considered a training device that can improve a pilot's instrument skills. [redacted] further stated in his opinion based on the information he read or is aware of, the hijackers were not as skilled as professional airline pilots. Once the hijackers took over control of the aircraft, the hijackers may have been skilled enough to alter the aircraft's flight path through the on-board computers. A more likely scenario, however, a flight crew member was compelled to initially alter the aircraft's flight path to its ultimate destination. However, at some point, [redacted] believes the hijackers would have had to take control of the aircraft manually as they approached their targets. It is [redacted] opinion, that it would be very difficult, if not, impossible, and require a lot of skill and training to maneuver an aircraft solely through the on-board computers into such objects as the Twin Towers or the Pentagon. However, manually, the aircraft can be flown at the control and direction of the pilot who possesses some flying skills.

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Hani Hanjour is believed to have piloted American Airlines flight #77 into the Pentagon. Hanjour most likely manually maneuvered the aircraft off of its flight path. Hanjour very likely used the aircraft's instruments to assist in the maneuvering of the aircraft into the Pentagon.

[redacted] the benefits of Hanjour, who has a commercial pilot's certificate and received training on a Boeing 737-200 simulator, training on AST-300 (the above noted simulator used at Sawyer), is that it would provide him confidence and improve his instrument skills which are to some degree transferrable to any aircraft to include a Boeing 757.

On December 1, 2001, [redacted] provided the following information:

[redacted] did observe [redacted] provide flight instruction on board an airplane on at least one occasion and possibly twice. [redacted] did not specifically recall those dates, nor did he specifically recall [redacted] Hani Hanjour on March 8, 1999. [redacted] was shown the original "Aircraft Usage Agreement" dated March 8, 1999 for aircraft number N3056P, a PA23-180 model airplane. [redacted] was advised that this was the only recorded rental of this aircraft for March 8, 1999. [redacted] was also shown a photocopy of the aforementioned "Aircraft Usage Agreement" and he confirmed that it was a photocopy of the original. The photocopy will be placed in a FD-340 envelope and forwarded to the file. [redacted] was shown photocopies of Hani Hanjour's [redacted] pilot log book entries for March 8, 1999. After reviewing these records for March 8, 1999, [redacted] the records reveal [redacted] was on the aforementioned airplane with [redacted] Hanjour. [redacted] confirmed that it was [redacted] verifying Hanjour's log book entries for March 8, 1999. [redacted] would confirm that the flight student, in this case Hanjour, was comfortable with an observer accompanying them on the flight. If the student was not comfortable with there being an observer, [redacted] the observer to accompany them. When asked how [redacted] would have coordinated accompanying [redacted] Hanjour, [redacted] [redacted] would have been at the airfield [redacted] to accompany them. [redacted] the "180" model has seats for four people; whereas, the "150" model only has two seats. [redacted] log book entries for March 8, 1999 reveal [redacted] credited himself with 1.7 hours as flight instructor and pilot in command. [redacted] understand why [redacted] the 1.7 hours as such since [redacted] would have been the observer. [redacted] may have

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entered the 1.7 hours to build [] flight time. []
[] Hanjour recorded 1.5 hours flight time for March 8, 1999. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regulations prohibit logging flight hours which are not logged in accordance with the applicable regulations. [] logging hours that are not earned in accordance with the applicable regulations is a fraud. []
[] pilot as being a representative of the FAA. Furthermore, the instructor pilot is responsible for anything that happens with the aircraft while they are present. [] would not and has not ever switched out with another flight instructor []
[] has never had a student, including Hanjour, land an aircraft in order [] to exit the aircraft so that another flight []
[]

[] did not actively socialize with [] because he is married and would spend his personal time with his family. Hani Hanjour was not outgoing, Hanjour was very quiet and did not talk much [] endeavored to limit his contact [] because he felt [] was annoying. [] was not aware of [] any relationship with Hanjour until their association was reported in the news media following the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001.

The investigation [] also revealed that while attending ground school in England at Four Forces Aviation, [] reported [] to have asked fellow students "if a plane were to fly into something, would it be the pilot or aircraft that did it." Additionally, in January 2001, during his second conversation [] a co-worker [] made statements that, in part, America and the United Kingdom were rich and that his country was poor. [] sounded angry and bitter. [] "America's time is coming" or "America's time will come." [] purported best friend []
[] vocal in his opposition with the U.S. policies towards Arab Nations. [] openly criticized the U.S. policy towards Israel, and often became angry about things that were happening to the Palestinians and the subsequent U.S. response. [] roommate [] was very vocal and loud at times, and often made bold and negative statements about the U.S. When [] the politics of the U.S., [] had anger in his speech at times. [] angry that the U.S. supported Israel. [] dissatisfaction with the U.S. Policy towards the Muslim world. [] boldly spoke of his

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support for the "homeland" and wanted the U.S. and their allies out of the "homeland." [redacted] he was a powerful individual and made those bold statements as if he had power and control. [redacted] was vocal in his opposition to U.S. troops being in Saudi Arabia. (Accordingly, [redacted] could have known that some sort of violent act was planned against the United States. Furthermore, [redacted] attitude toward the U.S. could serve as his motive for providing material support to Hani Hanjour.)

[redacted] was positioned to [redacted] to Hanjour. [redacted] pilot log book; however, had a page removed and was therefore missing entries covering the period of March 2000 through June 26, 2001. Sawyer records revealed [redacted] the AST-300 simulator on 06/23-25/2001. Previous use of the simulator was entered in [redacted] pilot log book. It is theorized that [redacted] when confronted of the prospect of law enforcement authorities discovering entries in [redacted] pilot log book documenting the training of Hanjour, tore out the associated log book page. [redacted] a pilot who was introduced to Hanjour [redacted] and had provided flight instruction [redacted] stated that [redacted] were struggling with instrumentation; [redacted] would have been the most qualified to provide Hanjour training. It is also theorized that Hanjour only took the flying lessons because he was directed to, not because it was his ambition to become a pilot. Hanjour had tremendous difficulties progressing in his training and had started over on at least one occasion. Therefore, he needed the additional simulator training to develop the skills to perform his mission, that is, flying the plane into the Pentagon. (See [redacted] comments above.)

To add, [redacted] could have [redacted] to Hanjour. And, when confronted of the prospect of law enforcement authorities discovering entries in [redacted] pilot's log book documenting the training of Hanjour, [redacted] the associated log book pages.

[redacted] indicted in Phoenix, Arizona for false statements, conspiracy, false oath in asylum application, false visa application and false affidavit. [redacted] on September 21, 2001 and incarcerated pending extradition proceedings. Two extradition requests were forwarded to the British authorities. The first request was based on [redacted] October 2001 indictment on two counts of false statements to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). The second request included [redacted] November 2001 indictment on

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conspiracy [redacted] to commit immigration related fraud, [redacted] obtain asylum in the U.S. based on a fictitious asylum application) false affidavit and false oath in connection with the immigration fraud, visa fraud and additional false statement charges related to applications to the FAA.

With respect to the early information indicating a connection between [redacted] the following is provided: On 07/11/2002, Legat London set forth results [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

DATE: 05-09-2006
CLASSIFIED BY 60309AUCTAM/MLT/LR2
REASON: 1.4 (C)
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U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

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Washington, D. C. 20535-0001

May 5, 2001

~~(S)~~ RAYED MOHAMMED ABDULLAH,

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
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM - USAMA BIN LADEN/AL-QAEDA

FULL INVESTIGATION AUTHORIZED: 10/08/2001 (NONUSPER)

OFFICE OF ORIGIN: Phoenix, Arizona

INVESTIGATIVE SUMMARY PREPARED: May 5, 2002

BASIS FOR INVESTIGATION:



~~Derived from: G-3~~
~~Declassify On: X-1~~
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AL-QAEDA

(U) AL-QAEDA, under the leadership of USAMA BIN LADEN, has declared holy war on the United States for its "occupation of holy lands" and has issued a total of three fatwas (religiously sanctioned opinions on civil or religious matters), in which it declared the duty of every Muslim to kill Americans, civilian or military, wherever possible.

(U) The name AL-QAEDA, or "the Base," dates back to 1988 and reportedly originated from the term used to refer to one

of USAMA BIN LADEN'S (UBL) guesthouses, where the Mujahidin that came to fight in Afghanistan were required to register. These registration records later provided with extensive contacts to Islamist fighters around the world. AL-QAEDA includes, in addition to the warriors present at USAMA BIN LADEN'S camps, a loose network of terrorist cells throughout the world. The most outstanding features of AL-QAEDA are its international outreach and vast financial resources, derived mainly from USAMA BIN LADEN'S personal wealth and financial dealings.

(U) USAMA BIN LADEN was raised in Saudi Arabia in a wealthy, high profile, family of Yemeni origins. The beginning of his radicalization dates back to his university studies in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, where he was linked to members of the Muslim Brotherhood. Later, his involvement in the Afghan struggle against the Soviet occupation played a major role in shaping his ideology. During this experience, he found a sense of purpose and became deeply religious. USAMA BIN LADEN also made contacts with Islamic fighters from around the world and participated in a victorious struggle against a secular superpower. The combination of USAMA BIN LADEN'S wealth, connection to, and command over experienced, motivated, and radical Islamic militants, and his fervent anti-U.S. orientation make him a serious threat to U.S. national security.

(U) AL-QAEDA operates approximately 12 training camps in Afghanistan, in which it has reportedly trained as many as 5,000 militants. These militants have allegedly created cells in 50 countries. Some of these trainees may be "sleeper" agents, who live undetected among local populations.

(U) AL-QAEDA members are familiar with modern communications and have been reported to use encrypted e-mail, cellular phones, satellite communications, and training manuals on CD-ROMs. The group emphasizes the symbolic value of targets when

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making its selection, e.g., U.S. embassies, World Trade Center, military barracks, USS Cole, etc.

(U) The U.S. State Department currently links AL-QAEDA to many recent terrorist attacks, among them the World Trade Center bombing (February 1993); the attacks in Riyadh (November 1995) and Dhahran (June 1996), Saudi Arabia; the assassination attempt on Egyptian President Mubarak in Ethiopia (June 1995); the near-simultaneous bombings of the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania (August 1998); and the bombing of the USS Cole in Yemen (November 2000).

(U) AL-QAEDA may have several hundred to several thousand members. AL-QAEDA serves as a focal point or umbrella organization for a worldwide network that includes, among others, many Sunni Islamic extremist groups such as Egyptian Islamic Jihad, some members of AL-GAMA'AT AL-ISLAMIYYA, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, and the HARAKAT UL-MUJAHIDIN. AL-QAEDA has a worldwide reach, has cells in a number of countries, and is reinforced by its ties to Sunni extremist networks. USAMA BIN LADEN and his key lieutenants reside in Afghanistan, and the group maintains terrorist training camps there.

INVESTIGATION TO DATE

RAYED MOHAMMED ABDULLAH

~~TOP SECRET~~ RAYED MOHAMMED ABDULLAH [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] despite the fact that he was [REDACTED] due to the fact that his [REDACTED] filed a student visa application in October, 1997, to attend a university in the United States. Investigation has identified two aliases utilized [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] during his third interview with the FBI, when asked if he used any other names stated that the name [REDACTED] is his true full name. He is known by this name in the Middle East. He shortened his name to [REDACTED] when he came to the United States. [REDACTED] claimed that he has only used the name [REDACTED] on official and non-official documentation since arriving in the United States. [REDACTED] is unaware of the fact that the FBI knows that he also uses the name [REDACTED]. Investigation determined that [REDACTED] uses this name on a compact disc he is featured on singing verses from the Koran. [REDACTED] did not volunteer this name to the FBI during any of his interviews.

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(S) [redacted] contacted the FBI, through an intermediary named [redacted] on 09/15/2001 to provide the FBI with information concerning HANI HANJOUR, one of the hijackers that attacked the Pentagon on 09/11/2001. [redacted] the Islamic Cultural Center (I.C.C.) located in Tempe, Arizona. [redacted] attends the I.C.C.. [redacted] was interviewed at [redacted] residence. [redacted] that he wanted to fully cooperate with the FBI.

X

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(S) After the terrorist incidents which took place on September 11, 2001, the following information has been confirmed concerning the crash of AMERICAN AIRLINES FLIGHT 77, which crashed into the Pentagon at approximately 9:39 a.m., on September 11, 2001.

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~~(S)~~ On September 11, 2001, AMERICAN AIRLINES FLIGHT 77, a Boeing 757 aircraft, departed Dulles International Airport (IAD) at 8:20 AM en route to Los Angeles with 58 passengers and 6 crew members on board. At 8:50 AM, the last routine radio contact with the aircraft was made and at 8:54 AM, the aircraft began an unauthorized turn to the south. Shortly thereafter, radar contact was lost. At 9:39 AM, Flight 77 deliberately crashed into the southwest side of the Pentagon, Alexandria, Virginia.

~~(S)~~ Investigation to date has determined that Flight 77 was hijacked by five Middle Eastern males. The hijackers have been identified as KHALID AL-MIHDHAR, date of birth May 16, 1975 (Seat 12B, Coach Section); NAWAF AL-HAZMI, date of birth August 6, 1976 (Seat 5E, First Class); HANNI HANJOUR, date of birth August 30, 1972 (Seat 1B, First Class); SALEM AL-HAZMI, date of birth February 2, 1981 (Seat 5F, First Class); and MAJED MOQED, date of birth June 18, 1977 (Seat 12A, Coach Section).

~~(S)~~ The five Flight 77 hijackers were in the United States on visas and passports from Saudi Arabia. HANJOUR is the earliest known entry into the United States. He entered the United States on October 3, 1991, from Saudi Arabia to attend the English as a Second Language (ESL) program at the University of Arizona. Believed to have returned home to Saudi Arabia at the beginning of 1992, HANJOUR re-entered the United States in April 1996 and resided in Florida for one month. HANJOUR then moved to California, where records indicate he attended ELS Language School in Oakland until August 1996. HANJOUR began flight training in September 1996 at Sierra Aeronautical Academy Airline Training Center, also located in Oakland. HANJOUR continued flight lessons after he moved to Arizona at the end of September 1996 when he attended one month of training at Cockpit Resource Management (CRM) in Scottsdale, Arizona. He then returned to Saudi Arabia for one year. HANJOUR returned to the United States in November 1997 and again resided in Florida for approximately one month. He moved back to Arizona in December 1997 and resumed flight training at CRM. HANJOUR then began training at Arizona Aviation in Mesa, Arizona, on March 3, 1998, and continued there until his departure from the United States in April 1999.

~~(S)~~ Over a span of three days in the Spring of 1999, AL-MIHDHAR, NAWAF AL-HAZMI, and SALEM AL-HAZMI obtained visas in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. Following a meeting in the beginning of January 2000 with a known USAMA BIN LADEN associate, AL-MIHDHAR and NAWAF AL-HAZMI entered the United States at Los Angeles, California, on January 15, 2000, and settled in the San Diego area. While residing in San Diego, both AL-MIHDHAR and NAWAF AL-HAZMI undertook flight instruction. In April 2000, NAWAF

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AL-HAZMI participated in a one-hour introductory lesson at National Air College in San Diego and then, along with AL-MIHDHAR, received instruction on two occasions at Sorbi Flying Club in San Diego during May 2000.

~~(S)~~ AL-MIHDHAR departed the United States in June 2000. NAWAF AL-HAZMI stayed in the San Diego area until December 2000, at which time he moved to Arizona with HANJOUR who had just returned to the United States. HANJOUR resumed his flight instruction at Arizona Aviation, after which he continued training at Pan Am International Flight Training Center, also known as Jet Tech International, in Phoenix, Arizona. In March 2001, NAWAF AL-HAZMI and HANJOUR vacated their Arizona residence and subsequently appeared in the Northern Virginia area in April 2001.

~~(S)~~ On May 2, 2001, MOQED entered the United States at Dulles International Airport, Washington, D.C., traveling from Dubai, U.A.E., with AHMED ALGHAMDI (Flight 175). NAWAF AL-HAZMI and HANJOUR arrived in New Jersey during this time and leased an apartment in Patterson. On June 29, 2001, SALEM AL-HAZMI arrived in the United States at John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK), New York, from Dubai, U.A.E., along with ABDULAZIZ AL OMARI (Flight 11). SALEM AL-HAZMI also proceeded to New Jersey. After AL-MIHDHAR's return to the United States at JFK, New York, on July 4, 2001, all five hijackers were located in the same area of New Jersey. This is the first documented instance that all five hijackers were in close proximity of each other. Investigation has revealed association between these hijackers as well as with those of the other hijackers' flights.

~~(S)~~ In the weeks immediately preceding September 11, 2001, the hijackers of Flight 77 stayed in various motels in the area of Laurel, Maryland, and utilized computers to gain Internet access at the local Kinko's. During this time period, numerous documented interactions occurred in the areas of Laurel and College Park, Maryland, during this time period among the Flight 77 hijackers and the hijackers of the other flights. ZIAD JARRAH (Flight 93) was observed with the Flight 77 hijackers on occasion and also had registered at some of the same hotels in the Laurel area as the Flight 77 hijackers. Another notable interaction between the hijackers occurred on August 13-14, 2001, when NAWAF AL-HAZMI and HANJOUR traveled to Las Vegas, Nevada, at the same time as MOHAMMAD ATTA (Flight 11).

~~(S)~~ The Flight 77 hijackers commenced their travel arrangements for the September 11, 2001, flight within a few days of August 8, 2001. On August 8, 2001, AL-MIHDHAR and MOQED attempted to purchase their tickets through American Airlines' website but were

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unsuccessful because the address they gave could not be verified by the airlines. AL-MIHDHAR and MOQED ultimately purchased their tickets with cash on September 5, 2001, at the American Airlines counter at Baltimore-Washington International Airport. On August 27, 2001, NAWAF AL-HAZMI and SALEM AL-HAZMI purchased their tickets through the web site Travelocity.com using a Visa debit card in name of NAWAF M. AL-HAZMI. On August 31, 2001, HANJOUR attempted to purchase his ticket with a VISA debit card at Advanced Travel Services, Totowa, New Jersey. After the card was rejected because the cost of the ticket exceeded the card's credit limit, HANJOUR paid for the ticket with cash.

~~(S)~~ Throughout his stay in New Jersey and Maryland, HANJOUR continued to attend flight training at various locations. The lengthy and extensive flight training obtained by HANJOUR throughout his years in the United States makes it reasonable to believe that he became the pilot of Flight 77 on September 11th. HANJOUR was seated in Seat 1B, the first row aisle seat of the First Class section. The other hijackers were seated in pairs further back in the airplane. Subsequent examination of FAA radar plots and the flight data recorder indicate that approximately thirty-four minutes after take-off, the aircraft made a 180 degree turn from its westward flight path near Portsmouth, Ohio, to return toward Washington, D.C. The aircraft then executed a 360 degree turn to make a final descending approach into the Pentagon at an estimated air speed in excess of 400 knots. The flight cockpit recorder was later recovered at the crash site but sustained such severe damage that it was rendered unusable.

~~(S)~~ At 9:39 AM., AA Flight 77 deliberately crashed into the southwest side of the Pentagon, Alexandria, Virginia. In addition to the 53 passengers, 6 flight crew members, and 5 hijackers, 189 Pentagon employees, both civilian and military, lost their lives.

~~(S)~~ On September 12, 2001, a 1988 Toyota Corolla registered to NAWAF AL-HAZMI was found in a parking lot at IAD. A subsequent search of this vehicle revealed many documents and other items associated with the hijackers, including a three page letter handwritten in Arabic. This letter was identical to those found in luggage belonging to ATTA (Flight 11) and at the crash site of United Airlines Flight 93 in Stoney Creek Township, Pennsylvania. Translation of these letters revealed specific religious guidance to prepare for the hijackings.

~~(S)~~ Following the crash of AMERICAN AIRLINES FLIGHT 77 into the Pentagon, investigation determined significant ties between the actual perpetrators of the crash (described above) and

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Set out below are a series of documented links between these individuals, in particular HANI HANJOUR [REDACTED]

~~(S)~~ On November 15, 1997, [REDACTED] arrived in Newark, New Jersey, via CONTINENTAL AIRLINES FLIGHT 51, and the aforementioned ELS LANGUAGE CENTERS in Melbourne, Florida, was listed as his intended destination. On November 16, 1997, HANI HANJOUR arrived in Atlanta, Georgia, via LUFTHANSA FLIGHT 444, with a listed destination of 3740 Corey Rd., Val Maria, Florida.

~~(S)~~ ABDULLAH, during an interview with the FBI on 09/15/2001, advised that in November 1997 he (ABDULLAH) arrived in Orlando, Florida, and was picked up at the airport by BANDAR ALHAZMI, who introduced him to HANI HANJOUR. ABDULLAH had previously stated that ALHAZMI had been a friend of ABDULLAH's from Saudi Arabia. According to ABDULLAH, HANJOUR told ABDULLAH that he (HANJOUR) had met BANDAR ALHAZMI at ELS, and was also interested in becoming a pilot. [REDACTED] did not know anyone named NAWAF AL-HAZMI. Investigation is continuing in an effort to determine if

[REDACTED] NAWAF AL-HAZMI [REDACTED]

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(S) In December, 1997, according to [redacted] statement to the FBI, at HANI HANJOUR's suggestion, HANJOUR [redacted] traveled to Arizona to look for a place to reside, and to go to flight school.

(S) Upon arrival in Arizona, HANJOUR [redacted] located an apartment [redacted] and began to take flight instruction at CRM FLIGHT SCHOOL.

(S) In late December, 1997, [redacted] Arizona and resided with HANJOUR [redacted] In addition, [redacted] began instruction at the CRM FLIGHT SCHOOL. During December, 1997, [redacted] HANJOUR secured flight instruction at CRM from various instructors.

(S) On December 23, 1997, [redacted] HANJOUR, [redacted] ALHAZMI purchased a 1990 Hyundai Excel, AZ License Plate [redacted] which has registered owners of [redacted] HANJOUR [redacted] listing their address at the aforementioned [redacted]

(S) Apparently for cost reasons, in early calendar year 1998, [redacted] HANJOUR [redacted] left CRM FLIGHT SCHOOL and began to attend aviation training at ARIZONA AVIATION, a separate flight school in the Phoenix Metropolitan area. Various Arizona aviation records show payments made [redacted] to ARIZONA AVIATION for flight training.

(S) During approximately April - September, 1998, according to [redacted] statements to the FBI, [redacted] moved to Michigan to attend HENRY FORD COMMUNITY COLLEGE, taking English, Math, and Computer classes. [redacted] stated that during this time period, he was in contact with HANJOUR [redacted] via telephone on 2-3 occasions.


(S) In September, 1998, [redacted] moved back to Arizona, and re-enrolled at ARIZONA AVIATION, taking pilot instruction from [redacted] Additionally, during this time period, an individual named [redacted] paid for ARIZONA AVIATION flight training. [redacted]

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(S) [redacted] a Saudi Arabian national who entered the United States during March 1997 on an F-1 (student) visa to attend MESA COMMUNITY COLLEGE located in Mesa, Arizona. Investigation into the 09/11/2001 terrorist attacks developed information that [redacted] called several close friends to his apartment several days after the attacks and told them that he had been taken flight lessons. [redacted] told his friends, who are all Saudi Arabian nationals, that he had been taking flight lessons and that they would probably be interviewed by the FBI. One of these

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individuals remembers [] stating that he trained with HANI HANJOUR. The others could not specifically remember [] stating that he had trained with HANJOUR. Each of these individuals told the FBI that they were "shocked" to learn that [] had been taking flight lessons.

~~(S)~~ [] was interviewed by the FBI on 09/18/2001 concerning his association with HANI HANJOUR. [] denied knowing HANJOUR. It was latter determined that [] did in fact know HANJOUR. On 09/20/2001 [] was indicted by a Federal Grand Jury in the District of Arizona for providing false statements to the FBI. He was subsequently arrested. [] is currently awaiting trial. [] has been detained since his arrest.

~~(S)~~ On 10/29/2001 FBI Phoenix executed a search warrant [] residence. Financial documents located during this search demonstrated a financial relationship between [] and the AL-RAJHI BANKING AND INVESTMENT CORPORATION. This corporation, as previously mentioned, has been identified as a financial conduit utilized by UBL/AL-QAEDA.

~~(S)~~ In regards to the relationship between [] [] one flight instructor told the FBI that it appeared that [] was the "boss" of [] scheduled flight simulator time [] and did all of the talking with flight school employees whenever he and [] were training together. [], a French citizen from East Africa and flight instructor, told the FBI that [] asked him to provide flight simulator training to him and [] at SAWYER SCHOOL OF AVIATION located in Phoenix, Arizona during June 2001. [] that he wanted [] not to tell anyone about [] receiving training. [] stated that he thought that it was "weird" that [] would make such a request. [] admitted to knowing HANI HANJOUR but denied providing him with any training at SAWYER during June 2001. FBI Phoenix does not believe that [] is being truthful concerning HANI HANJOUR. [] was arrested by FBI Phoenix and charged with various counts of Social Security fraud. He has been tried and convicted and was deported from the United States during April 2002.

~~(S)~~ FBI Phoenix believes that it was highly probable that [] were engaged in flight training at the direction of UBL/AL-QAEDA.

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~~(S)~~ Numerous interviews have disclosed that there is a regular meeting at an apartment in Tempe, Arizona, where [redacted] and various other associates meet to discuss matters of interest. The individuals attending these meetings contribute funds to secure the usage of the apartment. This information will be discussed in more detail subsequently.


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~~(S)~~ FBI interviews conducted at SAWYER AVIATION, CRM AIR TRAINING, ARIZONA AVIATION, and other Phoenix area flight schools attended by [REDACTED] HANI HANJOUR and the other individuals discussed above, disclosed that they were not good pilot students. Several individuals interviewed indicated that they knew something was wrong with the manner in which [REDACTED] HANJOUR and others conducted extensive flight simulator training. In hindsight these instructors wish they had called the FBI to report their suspicions. FBI Phoenix believes that the purpose for these individuals extensive use of the flight simulator was to gain the necessary knowledge to manually control an aircraft in flight. This would be necessary for the terrorists, after they seized control of the aircraft, to fly the aircraft into the intended targets.



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~~AS~~ [redacted] is the subject of a separate FBI investigation at Phoenix. [redacted] former roommate and student at ERAU at Prescott, Arizona. [redacted] was interviewed by the FBI with SOUBRA on April 17, 2000. [redacted] was arrested in Pakistan on March 28, 2002 with senior AL-QAEDA lieutenant [redacted]. Investigation has determined that [redacted] was receiving training in the use of remote control devices to conduct bombings. Investigation concerning [redacted] is continuing.

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Pentagon on September 11, 2001. Phoenix believes it possible that the above described [REDACTED]

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advised the FBI on September 15, 2001 that his mother and father's business was located in Mecca, Saudi Arabia. He made no mention of family business interests in Ar'Ar or Yemen. A review of Rand McNally's The New International Atlas reflects that the Saudi Arabian town/village of Ar'Ar is located in Northern Saudi Arabia near the Iraqi border. This is a couple of hundred miles away from Mecca.

(S) [REDACTED] comments concerning his studies is reference to [REDACTED] pilot training. [REDACTED] the FBI during several interviews that he is in the United States to learn how to fly. [REDACTED] the FBI that it is his "life long dream" to become a pilot. [REDACTED] to the person he refers [REDACTED] "that this is it from here (United States) " and [REDACTED] "there is no use in studying if it leads to nothing" could suggest that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Phoenix believes that [REDACTED] the United States by AL-QAEDA [REDACTED] association with HANI HANJOUR and NAWAF AL-HAZMI, two of the terrorists on board American Airlines flight 77 (AA-77) that attacked the Pentagon on September

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U.S. Department of Justice

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Federal Bureau of Investigation


In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Washington, DC 20535
January 8, 2003

IMAD EDDIN BARAKAT YARKAS
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM - SPANISH CELL

On November 13, 2001, the Spanish National Police (SNP) arrested IMAD EDDIN BARAKAT YARKAS, [REDACTED] and ten members of his Spain-based radical Islamic terrorist cell following a two year investigation. Operation Datil, as it was called by the Spanish authorities, resulted in the seizure of vast quantities of evidentiary material, including but not limited to: documents, computers and other electronic media, videos, propaganda and various firearms.

Members of Yarkas's cell who were arrested are:



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CONNECTIONS TO SAUDI ARABIA

Some of these subjects have been released from the SNP's custody, however they are still facing charges in Spain for terrorist activity. Further investigation, specifically tracing funds to countries outside of Spain, is necessary to determine the full scope and activities of the Yarkas cell. The following bank accounts, individuals and entities, and telephone numbers were found [REDACTED]. The importance of these items can not be determined without more information.

Bank Accounts

Several Saudi Arabian bank accounts were identified in the seized documents. It is requested that bank account information including opening account documents, bank statements, and deposit and withdrawal items be provided for the accounts and/or individuals listed. They are:

1. Al Rajhi Banking & Investment Corporation account number [REDACTED]. This account belongs to [REDACTED] and funds were sent [REDACTED] at Banco Sabadell account number [REDACTED] in 1993 and 1994. These funds were sent [REDACTED] himself.
2. Al Rajhi Banking & Investment Corporation account number [REDACTED]. This account belongs to [REDACTED] for Trading. Wire transfers were sent from this account [REDACTED] at Banco Sabadell account number [REDACTED] in 1994, and wire transfers were sent to [REDACTED] Banco Sabadell account number [REDACTED] in 1998. Some of these transfers were sent by Mazen Nanass, who apparently worked with [REDACTED] for Trading.
3. Al Rajhi Banking & Investment Corporation - General Transactions. Several other wire transfers were sent [REDACTED] from Al Rajhi Banking & Investment Corporation, but these transfers were not tied to an account [REDACTED] at the bank. These transfers were:
 - a. transfers [REDACTED] in 1993.

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b. transfers [redacted] at Deutsche Bank, Germany. These transactions may have come from [redacted] account number [redacted] at Al Rajhi Bank.

c. transfers to [redacted] ASLK Bank account number [redacted] in Belgium.

4. Al Rajhi Banking & Investment Corporation - Transactions [redacted]
[redacted] In 1999, cash was wired to [redacted] businesses, [redacted] to transfer funds both in Saudi Arabia and in Spain.

5. Al Rajhi Banking & Investment Corporation - [redacted]
identification number [redacted] Funds were sent [redacted]
Banco Sabadell account number [redacted]
account number, date of transaction or amount of transaction cannot be determined from the evidence. [redacted] claims that [redacted] is an investor.

6. Al Rajhi Banking & Investment Corporation account number [redacted]
Al Nejoud Establishment, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, fax number 6293608.

10,000,000 Spanish pesetas were sent on 6/26/2000 [redacted]

[redacted] Banco Sabadell account number [redacted]
from [redacted]

7. Al Rajhi Banking & Investment Corporation account number [redacted]
5,600,000 Spanish pesetas was sent [redacted]
[redacted] account number [redacted] on 12/22/1998
from the Al Rajhi Bank account 5500/8. The owner of this account cannot be determined from the evidence found.

8. Al Rajhi Banking & Investment Corporation account number [redacted]
378-00010025074. A check was written to [redacted]
[redacted] in the amount of 66525 Riyals. The check was signed by [redacted]
[redacted] account number 000476-2080
378-00010025074. The check had handwritten information on it:
"USD 17740 x 3.75 = 66525 Riyals. Transfer belongs [redacted]
[redacted] for Indonesia. Difference is commission."

9. Saudi American Bank account number [redacted] transfer was found in [redacted] possession which was in the amount of \$5,000 USD. The transaction was dated 9/28/1993, and the beneficiary of the wire could not be determined by reviewing the document. Additionally funds were sent [redacted] in 1993 from this account number.

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10. Saudi American Bank account number [REDACTED] Evidence of this account were found within the seized documents.
11. National Commercial Bank account number [REDACTED] This appears to [REDACTED] account. Evidence of this account were found within the seized documents.
12. National Commercial Bank account number [REDACTED] Evidence of this account were found within the seized documents.
13. National Commercial Bank account number [REDACTED] Evidence of this account were found within the seized documents.
14. National Commercial Bank account number [REDACTED] A telex transfer application submitted to the National Commercial Bank of Jeddah on 7 April 97 where [REDACTED] of the [REDACTED] requested that his account, number [REDACTED] be debited by \$17,740. The beneficiary was listed as [REDACTED] Bank Central Asia, KOU Mtraman, Jakarta, Indonesia, Account number [REDACTED] (last digit not certain), telephone number [REDACTED]. The same telex application contained the following information: applicant name: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

A deposit slip dated 11 September 1997 showing a deposit of 66643 Saudi Riyals was found for this account. The depositor [REDACTED] LNU, and the word "Indonesia" was written on the deposit slip.

15. Bank Al-Jazira account number [REDACTED] transferred 5,000,000 pesetas (approximately \$31,959 USD) from this account on 23 August 1999 to Proyectos y Promociones in Spain.

Individuals/Entities

Also found in the seized evidence were ledgers and various documents listing out "investors" and other individuals located in Saudi Arabia who were sending money [REDACTED]. The following is a list of some of the individuals and companies who sent money [REDACTED]. It is requested that any available information be provided on these individuals and entities.

1. [REDACTED]

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2. Mowafak T. Almulhem Est. - listed as one of [redacted] investors.
3. Eba House Trading Est. - listed as one of [redacted] investors.
4. Alebah House Trading Est. - listed as one of [redacted] investors.
5. [redacted] - listed as one of [redacted] investors.
6. [redacted] - listed as one of [redacted] investors.
7. [redacted] - listed as one of [redacted] investors.
8. [redacted] - listed as one of [redacted] investors.
9. [redacted] - listed as one of [redacted] investors.
10. [redacted] - listed as one of [redacted] investors.
11. [redacted] - listed as one of [redacted] investors.
12. Al-Waqf Foundation - listed as one of [redacted] investors.
13. [redacted] - it is believed that he sent 10 million Spanish pesetas (approximately \$57,315 USD) to [redacted] on 3 July 2000 through Al Rajhi Banking & Investment Company.
14. [redacted] She received \$100,000 USD from [redacted] through Al Rajhi Banking & Investment Corporation in 1993.
15. [redacted] - made capital loan investments in [redacted]
16. [redacted] - made capital loan investments in [redacted]
17. [redacted] - made capital loan investments in [redacted]
18. [redacted] - made capital loan investments in [redacted]

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19. [redacted] - made capital loan investments in [redacted]
20. [redacted] - made capital loan investments in [redacted]
21. [redacted] - made capital loan investments in [redacted]
22. [redacted] - made capital loan investments in [redacted]
23. [redacted] - made capital loan investments in [redacted]
24. [redacted] - made capital loan investments in [redacted]
25. [redacted] - made capital loan investments in [redacted]
26. [redacted] - made capital loan investments in [redacted]
27. [redacted] - made capital loan investments in [redacted]
28. [redacted] - made capital loan investments in [redacted]
29. [redacted] - made capital loan investments in [redacted]
30. [redacted] - made capital loan investments in [redacted]
31. [redacted] - made capital loan investments in [redacted]
32. [redacted] - made capital loan investments in [redacted]
33. [redacted] - made capital loan investments in [redacted]
34. [redacted] - made capital loan investments in [redacted]

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35. [redacted] made capital loan investments in [redacted]

36. [redacted] made capital loan investments in [redacted]

37. [redacted] dental clinic is associated with [redacted] and bank accounts for [redacted] possessions.

38. [redacted] hairdresser shop is associated with [redacted]

39. [redacted] entered into an agreement [redacted] to purchase some land in Madrid. The land was valued at 382 million Spanish pesetas. Apparently the deal was not completed.

40. [redacted] invested in one of [redacted] businesses in Madrid.

Businesses

41. [redacted]

42. [redacted]

43. [redacted]

Telephone Numbers

These are some of the telephone numbers which [redacted] contacted and for which we need subscriber information. It is requested that subscriber information be provided for the numbers listed below.

[redacted] made calls from his cellular telephone to this number.
Possible subscriber [redacted]

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FD-302 (Rev. 10-6-95)

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TO 1006600, DATED 3/22/06 - 1 -

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 9/9/98

The following is a combined report of interviews with Mohammad Rashed Daoud Al-Owhali (hereafter referred to as subject), a male citizen of Saudi Arabia that were conducted over a four day period between 22 to 25 Aug 98 at the CID Headquarters in Nairobi, Kenya. Present at the interviews were FBI Special Agents [redacted] FBI language specialist [redacted] as an interpreter and CID investigators [redacted]. Also present during certain segments of these interviews was Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA) Pat Fitzgerald. During these interviews, the interpreter translated to subject in subject's native language without any difficulties in dialects or any other language problems. Throughout these interviews subject appeared to be in good health, well rested and in good spirits. Subject was examined by medical personnel from the FBI on several occasions and received treatment for the wounds he had obtained during the bombing of the embassy. Subject made no complaints as to his treatment while being detained by the Kenyans. It should also be noted that during these interviews subject received food and water on a regular basis as well as snacks when he requested them. Subject also made frequent requests throughout each day to pray and was given every opportunity to do so. A written form prepared by AUSA Pat Fitzgerald was presented to the subject. This form provided subject with his full Miranda rights and advised that it did not promise him that he would be tried in the United States (US), but that AUSA Fitzgerald would make recommendations to the Attorney General for subject to stand trial in the US. Upon being presented with this form, subject signed it and agreed to waive his Miranda rights and tell all he knew about the bombing of the US Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya on 7 Aug 98. At the beginning of each separate interview, subject was presented with the form explaining his Miranda rights and each time subject agreed to waive these rights. The above mentioned form is attached to this FD-302. This report is separated into the following five parts: 1. Background Information; 2. Training in Afghanistan; 3. Planning and Preparation; 4. Day of the Bombing; and 5. Additional Information:

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262-NY-277013 - R

Investigation on 8/22-25/98 at Nairobi, KenyaFile # 262-NY-267856Date dictated 8/28/98

SEARCHED	INDEXED
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JUN 20 2001	
FBI - BQ	

by SA [redacted]

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TO 1006600, DATED 3/29/06

FD-302 (Rev. 10-6-95)

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 5/11/95

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On 4/13/95, SA's [redacted]
[redacted] conducted an interview of ABDUL HAKIM ALI, AKA ABDUL
HAKIM ALI HASHEM MURAD. MURAD was interviewed as he was being
transported from Manila, Philippines to New York as a result of a
sealed indictment issued by the United States Federal District
Court for the Southern District of New York. The indictment of
MURAD [redacted]
[redacted] was advised of the identities
of the interviewing agents and the purpose of the interview.

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Investigation on 4/12-13/95 at Aircraft in Flight 265A-NY-252802
File #
by SA [redacted] FBI Date dictated 4/19/95
SA [redacted] FBI

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TO 1006600, DATED
3/23/06

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 10/03/2001

NASSER AHMAD NASSER AL-BAHRI, a.k.a. ABU JANDAL, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] born in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia
in 1973 of Yemeni parents, [REDACTED] was
interviewed in the presence of PSO [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] at the Political Security Organization (PSO)
Headquarters in Sana'a, Yemen by Special Agent [REDACTED]
(FBI) and Special Agent [REDACTED] Naval Criminal
Investigative Service (NCIS).

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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Investigation on 9/17-10/2/01 at Sana'a, Yemen

File # 262-NY-277013-302 -57

Date dictated 10/03/2001

SA [REDACTED] /AHS/ahs
by SA [REDACTED] /NCIS

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10/04/2002

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Between September 12, and October 5, 2002, a continuing debriefing was conducted of Ahmad Adeb Ahmad Ahmad while incarcerated at the Alexandria Detention Center, Alexandria, Virginia by SA [REDACTED] and SSA [REDACTED] Dept. of State, DSS. [REDACTED] was present during all debriefings, as was AUSA Neil Hammerstrom. SSA [REDACTED] was present during the initial phase of the debriefing but was not present on October 3 or October 5.

[REDACTED]

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Case ID : 315N-NY-280350-302

Serial : 117841

ACS REQ 10-6-03

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09/23/1999

On September 16, 1999, Special Agents (SAs) [redacted]
[redacted] Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), [redacted]
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Criminal Investigation Division,
[redacted] United States Postal Inspection Service (USPS), and
[redacted] United States Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS), met with a source who has proven reliable in the
past. The source, who is not in a position to testify on this
matter, provided the following information:

Source stated that [redacted]

[redacted]
service based out of his residence [redacted]
(possibly apartment [redacted]) The name of
the business is called [redacted] " which is translated to mean
[redacted] Source stated that [redacted]

Source stated that Somalia is divided into three (3)
regions: Somaliland (northern region), Somalia (southern region)
and Bootyland (phonetic, northeast region). Source stated that
Somaliland is a highly developed and industrialized region of
Somalia, and the tribal warfare is occurring in the southern region
known as Somalia.

Source stated that [redacted]

Source stated that [redacted] contact with

Source stated that [redacted]

Source stated

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that [redacted] are under surveillance.
Source stated that [redacted]

[redacted]

Source stated that he/she was provided a copy of the INS communication [redacted] The Horn of Africa in San Diego, California. Source stated that [redacted] The Horn of Africa are affiliated with the "non-fundamentalist" group.

Source has become aware that "all" of the Somali food stores in the San Diego area, and an Arab food store located on 45th Street in El Cajon, are involved in a fraud involving EBT cards (food stamp vouchers). Source stated that individuals with EBT cards can enter these businesses and obtain cash from their cards. Source stated that no food purchase is required by the owners and employees of the businesses. Source stated that the businesses will provide the card holders with cash, and then charge a fee for the service.

Source was shown a color copy of a California Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) photograph [redacted] with the name and identifiers covered and unreadable. Source was unable to identify the individual pictured, but stated that he looks similar to [redacted] when he came from Africa.

Source was shown a color copy of a DMV photograph of [redacted] with the name and identifiers covered and unreadable. Source was unable to identify the individual pictured.

Source was shown a black and white copy of a DMV photograph of [redacted] with the name and identifiers covered and unreadable. Source stated that the face of the individual pictured was familiar, but was unable to recall his name. Source further recalled having observed the individual at a Somali restaurant near Mid-City Nutrition.

Source was shown a color copy of a DMV photograph for [redacted] with the name and identifiers covered and unreadable. Source was unable to identify the individual pictured.

Source was asked by SA [redacted] if the name of [redacted] The source responded by stating that he/she recalled that the name of the [redacted] In previous contacts the source has provided information that [redacted]

Source was asked by SA [redacted] if he/she could provide any information regarding the Paradise Health Center, located at 3400 E. 8th Street, Suite #207, National City, California, [redacted] The source was unable to provide any information.

Source stated that he/she has been acquainted [redacted]


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Source was asked if he/she could provide any information regarding [redacted] Miracle Publications Company. The source was unable to provide any information.

Source was asked if he/she could provide any information regarding [redacted] the Somali Community Center. Source stated that [redacted] obtained [redacted] degree in England before coming to the U.S. Source is aware that [redacted] has in the past applied for the position [redacted] [redacted] with the San Diego Police Department. Source is aware that [redacted] is currently employed [redacted] [redacted] with the Urban League.

Source provided the following names and associated license plate numbers:

1. [redacted]
2. [redacted]

A check of DMV computerized records indicated that California license plate number [redacted] is assigned to a 1988 Dodge, registered to [redacted]
[redacted]

A check of the Lexis Nexis computer database for Amana Foundation provided information that [redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]

A check of DMV computerized records indicated that California license plate number [redacted] is assigned to a 1993 Ford, registered to [redacted]
[redacted] The DMV check further indicated that this vehicle was recently impounded.

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Page 1

06/10/2002

EYAD MAHMOUD MOHAMMED MOUSTAFA ALRABABAH was interviewed at the Alexandria County Jail, Alexandria, Virginia (VA). Present during the interview was [REDACTED]. Prior to any questioning, ALRABABAH was advised of the nature of the interview and the identity of the interviewing agents. He was then provided with a Proffer Agreement letter on behalf of the UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S OFFICE (USAO) for the Eastern District of Virginia (EDVA). The letter explained the rules and agreements of the proffer session, which ALRABABAH acknowledged he understood and he and his attorney signed. Also present during the interviews were Special Agent (SA) [REDACTED] New York Office (NYO) and SA [REDACTED] Washington Field Office (WFO) of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

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Case ID : 315N-NY-280350-302

Serial : 117182

ACS REQ 10-21-03

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TO 1006600, DATED 2/23/06 -1-

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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Date of transcription 04/09/2004

On 04/07/2004, FUAD OMAR BAZARAH, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] was interviewed in his residence. After being
advised of the identities of the interviewing agents and the
purpose of the interview, BAZARAH provided the following
information:

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] That photograph is contained in the 1A
section of the file.

[REDACTED]

Investigation on 04/07/2004 at Upland, California

File # 315N-NY-280350-302

Date dictated 04/09/2004

by SA [REDACTED] SA [REDACTED]:amz

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IVAN CHIRIVELLA,

_____ was telephonically interviewed. CHIRIVELLA was advised of the identity of the interviewing agent and the purpose of the interview. He then provided the following information:

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by SA [redacted] : lmb

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10/06/2001

Reference Newark Lead Control Number [REDACTED]

JIMI NOURI, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] was interviewed at the FBI, Newark, Garret Mountain
Resident Agency, West Paterson, New Jersey. After being advised
of the identities of the interviewing agents and the nature of
the interview, NOURI provided the following information:

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

Case ID : 315N-NY-280350-302

Serial : 58885

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- 1 -

Date of transcription 09/15/2001

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On September 15, 2001, at approximately 1:30 P.M. Khaled Alkayed (also spelled Al-Kayed), [REDACTED] was interviewed by Special Agent (SA) [REDACTED] Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Khaled Alkayed (hereafter Alkayed) provided SA [REDACTED] with information during an interview on September 14, 2001 (details of which are incorporated in a separate FD-302). In addition to [REDACTED] Skywest, a commuter airline. [REDACTED] Aware of the identity of the interviewing agent and the nature of the follow up interview, Alkayed provided the following information:

Date dictated

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60309AUCTAM/MLT CLS DDP
TO 1006600, DATED 3/29/06

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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Date of transcription 01/31/2001

FAHD MOHAMMED AHMAD AL-QUSO, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] student of religious studies, single, was interviewed at the Political Security Organization (PSO) headquarters for Aden and Abyan in the City of Aden, Yemen. Also present were Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) Special Agent [REDACTED] and Ministry of Interior (MOI) investigators [REDACTED] along with the Yemen Political Security Organization (PSO) [REDACTED] [REDACTED] Presidential Security Office, was present for a portion of the interviews.

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The interviews were conducted by the interviewing agents in Arabic.

[REDACTED]

Investigation on 01/27-31/2001 at Aden, Yemen

File #

Date dictated 01/31/2001

by

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RAMEZ TAWFIK NOAMAN, male, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] was
interviewed in the United States Courthouse for the Southern District
of New York. Also present during this interview were Christopher
Morvillo and Robin Baker, Assistant United States Attorneys for the
Southern District of New York, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] NOAMAN was advised of the identities of the interviewing
agents and the purpose of the interview.

[REDACTED] the offer of a translator and agreed to
proceed with the interview in English. [REDACTED] was advised that it is
a federal crime to lie or to make false statements to federal
officials. [REDACTED] he understood his rights and he
thereafter provided the following information.

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

09/28/2001 New York, New York

265A-NY-280350-302

10/01/2001

SA [REDACTED]/jm

SA [REDACTED]

MISC REQ. #41

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265A-NY-280350-302

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[REDACTED]

09/28/2001

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[REDACTED]

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
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1006600, DATED 3/22/06

#126
MOHAMED SADIQ ODEH was interviewed at Nairobi, Kenya, from August 15, 1998, through August 28, 1998. Also present during these interviews were investigators of the Kenyan Criminal Investigation Division (CID) and, at times, Assistant United States Attorney PATRICK FITZGERALD. ODEH was advised of the identities of the interviewing agents and was advised that he had certain rights. ODEH was asked if he understood English enough to comprehend his rights and to answer questions if he chose to. ODEH responded that he was comfortable speaking English and would ask questions if he did not understand his rights or anything investigators should say.



Case ID : 315N-NY-267856-302

Serial : 1144

315N-NY-267856-S-1

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ACS REQ 12-29-03 (sg)

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3/7/06



U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

#129

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

July 18, 2003

Allegations of Al Qaeda Trafficking in Conflict Diamonds

Executive Summary

In November 2001, the Washington Post initiated a series of articles linking the al Qaeda terrorist network to diamond trafficking in West Africa. According to the media reporting, al Qaeda operatives, using aliases and based in Monrovia, Liberia, reaped millions of dollars from 1999 to 2001 through the sale of diamonds mined by the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). Reporting on this issue continues amid the current crisis in Liberia.

The FBI's Terrorist Financing Operations Section (TFOS), in concert with other agencies, has endeavored to determine the validity of these allegations. FBI efforts consisted of investigation in the U.S. and several foreign countries including Ghana, Belgium, Sierra Leone, and Burkina Faso. During this comprehensive investigation, more than 25 individuals ranging from former high-ranking RUF rebels to diamond dealers responsible for exporting an estimated 80% of the diamonds mined in Sierra Leone were interviewed. None of the individuals interviewed were aware of any al Qaeda diamond buying from the RUF-controlled areas as alleged by the media.

Several countries also conducted investigation into al Qaeda's alleged diamond trafficking activities in West Africa. TFOS met with several law enforcement and intelligence officials from various countries mentioned in the media reports. Based on the results of their independent investigations, these officials found that al Qaeda fugitives were not involved with the trafficking of conflict diamonds from Sierra Leone. The Belgian Federal Police investigated and are aiding the prosecution of a weapons for diamonds transaction involving the parties the media contends dealt with al Qaeda. The witnesses to this investigation denied that al Qaeda's operatives were involved with diamond trafficking in the region during 2000 through 2001. Furthermore, numerous witnesses have identified the alleged al Qaeda aliases as actual individuals from Senegal involved in the diamond trade of West Africa.

Lastly, the FBI, and others in the U.S. Intelligence Community, have interrogated numerous detainees believed to have significant financial knowledge of al Qaeda finances. These detainees specifically denied that al Qaeda used diamonds as a funding mechanism to support terrorism.

Allegations Relating to al Qaeda's Trafficking in Conflict Diamonds

In November 2001, the Washington Post initiated a series of articles linking the al Qaeda terrorist network to rough diamond trafficking in the war-torn West African country of Sierra Leone. These articles quoted several unidentified U.S. and European intelligence officials as well as unidentified sources who allegedly had direct knowledge that al Qaeda reaped millions of dollars, from 1999 to 2001, from the sale of diamonds mined by the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), the rebel army of Sierra Leone. According to the media reports, Aziz Nassour, Samih Ossaily, and Ibrahim Bah, acted as conduits for an extensive pre-9/11 diamond buying operation by al Qaeda operatives Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani and Fazul Abdullah Mohammed, who were using aliases. This allegedly resulted in the purchase of 20 million dollars in gems by al Qaeda operatives. The media reports also claimed that the Presidents of Liberia and Burkina Faso were paid bribes to assist and serve as hosts for the al Qaeda terrorists during their diamond buying operation.

Since the initial Washington Post report, several other media sources, including the BBC and the NGO Global Witness, have published or aired additional reports regarding this alleged al Qaeda/conflict diamond connection. Several of these reporters and organizations have interconnected relationships and have extensively shared sources and materials on this topic.

On April 17, 2003, Global Witness, a London based NGO, published ninety-nine page report entitled: "For a Few Dollar\$ More - How al Qaeda moved into the diamond trade." This report followed the initial reporting by the Washington Post but added more in-depth background and details, along with supporting documents. This report's principal author and investigator, Alex Yearsley, told the FBI that his intent for this report was to draw attention to the conflict diamond crisis in West Africa and thus, push forward the Kimberly Process.¹

Even as recent as July 4, 2003, the Washington Post continued its original reporting stating that "[Liberian President Charles] Taylor sold some of the [conflict] diamonds to al Qaeda in 2000 and 2001 as the terrorist organization moved its cash to commodities in advance of the Sept. 11 attacks, according to a year-long investigation by European law enforcement agencies."

¹ The Kimberly Process is a multi-nation agreement that requires certifications for the legitimate trading of diamonds in an attempt to end the funding of rebel groups through the international smuggling of the gems.

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Primary Allegations Under Investigation

In order to determine the validity of the allegations that have become so prevalent in the media's reporting of West Africa and al Qaeda's alternative financing operations, the FBI set forth to conduct an in depth investigation related specifically to the following predominant allegations:

(1) [REDACTED] (all East African embassy bombing fugitives) spent time in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Burkina Faso, during different periods from September 1998 through 2001, in order to purchase diamonds from the RUF rebels; and

(2) that these al Qaeda operatives entered the rough diamond trade and cornered the West African diamond market in Antwerp, Brussels, during the summer of 2001, in an attempt to thwart anticipated law enforcement efforts in the wake of the attacks which were to occur on 9/11/2001.

While the FBI focused its efforts on fully examining the leads related to the above listed allegations, significant overlap existed to allow for further examination into the potential terrorist exploitation of the West African region as well as the use of the particular resource, diamonds, to fund terrorist operations. This investigation covered not only interviews of those most knowledgeable with the diamond trade in the region during the relevant time period, but also obtained information from those responsible with enforcing the laws and maintaining the intelligence base for the regions affected by diamond trafficking and terrorist activity. Furthermore, the FBI interviewed or directed questions to detainees knowledgeable with al Qaeda's finances.

Overview of FBI Efforts


The FBI's Terrorist Financing Operations Section (TFOS), in concert with other agencies, has endeavored to determine the validity of these allegations. FBI efforts consisted of investigation in the U.S. and several foreign countries including Ghana, Belgium, Sierra Leone, and Burkina Faso. This comprehensive investigation included over 25 interviews - ranging from former high-ranking RUF rebels to diamond dealers responsible for exporting an estimated 80% of the diamonds mined in Sierra Leone. Also included in this investigation were over a dozen meetings with various law enforcement and intelligence officials. The FBI/TFOS and others in the U.S. Intelligence Community, have interrogated numerous detainees believed to have significant financial knowledge of al Qaeda finances. These detainees specifically denied that al Qaeda used diamonds as a funding mechanism to support terrorism.

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In conjunction with this investigation the FBI created a matrix addressing each of the specific allegations involving al Qaeda's involvement in conflict diamond trafficking made by the media. The results of this matrix are consistent with this LHM.

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
FBI Interview [REDACTED]

Another unidentified source used by the media to support the alleged al Qaeda/conflict diamond nexus was determined to be [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] was interviewed by the FBI and detailed [REDACTED] and others in buying diamonds from the Kono Region of Sierra Leone. [REDACTED]



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


FBI/TFOS Travel to Freetown and Kono, Sierra Leone

On June 6, 2003, FBI/TFOS traveled to the Kono diamond field region of Sierra Leone where, according to media reports, al Qaeda fugitives Ahmed Ghailani and Fazul Mohammed traveled in late December 2000-January 2001. These al Qaeda fugitives allegedly stayed at Small Lebanon, the residence/office of RUF Ground Commander Issa Sesay, for several days during this period and remained in the Kono area for three weeks. FBI/TFOS visited Small Lebanon and other areas around the Kono region, including the main diamond mining area.

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While in the region, FBI/TFOS interviewed a former RUF Commander in charge of Kono; the RUF liaison officer in charge of all passes for visitors; and a Sierra Leone government intelligence officer, all of whom were in the area and had visited Sesay at Small Lebanon on an almost daily basis during the relevant time period. They stated that they would have known if foreigners were ever at Small Lebanon or in the Kono region. They all advised that they were unaware that any white, Middle Eastern, or East Africans were ever present at Small Lebanon or in the Kono area. They were shown a photo spread containing photographs of al Qaeda fugitives Ahmed



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Ghailani, Fazul Mohammed, and Sheikh Ahmed Salim Sweden. None of the individuals shown the photo spreads were able to identify the al Qaeda operatives.

Also interviewed during this trip was [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] was aware of diamond transactions occurring at Small Lebanon, he did not recognize any of the al Qaeda members in the photo spread.

FBI/TFOS Interview of [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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Alleged Special Forces Team Operation

The Washington Post quotes unidentified U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency officials as monitoring Ahmed Ghailani and Fazul Mohammed in Western Africa in the weeks following 9/11. According to media reports, the Pentagon had a Special Forces team in neighboring Guinea ready to snatch these al Qaeda fugitives. However, the FBI met with DOD officials in Washington and the Defense Intelligence Attache in Freetown, Sierra Leone, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] These meetings revealed that this allegation was false. [REDACTED] while a group of U.S. Special Forces were in Guinea during that period training with their host country counterparts, these U.S. forces were not attempting to apprehend any al Qaeda fugitives.

FBI Travel to Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso

According to media reports, prior to March 2001 and again from July 2001 through the summer of 2002, al Qaeda fugitives, Ahmed Ghailani and Fazul Mohammed, stayed in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, under the protection of President Blaise Campaore. During these extended periods, the al Qaeda fugitives allegedly stayed at the government's official guest house known as the "Maison des Hotes." Allegations cite European intelligence reports stating that the al Qaeda fugitives moved between a protected area in Liberia and Maison des Hotes in the district of Zone du Bois, further described as the Presidential compound in Burkina Faso, and remained there for at least two months after 9/11.

On June 13, 2003, TFOS/FBI inspected the facilities of the Maison des Hotes at Zone du Bois, as well as the bungalow complex located next door. The Maison des Hotes is not part of the presidential compound as alleged by media reports; it is several miles away. The Maison des Hotes is a simple three bedroom residence, while the adjacent bungalows are six, one-room units. TFOS/FBI interviewed the two Chefs, the Facilities Manager, and the Commanding Officer of the Presidential Security Detail in charge of the Maison des Hotes and the adjacent bungalow complex. All were employed in their respective positions at the time of the alleged visits of al Qaeda fugitives Ahmed Ghailani and Fazul Mohammed. They were shown photo spreads that included photographs of Ahmed Ghailani and Fazul Mohammed and were unable to identify either man. None of those interviewed had any knowledge of Middle Easterners or East Africans staying at Maison des Hotes or nearby facilities during the relevant time period.

The FBI also met with [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] who was aware of the various allegations related to al Qaeda's presence in Burkina Faso. He advised that he and his

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security forces were completely surprised by the various articles and have spent considerable time and effort to determine if there was an al Qaeda presence in the country. [REDACTED] was convinced that the media allegations that fugitives Ahmed Ghailani and Fazul Mohammed were hosted by President Campaore or staying as guests at the Maison des Hotes were false. However, he added that Burkina Faso could not guarantee that al Qaeda operatives have never discreetly passed through the country.

Evaluation of Allegations Related to al Qaeda's Involvement in Diamond Trafficking in West Africa

The FBI has conducted a comprehensive investigation into this matter. Investigative results do not support the media allegations that al Qaeda fugitives Abdullah Ahmed Abdullah, Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani, and Fazul Mohammed engaged in a diamond buying operation in West Africa.

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] This in-depth investigation revealed that the individuals involved in Nassour's West African diamond trafficking operation during 2000 and 2001, with the exception [REDACTED] provided consistent details of all aspects of the operation, while specifically denying the involvement of the al Qaeda fugitives [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] the FBI's investigation further determined that Mohammad D. Keneme and Soulemani M. Guessen were not aliases used by Ahmed Ghailani and Fazul Mohammed, but rather they were true names of actual diamond traders from Senegal employed by Aziz Nassour. Several witnesses involved in Nassour's operation, who knew the two Senegalese men, viewed photographs of Ahmed Ghailani and Fazul Mohammed, and stated that they were not photographs of Mohammad D. Keneme and Soulemani M. Guessen.

Additionally, investigation into the allegations that Ahmed Ghailani and Fazul Mohammed were guests at Burkina Faso's official guest house, Maison des Hotes, for at least two months after 9/11, met with similar negative results.

Furthermore, the allegations that the U.S. readied a Special Forces team to snatch Ahmed Ghailani and Fazul Mohammed in Western Africa in the weeks following 9/11 were determined to be false.

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The July 4, 2003, reporting by the Washington Post alleging that a year-long investigation by European law enforcement agencies revealed that Charles Taylor sold diamonds to al Qaeda in 2000 and 2001, is questionable. The FBI has conferred with FBI's Legal Attaches, the U.S. State Department, other U.S. agencies, and several of our foreign law enforcement counterparts in order to determine the source of this information. Based on this search, the only European law enforcement agency that has conducted a year-long investigation into this issue is the BFP and they specifically deny having developed any evidence to suggest al Qaeda's involvement in purchasing diamonds from Charles Taylor or the region.

The extensive investigation conducted by the FBI in this matter contradicts the allegations raised by the various media and Global Witness reports. Based on the investigation conducted by the BFP, the media allegations detailing Nassour's involvement with diamond trafficking in exchange for weapons and equipment to the RUF is accurate; however, there is no evidence to support the allegations that al Qaeda operatives were involved in this operation.

The witness identifications of al Qaeda fugitives were made after 9/11. Furthermore, with the exception [redacted] only two witnesses identified al Qaeda fugitives as being involved in diamond trafficking in West Africa. The senior RUF official's initial identification was made only after the U.N. Special Court's investigators showed the witness an FBI Most Wanted Terrorist poster, not a traditional law enforcement photo spread. [redacted] identification was after he claimed he viewed the FBI's Most Wanted Poster on the Internet. Even though the two witnesses, [redacted] the former senior RUF official, were involved in the same diamond trafficking operations during the same time frame, they identified different al Qaeda fugitives. Both witnesses based their identification on a one-time sighting of the individuals they later thought were al Qaeda fugitives. These witnesses did not have any further information concerning the individuals they saw and they were not aware if they purchased diamonds. Based on the investigation conducted, it is believed [redacted] was mistaken in his identity of the two al Qaeda fugitives [redacted] and was referring to Souley Guisse and Mouhamed Kenemi, the two Senegalese males brought in by Aziz Nassour. Conversely, the former senior RUF official denied seeing the two al Qaeda fugitives identified [redacted] but did identify a third al Qaeda fugitive Sheikh Ahmed Salim Sweden. The former RUF official met the man, he now believes to [redacted] on only one occasion, and he added that this person left Liberia without consummating any diamond deals. The former RUF official could not provide any further information, and Balde, after being shown a photograph of Sweden, denied ever seeing him. No witness confirmed seeing the al Qaeda fugitive Abdullah Ahmed Abdullah.

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FBI Investigation into Allegations that Al Qaeda Operatives Cornered the Market on Western African Diamonds

According to the Washington Post, al Qaeda "reaped millions of dollars in the past three years from the illicit sale of diamonds mined by the rebels in Sierra Leone" and al Qaeda "operatives oversaw a 20 million dollar diamond buying spree that effectively cornered the market in the region's precious stones." This activity allegedly occurred during the summer of 2001 and was used to finance terrorist operations and protect funds from law enforcement scrutiny, in anticipation that their accounts would be frozen after the 9/11 attacks. The articles claim that the al Qaeda operatives originally bought diamonds from RUF rebels at low prices seeking to resell them for large profits in Europe, but in July 2001 they changed tactics and bought far more diamonds than usual, paying premium prices for them.

On March 17, 2003, TFOS/FBI traveled to Johannesburg, South Africa, to meet with the De Beers Diamond Company's Crime Intelligence Unit regarding its knowledge of possible al Qaeda involvement with conflict diamonds. De Beers was not aware of any unusual activity in the Antwerp diamond market with regard to raw diamonds from West Africa during the summer of 2001. Furthermore, De Beers did not have any information, other than the above mentioned media reports, relating to al Qaeda's presence in West Africa.

[redacted] Diamond Investigative Unit in Antwerp, reviewed the records of Aziz Nassour's Belgian company, ASA Diam. Also examined were Samih Ossaily's extensive records seized upon his arrest. According to the BFP, ASA Diam sold 20 million dollars worth of raw diamonds in Antwerp during the first five months of 2001 and then reinvested more than 19 million dollars of these funds for the purchase of additional diamonds from West Africa.

Based on its comprehensive review of ASA DIAM financial records, [redacted] that media assertions that "[i]nvestigators say that at least 20 million dollars was withdrawn from the account, money they believe was a portion of the company's transactions linked to al Qaeda's buying activities" was false. According to [redacted] the money was not tied in any way to al Qaeda, but traced back to West Africa for the purchase of additional gems.

On December 29, 2002, Washington Post reported [redacted] the Belgian investigators say that they uncovered bank records showing that the diamond company enjoyed a sudden surge in business and turned over almost one billion dollars the year before September 11." [redacted] told the FBI that such assertions were clear exaggerations and

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estimated that ASA DIAM's business, during that time frame, was less than 25 million dollars.

[redacted] profits Aziz Nassour made trafficking conflict diamonds throughout Africa may have been transferred to Lebanon, which is believed to be his current location since fleeing Belgium.

[redacted] categorized the Washington Post's assertion that "al Qaeda operatives oversaw a 20 million dollars diamond buying spree that effectively cornered the market on the regions stones" as ridiculous. They advised that it would take much more than this, possibly billions of dollars, to corner the raw diamond market. [redacted] [redacted] that during no time in 2001 was there any drying up, abundance, or unusual activity of Western African gems in the Antwerp market.

[redacted] also advised the FBI in April 2003, that any "drying up" of Sierra Leone diamonds or later increase in amounts exported could be explained by the hoarding of the raw stones prior to the Kimberly Process becoming effective and the U.N. sanctions being lifted during this period.

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TFOS/FBI interviewed diamond exporters [redacted]

[redacted]
[redacted] They both advised that they closely monitor the West African diamond trade and did so even during the period the RUF controlled the mining areas of Kono and Tonga. They were not aware of any unusual fluctuations or "cornering" in the West African diamond market during 2001 or anything else out of the ordinary, including sales in gems in excess of one million dollars or any al Qaeda diamond purchasing in the region.

Evaluation of Allegations Related to al Qaeda Cornering the West African Diamond Trade

As a result of this investigation, the FBI has determined that there is no substance to the allegations that al Qaeda operatives purchased 20 million dollars in diamonds that cornered the market. The FBI has been in contact with other intelligence, law enforcement, and regulatory agencies in the U.S. and abroad; none have identified the diamond/gemstone trade as a significant source of funding for al Qaeda.

Possible Terrorist Group Funding Through Conflict Diamonds

Due to the high value, relatively small size, and concealable nature of diamonds, the trafficking in diamonds and other precious gems could represent a simple and essentially risk-free means of transporting assets for any terrorist organization. As such, the FBI recognizes the potential systemic vulnerabilities in the current prevention of conflict diamond trafficking, and that the region and its resources require further monitoring.

Currently there is an indication that trafficking of conflict diamonds occurring throughout Africa may be derivatively supporting the Lebanese terrorist group Hizbollah⁶ through religious-based contributions. This is based on the general understanding that Lebanese diaspora communities throughout Africa control much of the diamond trade, as well as other export-import businesses. Many of these Lebanese are Shiite-Muslims with close ties to Lebanon. As these factors are merely indicators, further monitoring of the situation is warranted.

The official diamond trade in Sierra Leone has grown from 1.4 million dollars in diamond exports in 1999, to 6.5 million dollars in 2000, 26 million dollars in 2001, 41.7 million dollars in 2002, and 33.4 million dollars during the first five months of 2003. The Sierra Leonean Police, the U.S. Embassy officials in Sierra Leone, and U.N. Special Court personnel, opined that the majority of diamonds are illegally smuggled out of the country and that the total of official and illicit diamonds exported from Sierra Leone on a yearly basis is estimated to be an amount up to 300 million dollars.

While the FBI's investigation did not show any connections between al Qaeda and the trafficking of conflict diamonds, the risk of terrorist groups using such precious stones as alternative financing methods for laundering, transporting, or profit-generating purposes remains high. Additionally, other terrorist networks may currently benefit significantly from fund raising efforts directed at those who are profiting from the diamond trade. As such, the U.S. State Department and the U.S. intelligence community, as well as their counterparts in other countries and international organizations need to be actively engaged to monitor what is occurring throughout Africa in the movement and trade of precious minerals and gems.

⁶ The FBI/TFOS team investigating this matter has noticed a common theme during the course of investigation - a confusion between the al Qaeda organization and the Hizbollah organization. Many individuals interviewed during this investigation freely interchange the terms Hizbollah and al Qaeda.

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Page 1

DATE: 05-02-2006

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REASON: 1.4 (C)

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A Note to All Readers of the Daily UBL/Radical Fundamentalist Threat Update:

The intelligence below is raw intelligence reporting and is for informational purpose only.

Investigations or other actions should not be initiated without FBIHQ authority.

The information should not be a part of any official file.

Further dissemination of this information beyond
FBI personnel must receive prior FBIHQ approval.

ITOS THREAT UPDATE WEBPAGE

DAILY UBL / RADICAL FUNDAMENTALIST THREAT UPDATE

Friday July 20, 2001

Newly Reported Threats and Incidents

The following information has not been published in previous editions of the UBL Unit / Radical Fundamentalist Unit Daily Threat Update.

1). (U) State provided the following terrorist warning to the public on 7/18/01: The United States Government has strong indications that individuals may be planning imminent terrorist actions against U.S. interests in the Arabian Peninsula. In the past, such individuals have not distinguished between official and civilian targets. As always, we take this information seriously. U.S. Government facilities remain at a heightened state of alert. American citizens in the region are urged to remain vigilant with regard to their personal security and to exercise caution. We have no further information on specific targets, timing, or method of attack. (State 125145)

Updated Threats and Incidents

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Page 3

[REDACTED]

(S)

/ [REDACTED]

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/ [REDACTED]

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(S//NF) Information provided by the U.S. Customs revealed one [REDACTED] who arrived in Seattle, WA on a flight from Amsterdam on 07/15/00. He subsequently returned to Amsterdam on 08/24/00.

(S//NF) [REDACTED] again visited the U.S arriving in Chicago on a Kuwait Airways flight on 06/28/01.

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20jul01.htm

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There is no record that this individual has departed the U.S.

[REDACTED]

(S)

(S/NF) For the record, our traces on one [REDACTED] yielded the following:

--One [REDACTED] was caught entering Ireland on a false Portuguese passport in May 99 and subsequently claimed political asylum. A former member of Al-gama'at al-Islamiya who was jailed in Egypt in 1986 [REDACTED] was wanted for questioning there in connection with a terrorism case. [REDACTED] is closely tied to senior EIJ/UBL officials in Yemen, where he lived for more than three years following his 1991 departure from Egypt.

--One [REDACTED] was arrested in January 1995 in Manila for his role in [REDACTED] plot to attack U.S. Airlines and the Pope. [REDACTED] was turned over to U.S. authorities and was placed in U.S. custody. (CIR 316/01731-01)

[REDACTED]

(S)

Other Related Intelligence

IRAN/HEZBOLLAH UNIT THREATS

No new items.

MIDDLE EAST UNIT THREATS

No new items.

DRV FROM: Multiple Sources

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Return to Threat Update List

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09/21/2001

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On September 19, 2001, Special Agents (SAs) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), in reference to
Control Number 2334, conducted an interview of ANWAR AUQALI, [REDACTED] DAL HIJRA
MOSQUE, 3331 Kaywood Drive, Falls Church, Virginia, 22041 [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] The purpose of the
interview was to glean further information [REDACTED] in regards to his
relationship with NAWAF AL-HAZMI, subject of Flight 77 which crashed into the
Pentagon. Present during the interview were [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] AUQALI provided the following
information:

[REDACTED]

Case ID : 315N-NY-280350-302
199N-WF-222852

Serial : 19639
15

ACS REQ 10-6-03

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09/16/99

On September 14, 1999, [redacted] represented by and in the company of [redacted] met with Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA) PATRICK FITZGERALD and Special Agents [redacted] in a proffer session. The session began at approximately 11:30 a.m.

[redacted] he would explain USAMA BIN LADEN's plans from 1990 forward, as background for understanding the bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi and Tanzania on August 7, 1998. [redacted] the collapse of the Somali state in 1990 inspired BIN LADEN to create a plan. [redacted] the interviewers with a diagram. BIN LADEN planned to start by taking over Yemen first, from there he would then storm Saudi Arabia. BIN LADEN began training people in Afghanistan, however, once they left Afghanistan and went back to their religious leaders, they were told that BIN LADEN's teachings were wrong, and BIN LADEN lost them. BIN LADEN then joined forces with ITTIHAD AL ISLAMI. Once the Government in Somalia fell, BIN LADEN moved to Sudan in 1991, so he could be closer to the area of his plan. BIN LADEN planned to reach Yemen through Somalia. [redacted] information from ABU HAFS in 1991. BIN LADEN, using ITTIHAD AL ISLAMI, sent Al Qaeda members to Somalia by boat. ITTIHAD AL ISLAMI, arrested ALI YOUSEF (now president of Somaliland) and put him in jail. Some of ITTIHAD AL ISLAMI wanted to kill ALI YOUSEF, some did not. The group that did not want to kill YOUSEF moved to Las Quory. After this BIN LADEN determined that Somalia was not an option. The tribe of UM RIHAN turned Somaliland into an independent Islamic state. Since BIN LADEN could not base his plan in Somaliland he decided to go to Ogaden. [redacted] not in Ogaden. According to [redacted] U.S. Cobra helicopters helped the Ethiopians and attacked ITTIHAD AL ISLAMI in Ogaden. BIN LADEN blamed the United Nations for his failure in Somalia and blamed the United States for his failure in Ogaden. In 1993, BIN LADEN decided that in order to reach his goal (of taking over Yemen & Saudi Arabia), he must wage jihad against the U.S., so he prepared Al Qaeda to attack American targets. BIN LADEN and Al Qaeda used boats to move men and supplies between Kenya and Somalia. The members of the ITTIHAD AL ISLAMI (in Somalia) established a training camp in an area of Somalia known as Howa. BIN LADEN realized that ITTIHAD AL ISLAMI was not interested in helping further his policy; they simply wanted his financial support.

In approximately 1993, BIN LADEN took another approach and he sent Al Qaeda members to Mombassa and Nairobi, Kenya. [redacted] Afghanistan from ABU HAFS who showed him the areas in Kenya on a map. [redacted] the first Al Qaeda sent to Kenya. [redacted] a member of the Shura Council,

Case ID : 265A-NY-259391-302
265A-NY-259391-I
265A-NY-259391-UU

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Page 2

which was in part responsible for security within Al Qaeda. ITTIHAD AL ISLAMI had connections with Yemeni fisherman who frequented Mombassa. BIN LADEN sent two other Al Qaeda members to Mombassa, [REDACTED] both resembled the people living in that area. Both were instructed to get married and start businesses in Mombassa. [REDACTED] a woman from the Comoros, [REDACTED] a woman from Mombassa. They first worked as laborers for a man [REDACTED]. Later [REDACTED] bought a boat for \$6,000 to work for themselves. The money for the boat was provided by ABU HAFS. [REDACTED] lived together and also opened a small store in their house. A third person, [REDACTED] (PH), an Egyptian, a.k.a. [REDACTED] was also sent to Mombassa. [REDACTED] a Kenyan woman and remained in Mombassa. [REDACTED] a Yemeni, was also in Mombassa. This is the same man SA [REDACTED] home in Nairobi in August of 1997.

[REDACTED] was sent to Nairobi, Kenya by BIN LADEN at the same time. BIN LADEN wanted to conduct an operation inside Somalia. Kenya was the ideal location because it afforded easy access into Somalia. [REDACTED] was instructed to establish a business in Nairobi which was a front for Al Qaeda. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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FD-302 (Rev. 10-6-95)

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Qualid Moncef Benomrane, [redacted]
 birth Tunis, Tunisia. [redacted]
 [redacted] was interviewed at the Santa Monica
 Jail facility, Santa Monica, Ca. Present during the interview was Los
 Angeles Police [redacted] After being
 advised of the identity of the interviewing detectives and the purpose
 of the interview, Benomrane provided the following information:

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Date dictated

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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Date of transcription 03/07/2002

Qualid Moncef Benomrane, [redacted] place
of birth Tunis, Tunisia, [redacted]
[redacted] was interviewed at the INS
detention facility located at 300 N. Los Angeles St., Los Angeles,
CA. Present during the interview was Los Angeles Police [redacted]
[redacted] After being advised of the identity of the
interviewing agent and the purpose of the interview Benomrane
provided the following information:

[redacted]

[redacted]

Currently, [redacted]
[redacted] provides often times provides [redacted]
[redacted] Additionally, [redacted] a month
for insurance. [redacted] the
corner of Wagner Ave and Centinella Ave on Wagner.

[redacted]

Investigation on 03/06/2002 at Los Angeles, CA

File # 265A-LA-280901

Date dictated _____

by SA [redacted] ct

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[redacted] was interviewed at the INS detention facility located at 300 N. Los Angeles St., Los Angeles, CA. Present during the interview was Los Angeles Police Officer [redacted]. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agent and the purpose of the interview Benomrane provided the following information:

Date dictated

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

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On 10/26/2001, SAMIR ABDOUN.

After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agents, and the nature and purpose of the interview, SAMIR ABDOUN was advised of his rights as listed on the FD-395. ABDOUN read the FD-395 and signed the waiver of rights. He was willing to talk with the interviewing agents without an attorney and voluntarily provided the following information:

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Serial : 70221
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05/15/2002

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Samir Abdoun, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] was interviewed at the Office of the United States Attorney, 800 Front Street, San Diego, California, by SA's [REDACTED] Federal Bureau of Investigation, [REDACTED] United States Immigration and Naturalization Service, (INS), and Michael Wheat, Assistant United States Attorney, (AUSA), Southern District of California. [REDACTED] was represented [REDACTED] who was also present. [REDACTED] were advised of the identities of the interviewing agents, AUSA Wheat, and the nature of the interview. Abdoun voluntarily provided the following:

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Case ID : 315N-SD-64663

Serial : 67

ACS 11/10/03

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FD-302 (Rev. 10-6-95)

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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Date of transcription 08/26/2002

Samuel G. Coombs [redacted] voluntarily appeared at the Macomb County Resident Agency (MCRA) per a pre-arranged appointment with Special Agent [redacted] New York Division. Coombs [redacted] advised of the identities of the interviewing Agents, both physically present at the MCRA and SA [redacted] telephonically. Coombs [redacted] were interviewed telephonically by SA [redacted] and provided the following voluntary information:

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[Redacted content]

Investigation on 08/21/2002 at Clinton Township, Michigan

File # 265A-NY-280350-302 265A-NY-282573

Date dictated 08/26/2002

by SA [redacted] SSRA [redacted] WJF/pas

FD-302a (Rev. 10-6-95)

265A-NY-280350-302, 265A-NY-282573

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Continuation of FD-302 of Samuel Coombs & Thomas Wallace, On 08/21/2002, Page 4



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Page 1

DATE 05-02-2006 BY
60309AUCTAM/MLT/CLS DUP
TO 1006600, DATED 3/29/06

FBI/DS Deployment - Freetown, Sierra Leone

Situation Report

As of: 2200Z 02/09/2004

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b7CActivity:

The team met with Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) [redacted] on 02/09/2004. [redacted] provided access to an SCSL protected witness, symbol number [redacted]. The team interviewed [redacted] with pertinent results, see the attached report. Subsequent to this interview, [redacted] provided the team with documents related to the investigation in Monrovia, Liberia, about which he had been interviewed on 02/08/2004. These documents, in conjunction with the results of his interview, are documented in the attached report.

[redacted] advised the team it would again not be able to interview [redacted] as it was now the rule of the SCSL that no detainees could be interviewed without the permission of their defense counsel. According to [redacted] his counsel could not be reached, but was due to arrive in Freetown on the evening of 02/16/2004. It is [redacted] belief it is unlikely [redacted] defense will allow an interview, although it is possible.

The team continues to maintain a dialog with Amembassy Monrovia to facilitate the team's travel there. **The team is in receipt of the fund site information, much appreciated.** Country clearance has been received from Amembassy Monrovia, and RSO Monrovia has advised he will have a vehicle to meet the team upon their arrival on 02/10/2004.

The team received a phone call from SA [redacted] FBI WFO, regarding the cable mentioned in the previous 02/09/2004 sitrep. SA [redacted] advised that, while she had not seen the cable, she was in the process of closing the case and did not want the team to attempt to cover the lead information provided in the cable. Therefore, the team will not conduct this investigation.

Intent:

The team, minus [redacted] will travel to Monrovia on 02/10/2004 as described in the previous 02/09/2004 sitrep. The team will make all appropriate contacts once it has arrived at Amembassy Monrovia.

[redacted] will remain in Freetown and attempt to contact [redacted] defense counsel in order to request permission to interview him. If permission is granted, an interview will be arranged as soon as possible, and may be accomplished by the Monrovia element upon their return to Freetown. If the defense counsel cannot be reached, the team does not intend to extend in Freetown for the counsel's arrival. Not only does SCSL staff not believe permission for such an interview will be granted, the team's investigation to date makes it unlikely that an interview [redacted] would be fruitful in any case.

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MISC. REQ. #57

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The team anticipates reporting from Amembassies Dakar and Kinshasa, and additional reporting from Amembassy Monrovia.

Personnel:

NSTR.

Administrative/Logistical:

It is apparent, based on DOS traffic to the team, that there is some confusion about [REDACTED] requirements at Dulles. He is not traveling due to a medical emergency, but is traveling as originally scheduled in order to be at home in time for his wife's pre-planned surgery. TL requests only that the standard expediting conducted by the Dulles RA be provided to [REDACTED] upon their arrival to avoid any confusion with BICE, and to ensure any such confusion does not interfere with [REDACTED] domestic connection. For clarity, [REDACTED] itinerary is resent below:

Depart Freetown as scheduled on 02/12/2004, arriving at Washington, Dulles via Brussels at 1530 hrs on 02/13/2004 on **United Airlines Flight 951**.

Safety/Medical:

NSTR.

// [REDACTED]

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MISC. REQ. #57

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[REDACTED] SITREP 020921S UNCLASSIFIED

Page 1

DATE 05-02-2006 BY
60309AUCTAM/MLT/CLS DUE
TO 1006600, DATED 3/29/06

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FBI/DS Deployment - Freetown, Sierra Leone

Situation Report

As of: 1300Z, 02/09/2004

Activity:

The team met with Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) [REDACTED] on 02/08/2004. [REDACTED] had returned from Monrovia, Liberia on 02/07/2004, where he had conducted investigations related to the SCSL's mandate. In the course of these investigations, [REDACTED] had interviewed several members of the staff of the Royal Hotel in Monrovia. This hotel was formerly known as the Hotel Boulevard, and was a known hangout for [REDACTED] and those with whom he conducted illicit diamond deals. In the course of these interviews, [REDACTED] displayed a page of photos of the Top 22 Terrorists taken from the FBI web site. According to [REDACTED] all parties interviewed identified [REDACTED] as individuals who had spent time in the hotel. A report on this contact will follow under separate cover pending [REDACTED] provision of documents in his possession relating to his investigation in Monrovia. [REDACTED] strongly advocated the team's travel to Monrovia, claiming "everything was in Monrovia," and that if the team chose not to travel to Monrovia, it "would not be doing its job."

[REDACTED] described the following as the investigative leads for the team he had discovered in Monrovia:

- 1) Interviewing the staff at the Royal Hotel (formerly Hotel Boulevard); Interviews at the Liberian Anti-Terrorist Unit (ATU) HQ in Batala (phonetic), Liberia. These potential interviews are based on information that the individuals identified by the Royal Hotel staff as [REDACTED] may have traveled to the ATU HQ. Before the team conducts any investigation into this matter, the lead information will be confirmed and more specifics garnered. RSO Monrovia will then be consulted on the feasibility of travel to, and interviews in, the ATU compound; and,
- 1) To locate and interview [REDACTED] if possible. [REDACTED] is described as [REDACTED] the CHARLES TAYLOR regime who leased a Boeing 737 aircraft for TAYLOR to use as his "presidential aircraft." [REDACTED] is reportedly now the Liberian Ambassador at Large for the Ivory Coast. According to [REDACTED] is an associate [REDACTED] and used the 737 to transport a number of Lebanese diamond traders into and out of Monrovia. At this time, even given the above is factual, the team sees very little connection between [REDACTED] and its investigation. However, any information regarding [REDACTED] available to the team while in Monrovia will be investigated and reported.

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MISC. REQ. #57

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The team met briefly with [REDACTED] during the evening of 02/08/2004. [REDACTED] was briefed on the team's meeting with [REDACTED] and the team's belief it was necessary to travel to Monrovia in light of [REDACTED] information and allegations. [REDACTED] concurred and advised he would make contact with his counterpart in Monrovia to facilitate the team's anticipated travel. Additionally, [REDACTED] provided the team with a classified cable from the Defense Attaché's Office (DAO) in Conakry, Guinea, Unclass Serial: IIR 6 839 0038 04, Unclass Subject: Details on the 1992 Murder of the Catholic Nuns, see **Intent** below.

The team continues to maintain a dialog with Amembassy Monrovia to facilitate the team's travel there. The country clearance cable was sent out on 02/08/2004 from Amembassy Freetown to Amembassy Monrovia, naming [REDACTED] as travelers, see **Personnel** below. The team is in receipt of LEGAT BONNER's email regarding DCI concurrence for travel to Monrovia and will comply.

Intent:

The team, minus [REDACTED] intends to travel to Monrovia, Liberia on 02/10/2004 to conduct logical investigation of the leads provided by [REDACTED]. Transportation will be provided by a regularly scheduled U.N. World Food Program (WFP) fixed wing flight from Freetown to Monrovia, as arranged by the SCSL. The team would then return to Freetown via the same aircraft on 02/14/2004. Due to the current status of the U.S. mission in Liberia, if the team completes all logical investigation in Monrovia prior to 02/14/2004, the team may make alternate plans to return to Freetown earlier. Flight arrangements for [REDACTED] to return to the U.S. are being negotiated, and the team will require a fund site in order to complete these arrangements. Flight arrangements for [REDACTED] remained unchanged, see **Administrative/Logistical** below.

The team anticipates possibly interviewing [REDACTED] and another SCSL confidential witness on 02/09/2004. Reports on these interviews, if they occur, will follow under separate cover.

Based on the content of the aforementioned DAO Conakry cable, the team will contact case agent for the captioned matter, SA [REDACTED] FBI WFO, to determine whether she would like the team to pursue the lead in Monrovia, if possible. If [REDACTED] concurs, the team will coordinate with RSO Monrovia to conduct the appropriate investigation while on the ground.

The team anticipates reporting from Amembassies Dakar and Kinshasa, and additional reporting from Amembassy Monrovia.

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MISC. REQ. #57

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[REDACTED] SITREP - 02092

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b6
b7cPersonnel:

As discussed with D/UC [REDACTED] on 02/08/2004, [REDACTED] will travel to Monrovia to conduct logical investigation as described supra. [REDACTED] will remain in Freetown to finalize any investigative issues with the SCSL and will then depart as previously scheduled on 02/12/2004. TL believes this will effectively cover all aspects of the investigation while dramatically reducing the logistical burden of moving personnel to and from Monrovia, lodging them and ensuring their safety while in Monrovia, and arranging for their travel back to the U.S. Additionally, [REDACTED] the week of 02/16/2004, and leaving his itinerary unchanged will ensure he is available to his family during this time.

Administrative/Logistical:

As described supra, the members of the team traveling to Monrovia will do so via U.N. WFP fixed wing aircraft as arranged through the SCSL. While in Monrovia, RSO Monrovia has arranged for the team to be housed on the embassy compound, as required by current embassy rules. RSO Monrovia advised a vehicle and driver would likely be available for the team during their stay. Approval to travel away from the embassy will be negotiated on an as needed basis as the investigation requires. Security arrangements for the team's travel will also be negotiated as needed. While the RSO is required to stay on or near the compound, and therefore would be unavailable to travel with the team, he can provide SPE for the team members, as required. The team will advise of itineraries for [REDACTED] as they become available.

[REDACTED] will depart Freetown as scheduled on 02/12/2004, arriving at Washington, Dulles via Brussels at 1530 hrs on 02/13/2004 on United Airlines Flight 951.

Note: TL requests FT make arrangements with Dulles RA to expedite [REDACTED] through his international arrival on 02/13/2004 at Washington, Dulles in order to facilitate his domestic connection back to Detroit. [REDACTED] will make his own arrangements for transport from Dulles to his residence.

Safety/Medical:

NSTR.

[REDACTED]

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MISC. REQ. #57

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
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